National Journal - 22 November, 2011

How Should the U.S. Begin its 'Pivot' to Asia and the Pacific? - National Security Experts.

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Comments

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Col. Lang:

As you know I completely agree with your assessment. As for Prof. Brenner's comments, I am not certain what he means when he wrote "A smart strategy would never have pivoted away from the rising power that is China and the rising region that is Asia. A smart strategy can keep its mind on China even when Uncle Sam up to his neck in the godforsaken wastes of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia. " The Obama administration never deviated from its stated aims from day one regarding China. In the last two years of the second Bush administration the United States did try to engage China to accept its role as a major stakeholder in the international system.

The Obama administration continued the same policy for the first 12 months until it became clear that China would not become a partner but would likely be the most significant competitor and a potential challenger to the United States. (This realization shouldn't have been a surprise, but I suppose it's better late then never.) The United States never lost sight of China as the focus our foreign policy in this century. We tried to use "soft power" to persuade China to accept its role as a stakeholder and failed. The shift now isn't about smart power (or "soft power"), because that is not what is underpinning our allies' reactions to China's rise. It is simple "hard power" considerations that are driving East and South East Asian states. AirSea Battle didn't suddenly appear because the Obama administration had just discovered the importance of China recently. It's been in the pipeline for some time.

China wants its place in the sun now, while the United States will not cede an uncontested sphere of influence in critical maritime areas. The main problem appears to be that the PLA senior leadership hasn't accepted the lessons of Kaiserreich's naval race. Of course even Wilhelm II's blustering didn't start until he had built the High Sea Fleet while PLAN has already jumped the gun. I suspect the PLAN leadership had wrongly assumed that the United States would not compete in Asia which is understandable back in 2004. And before anyone starts to accuse the US of yet another round of imperialism, I would remind others to look at the behavior of SE and East Asian states in the last three years (in particular Japan).

[Fred]

"it became clear that China would not become a partner but would likely be the most significant competitor and a potential challenger to the United States."

Someone should remind the 1% since they are fueling China's rise with the continued outsourcing of manufacturing capability and subsequent loss of intellectual property.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I gather that by "stake holder" and "partner" you mean suborning of Chinese interests to those of US?

Isn't that expectation somewhat unrealistic – a fantasy?

I mean, why should the Chinese do so?

Napoleon: "A dragon is sleeping in the East, do not wake it up."

[Norbert M Salamon]

You, Fred, hit the hail on the head:
the most pervasive real - as opposed to imagery, enemy of the United Staes of America both in the field of Constitutional Law [patriot act, wiretapping, etc] and economy resides in the power of the top 1% and their servants on K Street, who corrupt the political leadership of this once great nation.

[walrus]

Well better late than never I guess.

There are a number of issues that have to be dealt with around here otherwise everything West of Pearl Harbor will be insecure.

1. Geography - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore are a choke point for world trade with China and Japan.

2. The worlds most populous Islamic nation, Indonesia, needs attention. Their brand of Islam is pretty easy going apart from the usual fanatics. America won kudos with its response to the Aceh earthquake and subsequent assistance in seemingly settling the insurrection in Aceh.

Indonesians generally don't like the Chinese although its about Forty years since the last round of anti Chinese riots and all Indonesian Chinese are in theory "integrated" Bumiputra.

3. The Chinese are extending their influence into the Pacific via "Aid" (bribes) to various island nations. This needs to be countered. Of particular concern is New Guinea which is heading rapidly to "Failed State" mode.

4. Then there is the entire South China Sea and the Philippines.

The latest response - stationing a small group of marines in Australia is the most that could be got away with considering our left leaning Government at present. I think I understand that this presence will be expanded as politics allow. At some stage naval units will have to follow. The U.S Air Force is already here whenever it wants to be.

[Neil Richardson]

"I gather that by "stake holder" and "partner" you mean suborning of Chinese interests to those of US?"

In some cases yes. In others no. I think we have to refrain from categorical statements. States have a wide range of interests, and horse trading is the norm in peacetime. For example, the United States would like to see China relax its strong grip on Tibet, but it just isn't high in terms of priorities (or rather it's a low intensity issue for the USG). Despite what PLAN leadership rants periodically, we are very conscientious of sensitivity of the Taiwan issue. We would not pull out our brass knucle (7th Fleet) unless we were pushed unreasonably in this area. That is why we have adopted what is termed "strategic ambiguity" regarding Taiwan. The escalator in the Third Strait Crisis was the PRC when they started to conduct missile tests and amphib exercises. However, when PLAN journals openly advocate the adoption of sea denial strategy (and all indications are they have done so), there's very little recourse the United States can take other than to prepare for a containment strategy. We are not withdrawing to Hawaii because we are a maritime nation.

Does France suborn their national interests to that of the United States? Yet the French navy hasn't declared the Med as France's own lake. And in the unlikely event that either France or Italy decided to extend their maritime EEZ to include most of the Med, you can be sure that the 6th Fleet would send a task force to quash that idea. The Monroe Doctrine wasn't enforced by the United States until the 20th century. It was the Royal Navy that did it for us. The PLAN's blustering has done nothing but drive SE and East Asian states right into the US.

"Isn't that expectation somewhat unrealistic – a fantasy?"

I'd agree it was unrealistic given China's historical path. However that was Obama's first year foreign policy meme. The United States would engage China and try to persuade (that is still ongoing for obvious reasons) rather than adopt the Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz/Feith line on China. Incidentally, Feith read the Israelis a riot act after they'd agreed to sell Phalcon AWACS to China. And to my knowledge the US did punish Israel (as much as politically possible I suppose). Understandably the Obama administration's first inclination probably was to feel out whether there could be a high order working relationship or not as there are common interest areas.

"I mean, why should the Chinese do so?"

Because they are now looking squarely at the prospect of containment (or as they call it "encirclement"). The stereotype of the Chinese leadership here in the West is that they are playing a long game. I think that's a very simplistic and dangerous notion. In some areas, yes that would match the reality. In other critical areas, they do not. The civilian leadership (especially during a succession period) and PLA do not always share the same outlook on time frame. If the Straccis were to take on the Corleone family head on, they'd better make sure they can get the other three families to support them. Otherwise, it's a slippery slope to either a humiliation or conflagration in East Asia. You can't always bluff and expect the other player to keep folding.

[Fred]

NR

"...the lessons of Kaiserreich's naval race."

I think this is a lesson many have forgotten.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I respectfully do not consider your arguments convincing.
I will start by recalling what a Chinese General is purported to have stated in a lecture to Chinese people’s Army: “They (the Americans – BM) – ultimately care more about Los Angeles than about Tai Pei.” I believe this to be a fact and it is inconceivable for me that US will go to war with China over Taiwan. And if US is not going to go to war with China over Taiwan, I cannot see any other immediate cause of friction.

In regards to France, she is a has-been global power that occupied her current perch by the indulgence of US and the Chutzpa of that great Frenchman, Charles de Gaulle. She is part of US alliance structure in which US calls the shots. And yes, France has suborned her national interests at times to US’s.

The denial of sea lanes is a two-way street. Multiple state actors can play that game. Chinese are not going to be sitting there being chocked because someone 10000 miles away has decided – for foolish domestic reasons at that – to harm China. If this is to be avoided, Chinese must be re-assured. Note that during Cold War, USSR never used gas supplies to Western Europe as an instruments of geopolitics.

I am very very skeptical of any containment strategy against China. There are 2 reasons: the potential participants in such a regime are Vietnam, Korea, Japan, India, Thailand and potentially Indonesia and Malaysia together with US and Australia.

Due to reasons of civilizational dis-affinity and inter-national dissension, and geographical disparity, I cannot see these cats being herded into a coherent anti-Chinese formation. And what is in it for them? I mean I can see Vietnam desiring closer strategic relationship with US due to the centuries of Chinese intervention and occupation of that state but India? She is hemmed in South Asia and cannot do anything to Chinese. And likewise for the rest of these states. Here is the text of Chinese Premier Wen's statement at 14th China-ASEAN Summit – read and see all the goodies that China is promising:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/18/c_131255936.htm

My second reason for being skeptical is that the fundamental economic co-depends of US and China. Neither state can truly confront the other without grievous injury and harm to itself and to its own polity. Under such a condition, talk, much less any effort, at containment is silly – in my opinion.

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Babak:

I had discussed this very topic a year ago with Professor Kiracofe and Lysander. My position remains mostly the same. In order to save the trouble of repeating the arguments, I'd refer you to this:

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2010/11/neil-richardson-commenting-on-the-national-journal-blog-item.html

"I will start by recalling what a Chinese General is purported to have stated in a lecture to Chinese people’s Army: “They (the Americans – BM) – ultimately care more about Los Angeles than about Tai Pei.” I believe this to be a fact and it is inconceivable for me that US will go to war with China over Taiwan. "

Well, if this PLA general officer were that confident about a potential US reaction (btw which one was it?), then why did the PRC back down during the Third Strait Crisis? They certainly had the ability to threaten Los Angeles and San Francisco in 1995-1996. This is called the "decoupling" of extended deterrence. The arguments have been rehashed going back to the 1950s. (In fact DeGaulle used it to justify the Force de Frappe) There is a great body of work available on this so I won't dig too deep here. Let me just say that had the Soviets believed this to be true, they'd have overrun West Berlin at some point before 1965.

Also let me make one thing clear. I believe any general war between the United States and the PRC to be mutually suicidal. However, the same held true for the Cold War as well between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"And if US is not going to go to war with China over Taiwan, I cannot see any other immediate cause of friction."

I do not believe the PLAN senior leadership shares your view despite the bluster you cited. I think you have to separate the chaff when it comes to information operation for domestic consumption. This is why the strategic ambiguity has worked for nearly forty years now. I've been told numerous times that 1995-1996 was a seminal event for the PLAN and in particular PLANAF senior leadership. If they'd truly believed what that PLA general officer said regarding LA for Taipei, they'd have called our bluff even after Independence and Nimitz CVBGs showed up at their front door unannounced.

"In regards to France, she is a has-been global power that occupied her current perch by the indulgence of US and the Chutzpa of that great Frenchman, Charles de Gaulle. She is part of US alliance structure in which US calls the shots. And yes, France has suborned her national interests at times to US’s."

I think the last sentence is the key here, and that was precisely my point in the response above. "At times" states suborn their national interest to another state. That goes for the United States as well. Given the wide range of interests, as I stated there's a lot of horse trading going on. The United States would've preferred that the French would leave Indochina. The US also would've preferred that the French didn't knock the US off the dollar gold standard. We'd have preferred that Britain would side with us on trade matters during GATT rounds, but they didn't despite our "Special Relationship." Again, I do not think it's useful to think in categorical terms.

"The denial of sea lanes is a two-way street. Multiple state actors can play that game."
Indeed. And that's the biggest worry facing the PLAN today as ROKN and JMSDF have planned substantial increases in submarine force as well as ASW capabilities.

"Chinese are not going to be sitting there being chocked because someone 10000 miles away has decided – for foolish domestic reasons at that – to harm China. If this is to be avoided, Chinese must be re-assured. Note that during Cold War, USSR never used gas supplies to Western Europe as an instruments of geopolitics."

First, I think you aren't familiar with the concepts here. Sea denial (or A2/AD) is not sea control. You are confusing the two. Second, your insinuation that the US is yet again engaging in an imperialist adventure (for domestic reasons) to harm China is wrong. This has nothing to do with domestic consumption (although the opposite is the case for the PRC). It has everything to do with realist considerations. In fact the last thing any US politician would want to do is to upset what Niall Ferguson called the Chimerica symbiosis. However we live in a world of divided state sovereignty.

Third, we have been reassuring the Chinese for thirty years by my estimation. And IMHO we should continue to do this because stability in Western Pacific is in the interest of everyone. However, I don't think you appreciate the security dynamics of East and SE Asia today. It's been over a year since I had that discussion posted above. The security arrangements have been hastened at much faster pace than even I'd believed possible then.

"I am very very skeptical of any containment strategy against China. There are 2 reasons: the potential participants in such a regime are Vietnam, Korea, Japan, India, Thailand and potentially Indonesia and Malaysia together with US and Australia. Due to reasons of civilizational dis-affinity and inter-national dissension, and geographical disparity, I cannot see these cats being herded into a coherent anti-Chinese formation. And what is in it for them? I mean I can see Vietnam desiring closer strategic relationship with US due to the centuries of Chinese intervention and occupation of that state but India? She is hemmed in South Asia and cannot do anything to Chinese. And likewise for the rest of these states. Here is the text of Chinese Premier Wen's statement at 14th China-ASEAN Summit – read and see all the goodies that China is promising"

All of this has been discussed a year ago and I'd refer you to that thread. I think you have to understand one critical matter. It's not the United States who initiated the proto-alliance formation in the last three years. It's the other way around. Japan has been reaching out to India and ROK. As an old East Asia hand, I would recommend that you take Wen's statements with a grain of salt. What's in it for these Asian states? Well, again I would caution you from transposing our perspective in their security considerations. I am not a South Asian specialist and I'd defer to others here on India. However, as you said above (and I'd agree) more than one state can play the sea denial game when it comes to the String of Pearls.

As for Japan, ROK, Taiwan and VN, well their view of the PRC is quite different from ours. We see the PRC as sometime annoyance in the past and perhaps as a potential challenger in the future. These states see the PRC as a bully. Our historical legacy in Asia is very different from that of Zhong Guo. For all the nonsense about Yankee imperialism, we didn't establish suzerainty that had lasted centuries. As I stated earlier, the East Asians have a very different view regarding the United States.

"My second reason for being skeptical is that the fundamental economic co-depends of US and China. Neither state can truly confront the other without grievous injury and harm to itself and to its own polity. Under such a condition, talk, much less any effort, at containment is silly – in my opinion. "

Again my position is clear on this. Economic considerations are very important in statecraft. However, historically they do not trump security considerations often even if it means cutting off the nose to spite the face. Before 1914 there was a high level of economic interdependence among major European states (in fact that level wasn't reached again until 1970s). Before 1939 there was a very low level of economic interdependence due to the regionalization of trading blocs. Wars (or conflict spiral) often result from miscalculations and misperception.

[David Habakkuk]

Neil Richardson,

Having no claims whatsoever to expertise in the politics of the Far East, I do not know whether the Chinese use the term 'encirclement'. It is however clearly an extremely inapt term, given that they have extremely long land borders – of which a critical one is with Russia.

If indeed the 'containment' of Chinese aspirations to increased maritime influence is deemed to be a – if not the – key strategic priority for the United States, does it then become important to try to avoid a coming together of Russia and China?

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Mr. Habakkuk:

Indeed I would agree and expect the Chinese to reach some sort of modus vivendi with Russia on territorial claims. (As for encirclement, it's become a popular term now not only in the pop media but also among policy analysts in state sponsored think tanks like CIISS.) Regarding the US position, I think there's a bit of complacency at least among some American Sinologists on Sino-Russian rapproachement (I'd argue that stage has been reached already) possibly upgrading to a higher level of cooperation. I've heard some rule out such a possibility based on past conflicts, but I suspect that is too facile a conclusion.

I also agree that a possible containment is a maritime one if it comes to that. And while the PLAN bluffs about anti-access/area denial, they are forgetting that China is increasingly dependent on maritime routes (I realize now I should've made this point clearer when I had discussed ROKN and JMSDF increasing their submarine and ASW capabilities).

My concern is that in the last ten years, the United States has given Russia and China an awful lot of reasons to reach an understanding which is why I am still very ambivalent about the NATO theater ballistic missile defense.

[David Habakkuk]

Neil Richardson,

On missile defence, Medvedev's latest statement is interesting.

(See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8910909/Dmitry-Medvedev-threatens-US-over-planned-missile-defence-shield.html.)

The belief that a past history of conflict – or indeed, quite deep-rooted differences of interest and/or ideology – can prevent unexpected alliances is a familiar delusion, particularly where the powers in question feel threatened. Before 1914, Imperial Germany was disastrously complacent about the possibility of a rapprochement between Great Britain and Russia, and thereby created a kind of do it yourself 'encirclement'.

Before 1939, Britain was disastrously complacent about the possibility of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and ended up wrecking the prospects for any successful 'encirclement' of the latter – an error which could have been catastrophic, but for Hitler's incompetence.

After 1945, Stalin believed that the 'contradiction' between the United States and Great Britain would be a fundamental feature of the post-war international system – an error which was partly ideologically-driven, but much less surprising than it looks in retrospect. As a result he ended up facilitating the creation of the kind of united capitalist world with which the Soviet Union had no realistic prospect of competing successfully.

Looking at the situation from the Russian side, today's much-weakened Russia certainly has reasons to fear China. But a combination of 'appeasement' and nuclear 'deterrence' may very well be their least worst option.

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Mr. Habakkuk:

Thank your for pointing out the article. I hadn't come across any mention of this in other articles:

"But Russia has rejected those overtures and is now demanding legally binding guarantees from Washington that the new system will never be used against Russia."

Unless this is just pre-election rhetoric, it appears to be a very short-sighted decision on the part of the United States if we aren't ready to jump at this. I wouldn't have thought a legally binding guarantee would be too high a price for us. I suppose the new NATO member states are the ones balking at this, but IMHO I think it's about time the United States reduced our commitment level in the alliance.

[Norbert M Salamon]

That Aircraft Carrier CVN-77 Parks Next Door To Syria at the same time that Russia has sent one of her navy to Syria, when related to by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev recent remarks re USA Missile defence is far more pressing Foreign Policy issue than the hype about China - USA relatioons.

Zerohedge has both the USA major Fleet postion listing and the speech by the Russian President.

Do keep in mind that both Russia and China nixed measures against Syria and Iran.
Happy thnksgiving [though late by Canadain standards].

[turcopolier]

NMS

The carrier battle group is tere as a precaution of the necessity of NEO. try notto make up crises. Canada does "Thnksgiving?" that would be in August at the end of summer? pl

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you for your detailed comments; I must study much of it in order to be able to formulate a response, if any.

But on 2 points I still find myself in disagreement with you.

One is the feasibility of the herding of the cats; even if they wish to be so herded. I suppose future would tell.

On the subject of the economic co-dependence of China and the United States, I think the analogy is not with World War I but rather to the World circa 1900. World War I began when, in my opinion, the economic foundations of the peace preceding it changed.

And here is where I think I part with you: Yes, World War I was a miscalucaltion by all belligerents when the conditions of their mutual and inter-related economic co-dependencies was altered. But the belligerents were willing to go to war; they thought war was a feasible option.

I still believe that war is not a feasible option between China and US. And if war is not feasible, what is the point of containment strategies?

[Norbert M Salamon]

thanks for the military analysis

by Federal Statute Law Thanksgiving is the 2nd Monday of October in Canada [to get automatic ling weekend]

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Babak:
"One is the feasibility of the herding of the cats; even if they wish to be so herded. I suppose future would tell."

I do not believe this is an apt analogy at this point. Five years ago I would've accepted such a comparison, but today it doesn't seem to fit. Obviously we already have bilateral defense treaties with ROK, Japan, Australia and ROC (TRA with some limitations). As far back as 2002 the United States had marked Japan and Australia as the two linchpins of defensive framework in the Pacific. However, there hadn't been much effort until fairly recently. The reason why I had pointed out the need to observe SE and East Asian states in the last three years is that a lot of bilateral and multilateral efforts at cooperation have been made without the United States. AirSea Battle will require adjustment on the part of the United States, but I think they're quite achievable. And I would agree with the points Walrus made earlier on the requirements of a potential Pacific alliance with ASB corseting such institution in the future.

"On the subject of the economic co-dependence of China and the United States, I think the analogy is not with World War I but rather to the World circa 1900. World War I began when, in my opinion, the economic foundations of the peace preceding it changed."

In what sense? The traditional liberal argument had been that since major states had a very high level of interdependence, economic considerations would rule out a system-wide war. In fact there were many popular works on how warfare had become obsolete which obviously proved to be a false notion.

"And here is where I think I part with you: Yes, World War I was a miscalucaltion by all belligerents when the conditions of their mutual and inter-related economic co-dependencies was altered. But the belligerents were willing to go to war; they thought war was a feasible option."

Well, this is where I disagree strongly. War is a feasible option in the minds of the PRC and the United States. The biggest problem is the Chinese doctrine. The latest iteration is "Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions" which replaced "Local Wars Under High-Technology Conditions." I don't want to expand too much here, but to make it short, the PLA expects to fight short local wars with limited aims. They expect to win the first battle (they refer to winning one campaign at most) and presenting fait accompli such as the invasion of Taiwan or the capture of keyhole islands that command maritime choke points. In addition the legacy of People's War elements of the old Chinese doctrine has become a powder keg as one can easily spot the problems in the media as well as in public opinion surveys. I believe a general war between the US and the PRC would be suicidal, but this is not a universally shared notion. I just don't believe that you can contain a limited war from spiralling into a general war.

There are unforeseen sparks that could easily light the fuse of conflict spiral. For example if Taiwan were to declare independence, the likelihood of war would increase dramatically. The United States does not want to intervene as long as the PRC would agree to a peaceful resolution. However, the PRC has no intention of ever giving such guarantees. If the PLAN senior leadership thinks they can update and replay the Kaigun's limited aims strategy against the United States and our allies, I think it would be a tragic mistake. Unfortunately there are many indications that Liu Huaqing's legacy is driving the PLAN's course of action.

In addition, the PLAN has been very aggressive in harassing not only US reconnaissance assets, but also vessels and aircrafts of every state in this region. In fact they had an incident in September when the PLAN warned an Indian vessel that it was entering Chinese waters. (It was 40 nm off Haiphong which is international waters under the UNCLOS) The United States Navy will enforce the freedom of navigation as we have done since 1945. This is a very sensitive issue for the United States going as far back as 1812. This is the hegemonic responsibility which we inherited from Britain after WWII. Up until now we have reassured and encouraged the Chinese to settle the disputes peacefully without any success (We don't have any claims other than the right of navigation). Well now all these states have had enough of China and decided to band together as we saw the recent developments at ASEAN (China had sought to deal with them individually but failed).

"I still believe that war is not a feasible option between China and US. And if war is not feasible, what is the point of containment strategies?"

The Soviet Union's political and military capabilities were vastly superior to those of the PRC (in relative sense vis-a-vis the US). Yet containment proved to be a very successful strategy. The point of a containment is to wait out the PRC while protecting the major power centers. I would refer you to the writings of George Kennan.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you for your comments.

In regards to WWI, my understanding has been than the long European Peace between Congress of Vienna to WWI was based on an economic order that had created a European-wide peace interest.

When the economic underpinnings of that peace decayed - around 1900 - war became a distinct possibility.

Furthermore, again my understanding has been that the European leaders all expected a short war - ignoring the lessons of the American Civil War.

What I understand from your writing is that the Chinese military planners also anticipate quick wars ending in decisive Chinese victory.

On the other hand, Mr. Rumsfeld’s Doctrine of Shock & Awe seems to have been the US counter-part of PLA's.

Which implies that both sides could be repeating the mistakes of WWI; in my opinion.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I forgot to ask:

What does "waiting out PRC" means?

Surely you are not suggesting that a different political dispensation in China will be any less assertive of Chinese power?

[Neil Richardson]

That's precisely what it means as Kennan had indicated in his writings.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Then you will have to wait a long time, perhaps centuries.

[David Habakkuk]

Neil Richardson,

There is however a problem involved in equating the strategy of 'containment' as implemented with the strategy which Kennan envisaged – that he himself has repeatedly sought to disassociate himself from that strategy, as it was developed in the key NSC 68 paper masterminded by Paul Nitze in April 1950 and subsequently. While I certainly do not think that Kennan's claims should be taken simply at face value, I also think that they cannot simply be ignored.

I dealt with some of the issues involved in an exchange of comments with Cieran and Babak Makkinejad back in 2009.

(See http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/08/national-journal-blog-11-august-2009.html .)

Unfortunately, the exchange of letters between Kennan and John Lukacs to which I referred is no longer available on the net – one needs to buy it. A crucial dispatch which Kennan sent from Moscow in September 1952, which he himself regarded as a central statement about how American strategy had deviated from his conception, is however available on the web.

While one should certainly not take the whole of the argument of this dispatch at face value, Kennan's claim about the 'cosmic misunderstanding' between the Cold War antagonists over the significance of each other's military preparations is important, and of continuing relevance.

(See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/doc1.htm .)

Having been taken up with other business, I have not yet had time to read the new 'authorised' biography of Kennan by John Lewis Gaddis. However, I suspect it may obfuscate as much as it illuminates.

In the revised edition of his influential study Strategies of Containment, published in 2005, Gaddis continued to accept Kennan's claim about a sharp discontinuity in American strategy at the end of the Forties. In large measure this was on the basis of the suggestion that NSC 68 ignored the massive American superiority in military-industrial potential.

This is almost the precise reverse of the truth. Far from ignoring the American superiority in military-industrial potential, Nitze stressed it – pointing out among other things that the United States was producing more than ten times as many motor vehicles as the Soviet Union. The crucial point he was making was that a Soviet nuclear, and even more thermonuclear, capability had the potentiality to call radically into question the ability of United States to remobilise this massive potential power, and deploy it in Eurasia.

An ironical corollary of this fundamental point is that the conventional wisdom according to which nuclear weapons stabilised the Cold War balance – of which Gaddis has been a leading advocate – may in fact be the precise reverse of the truth.

[Neil Richardson]

That's rather doubtful. Rapid modernization has serious consequences internally.

[Neil Richardson]

Dear Babak:

"In regards to WWI, my understanding has been than the long European Peace between Congress of Vienna to WWI was based on an economic order that had created a European-wide peace interest.
When the economic underpinnings of that peace decayed - around 1900 - war became a distinct possibility."

I am still not sure as to what you're referring here. Are you talking about Pax Britannica (or the British hegemony)? You'd have to be more specific. Or are you looking at domestic or internal level (Fritz Fischer or Sonderweg)? If it's the former, we are probably seeing the last leg of Pax Americana. If it's the latter, well domestic imperialism could become major source of concern as I had mentioned to Prof. Kiracofe in the earlier thread. And it is directly related to my point above on the implications of the People's War legacy.

"Furthermore, again my understanding has been that the European leaders all expected a short war - ignoring the lessons of the American Civil War."
It was the "Cult of the Offensive" which ignored the rapid technological advances prior to 1914 that had an impact on their thinking. To be fair to the European leaders it just wasn't that clear, because there were more recent conflicts that had imparted different "lessons" such as the Franco-Prussian War as well as the Russo-Japanese War. The period before 1914 could easily be characterized as a "Revolution in Military Affairs." We are undergoing another RMA now. The lessons of the Civil War were fairly limited in terms of applicability(e.g., the impact of telegraph and railroad on internal lines of communication).

"What I understand from your writing is that the Chinese military planners also anticipate quick wars ending in decisive Chinese victory. On the other hand, Mr. Rumsfeld’s Doctrine of Shock & Awe seems to have been the US counter-part of PLA's."

Yes you're right in limited sense. Both doctrines expect a quick resolution of a conflict. However, there are several critical differences. First, Rapid Decisive Operations was a set of incoherent ideas at the strategic level (at operational and tactical levels, it had little impact other than muddy up the USAF and USN's set of priorities).

Second, there were an awful lot of people in the US services who had strong objections to it. RDO lasted about four years and had almost no impact on operational thinking except in the minds of "air power" theorists. Its cousin or Effects-Based Operations also went into the dustbin a few years later. Thankfully the first thing Mattis did when he took over the Jiffycom was to cross out any mention of EBO. I'm sure it'll pop up again in some other form in about 15 to 20 years.

Third, when Rumsfeld bought into the RDO/EBO nonsense (and to be fair to him the development preceded his tenure), the general assumption was that the US forces would possess a priori information dominance. Naturally the PLA's highest priority is to deny that advantage to any future adversary. (And to compare "Local Wars" to RDO/EBO is like comparing Schubert's Unfinished Symphony to a little ditty. The former is far more mature as a doctrine despite its flawed assumptions. RDO was merely musings of a kid with far too many toys than he could handle) As I posted at the beginning, the United States is about to adopt ASB. The assumptions of ASB are far more realistic than RDO although it's still too early in the maturation process.

The point I am trying to make is that the PLA has a mature doctrine and it guides their operational planning, training, procurement, etc. The unstated assumption of RDO was that we did not expect to fight anyone worth fighting which demonstrates how intellectually shallow the whole venture had been. It's one thing to "shock and awe" a vastly inferior adversary. When you try to apply that idiotic concept (the enemy must have an easily identifiable center of gravity which can be destroyed very quickly) to a major power adversary, well you can see how quickly it falls apart. And this is why it had been cast aside quickly.

A critical assumption that "Local Wars" makes is that the United States will seek peace after a devastating military setback and accept the ensuing political outcome if we were to intervene in China's sphere of influence. That is an awfully risky assumption to accept as the Japanese could probably attest. As of today the PLA has no ability to survive in a conventional battlefield if they decide to try their luck against US forces. Their early bet is to acquire capabilities to hit our C4ISR which fits nicely with their goal of subduing without fighting. However they are decades away from militarily challenging the United States head on even if one assumes that we would not get any help whatsoever from our allies. The problem is the civil military relations has become rather one sided after the last of the Long March generation had passed from leadership. This is the reason why PACOM had tried for years to establish contacts with the PLA senior leadership. (Dennis Blair in particular) It's one thing to call the United States a paper tiger. However it's quite another to believe it and base your military doctrine on that notion. As one often hears these days, hope is not a strategy.

"Which implies that both sides could be repeating the mistakes of WWI; in my opinion"

Well if that's the case then are you still convinced that a war is unthinkable? That really was my point.