Osama bin Laden : The real story? - FB Ali

The killing of bin Laden in a US Special Forces raid on a house in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad unleashed a torrent of stories about the event. The accounts by various US officials (given in bits and pieces immediately after the raid) gave little information on the details of the operation, and none on the ‘back story’. This left the field open to a lot of speculative accounts about how the raid took place and the events leading up to it. A rash of conspiracy theories also sprang up, many of which flatly denied bin Laden was even present in the house, while others put forward various versions of the Pakistani role in these events.

Recently, two accounts have been published that claim to be based on information from sources ‘in the know’ or ones who actually participated in the planning (though perhaps not the execution) of the raid. The first was a detailed account by Nicholas Schmidle in The New Yorker, based on interviews with and information provided by senior White House staff and some of the planners of the raid. This was obviously the “official” version, what the US administration would like people to believe. The second is a post on her blog by RJ Hillhouse, in which she quotes her intelligence sources on certain aspects of the raid, especially the events leading up to it.

By studying these two accounts, separating the grain from the chaff, and judiciously filling in some of the blanks, it is possible to come up with what is likely to be fairly close to the real story.

 

It begins with the CIA station chief in one of the Gulf states receiving an unexpected visitor with a fascinating tale. He was a recently retired senior officer of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, and he wanted to talk about Osama bin Laden. Some years ago, he said, the Saudi intelligence chief approached the ISI with the request to provide sanctuary to bin Laden within Pakistan. The Saudis said that bin Laden was prepared to come down from the hills where he was hiding, provided sufficient assurances were available about his security. In return, he would ensure that al Qaeda would not target Pakistan, and he would also limit his own involvement in its operations.

The Saudi motive behind this request presumably had to do with their internal imperatives. The bin Ladens are a very rich and influential family in Saudi Arabia. Osama and al Qaeda, and their goals, are supported by a large number of religious Saudis (even though the royal family considers them enemies). If bin Laden were to be hunted down and killed by the Americans in the tribal badlands of Pakistan, it would give the regime a black eye in the view of many of its people as well as being a serious blow to the bin Laden clan. It made sense to the Saudis to get Osama bin Laden into a safe hideout while at the same time neutralizing him as a functioning jihadi.

Whatever the Saudi motivation, their request placed the Pakistanis in a severe dilemma. The Saudis were their helpers and supporters, in fact the kingdom was their backer of last resort; they could not afford to alienate them. On the other side, bin Laden was the principal enemy and target of their current backer and ally, the United States; they could not take the risk of being caught harbouring him. The matter went right up to President Musharraf, and was the subject of much anxious debate. Finally, it was decided that the affair would be handled through one of the client jihadi outfits of the ISI, with no official involvement, thus ensuring plausible deniability in case something went wrong.

This, said the former ISI official, was how bin Laden was moved into Pakistan some years ago, and was safely harboured there. He was prepared to divulge his current location to the CIA provided he was given the reward on offer, and he and his family (accompanying him on this holiday) were securely relocated to the USA. The CIA station chief set up another meeting with the informant, and promptly relayed the information to Washington. The background check on the ISI officer having proved satisfactory, at this second meeting the station chief accepted his offer on the condition that the reward would only be paid if his information proved accurate.

When the location of bin Laden reached Langley, the CIA commenced a sophisticated, but secret, operation to verify that bin Laden did indeed live in the house in Abbottabad that their ISI informant had betrayed to them. Even before the results of this activity became available, the top security officials in the US administration began to consider actions that could be taken if his presence there was confirmed. This process quickly narrowed down the options to essentially two: a drone strike on the house, or a Special Forces raid (of the type being regularly carried out in Afghanistan against suspected insurgent leaders). When the CIA established that there was a high probability that Osama bin Laden did indeed live in the Abbottabad house, detailed planning began for both options. Their pros and cons differed so radically, however, that choosing between them was not easy.

A drone strike would involve no risk to US personnel while also reducing the loss of face for the Pakistanis and, hence, their reaction after the event. An SF raid, on the other hand, would be a risky affair. Apart from the danger of various mishaps there was a possibility of Pakistani interference, both in the air and on the ground, which would endanger not only the success of the operation but also the US personnel involved. Such an intrusion of American ‘boots on the ground’ would likely cause serious problems in relations between the two countries. The biggest difference, however, lay in the degree to which the success of the operation could be established by the administration, and generally accepted by the world when announced. A successful drone strike would show that the house was destroyed, but not whether bin Laden had been killed (the Pakistanis would never admit that he had even been there). A successful SF raid, on the other hand, would provide definitive proof.

The two options were presented to President Obama for a decision. His military advisers generally favoured the drone option, though the JSOC command was quite happy to do the raid. The ‘political’ advisers did not want to pass up this great opportunity to claim a notable success for the administration, but that would only be possible with an SF raid. Obama mulled over the choice for a few days and decided to carry out the raid ─ but with its risks minimized by getting the Pakistan military to cooperate. This set off another hectic debate among the advisers; it was finally decided that a very hard line be taken with the Pakistanis, giving them, in effect, neither the option to refuse nor any wiggle room in compliance. Leon Panetta was chosen to deliver the ultimatum: in essence, to do another ‘Armitage’ on them.

Panetta enjoyed playing the heavy with the Pakistanis (especially after their successful false emissary caper and their exploitation of the Raymond Davis affair). He told the ISI chief how the US had found out, and then confirmed, that bin Laden was being sheltered by them. The US was going to take him out; Pakistan could either help, or it would be considered an enemy of the US and treated accordingly. Backed into a corner, with their ‘plausible deniability’ in shreds, the Pakistani generals folded: they were prepared to help, but they needed a good cover story, especially for the Saudis. The US agreed to work with them on this, but demanded that knowledge of the raid be confined to a very few people at the top of the command chain, no more than necessary to ensure that any attempt by someone in the security forces to interfere with the operation would be immediately detected and quashed.

The cover story finally agreed upon was that the US had carried out a drone strike on the house (though none would in fact take place). This would account for the night-time explosions at the house, and, more importantly, provide an explanation to give to the Saudis for bin Laden’s sudden and unfortunate demise (his body having been almost obliterated by the bombs!). The US’s agreement was simply a ruse, however, in order to keep the Pakistanis cooperating; having rejected the drone option because it did not allow a definitive claim of the operation’s success, the US administration had no intention of going through with this cover story. Instead, it intended to announce the carrying out of the raid, and its momentous result, as soon as it was completed, though it is likely they planned to shift its venue to some undefined place under insurgent control so as to allow the Pakistani military some face-saving, and thus limit their adverse reaction. In the event, the helicopter crash put paid to this.

With the Pakistani military on board, the raid was launched on May 1^st. Two Black Hawk helicopters with the Navy SEALs team on board took off from Jalalabad late evening and landed at the Ghazi airbase, Tarbela. This base is used by Pakistani SF (the Special Services Group), and has a US SF helicopter-training contingent stationed there. Helicopter flights into the US base area from Afghanistan are routine, and the flight of these two helicopters was cleared on the same basis. The attack on the Abbottabad target was launched from here later that night. The flying distance from Ghazi to the target is approximately 60 km (40 miles).

Even though the Pakistan army chief had agreed to allow the raid to go through without any interference, the US was not taking any chances. Schmidle describes a backup force of four Chinook helicopters, two with a backup SEALs team (which remained on the Afghan side of the border), and two as helicopter backups for the assault Black Hawks. He says that these latter two “landed at a predetermined point on a dry riverbed in a wide, unpopulated valley”. This is probably correct since, in case of a Pakistani double-cross, they would be grounded if they were to wait at the Ghazi airbase instead. One of these Chinooks was later used as the replacement for the Black Hawk that crashed at the Abbottabad house.

Schmidle’s account (and critiques of it published afterwards) dwell mostly on the details of the action inside the bin Laden compound. It doesn’t really matter how that action unfolded, though controversy over it does shift attention away from those aspects of the operation that are being kept concealed by both the US and Pakistan. The important point of these actions is that they resulted in Osama bin Laden being killed. Many conspiracy theorists refuse to accept this, but al Qaeda does, and so do the Pakistanis, who have in their custody bin Laden’s wives who witnessed the event. It may be worth commenting on a couple of the items of controversy. It doesn’t matter whether bin Laden had a weapon or not; the orders were for him to be killed. The reason why Amal al-Fatah, bin Laden’s wife who tried to protect him, was shot in the leg (DEVGRU normally just kills) was probably because the plan was to bring the wives and surviving sons back as prisoners (the loss of one of the Black Hawks forced a change there).

As for the fallout from the operation, it was, as expected, mainly on US-Pakistan relations. If the US had the intention of making it easier for the Pakistanis by fudging the site of the raid, the crashed helicopter’s tail sticking up from bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound ended that option. This stark evidence of the US incursion left the US with no option but to (in Hillhouse’s apt phrase) throw the Pakistanis under the bus. Panetta couldn’t let the opportunity pass without adding an extra kick of his own (“ they were either complicit or incompetent”). The Pakistan military lost a lot of ‘face’ internally, but had a tolerable alibi for the Saudis. Most importantly, the raid and its aftermath ended all chances of them working as allies with the US in the future; the relationship became once again purely transactional, with no trust on either side.

The United States certainly got their man but, in the process, lost Pakistan. Time will tell whether that was a good deal.

Comments

[VietnamVet]

Brig. General Ali,

Your scenario makes sense and explains a lot of the unanswered irregularities.

If under Pakistani home detention, with even a gate to keep Osama upstairs, and if the USA claims of an intelligence bonanza from the raid are accurate, this implies active participation and support of Osama's contacts with Al Qaeda by the ISI. Perhaps, this implies the Bush II belief that USA was under no treat from non-state actors (Al Qaeda) is correct. But, the States that were implicated in 9/11 attack, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, were unassailable. So like the school yard bully, the kid standing to the side (Iraq) is attacked instead of the real assailants.

[Byron Raum]

Does the Saudi royal family consider al-Qaeda an enemy, or does the Saudi royal family call al-Qaeda an enemy?

[mbrenner]

A minor point or two.

1. The CIA clearly has no human intelligence capability in Pakistan. Certainly not one that includes natives. Otherwise, we at the very least could have confirmed OBL's presence in the house in less than 6 months - and without doubts near the very end as to whether in fact he was (still) there. The neighbors all did know who was in the house! (As reported to me by an authoritative local source who spoke directly to them).

2. Leon Panetta is major national liability. Crude emulations of the Godfather have and will jeopardize the national interest.

3. Most important. What do we make of reports that Obama personally the contingency plan of what to do in the event of Pakistani interference? There have been several inside reports that he insisted that the Seals try to fight their way out with OBL's body in tow. The implication is that he was prepared to sacrifice American national interests for personal glory and electoral benefit. If he knew, though, that there would not be any Pakistani intereference, then either his action - or the telling of a tale about a dramatic decision that never occured - was pure public relations. Of that he certainly is more than capable.

[J]

mbrenner,

What's a DoD to do, with the 'emulations of the Godfather' now at its helm? Throw up its hands and do the OMG routine?

[FB Ali]

M Brenner,

My impression is that the CIA's native humint capability there is the people in the Pakistani intelligence agencies (including ISI) who are in their pay. However, they are generally not in the top layers.

My estimate is that the decision to allow ObL to be relocated by some jihadi outfit was taken and communicated at the highest level. Lower levels probably just knew that the house in Abbottabad was 'off limits', not who was living there, though some must have suspected it. Their reports must have been part of the CIA confirmation process.

I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that Obama would not have launched the raid unless he had assurances from Kayani and Pasha that there would be no interference. However, there must have been a contingency plan in case there was a double-cross.

[JYD]

Brig Ali,

Obama's actions have shown him to be a calculated risk taker. Getting Bin Laden was the highest priority for him.

Had the US confronted Kayani with evidence of Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, Kayani could have simply had the target moved despite US monitoring. This is what Pakistan has been doing with the Haqqani network targets. Posession is 9/10th of the law, they say. Even when the US shared precise coordinates, the targets seem to disappear overnight.

Given that the US would have studied Pakistan military's radar and surveillance patterns along its Western border, they could have easily concluded that there was only a small risk of interference. Plus, even if the Pak mil were to discover the raid as it happened, it is not a given that they'd shoot without seriously thinking about the consequences.

[shahbaz]

wish ful thinking

[Hashim Khan]

I think Brig FB Ali has nailed it right. To the question of why didn't ISI move Osama after they knew that the CIA knows where he is, could they. If ISI knew that Osama has been found out, then they also knew that he is under constant survilence by them and any attempt to relocate him would not go unnoticed. The end result would have been that ISI would have been dyed as the blackest sheep. The only option for Pakistan was to fake ignorance of the US plans of a raid and raise tantrums later on. I think it worked out best for the US and Pakistan the way it was carried out. US got their man, Pakistan didn't lose face with Saudis, and Saudis can point finger at any one they feel like, though they are also taking the best course of action by showing a helpless shrug and staying mum.

[Tariq]

The US has been so proactive in its handling of all matters related to Bin Laden, no different than the Roman legions chasing , Hannibal all the way to Armenia, or the end of some of the famous red indian chiefs. If the scenario given is correct ,What is stopping them from demanding from the ex commando president , reasons for double dealing, and complicity ,instead of giving him vip treatment?

[Arun]

http://twitter.com/#!/asiffshahzad/status/109338511357915136

"Visited JUI Fazlur Rehman madrasah in Bhakkar, Pakistan full of Taliban ready to die for fight against america."

[Arun]

Jaish-e-Muhammad reviving:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MI02Df02.html

[Arun]

One should distinguish the Obama of domestic politics, where he wants to be the bipartisan president; and Obama of foreign policy. Obama's "nature" is thus not a fact, but a speculation.

[Arun]

Better start making up the narrative from now for when Mullah Omar is captured. Perhaps it will be more convincing then.

[confusedponderer]

utph,
"If I knew the precise operational details you request, I would not be in a position to reveal them in public, would I."

Swagger. You miss the point - That. It. Is. Very. Probably. Not. Feasible. Period.

Naturally, if you knew the operational details... you would see that.

What I am saying is that the idea to mount simultaneous (to preserve the element of surprise) assaults on the locations where the Pakistanis hold their crown jewels under heavy guard would probably end in bloody failure.

Getting their nukes pulled is nothing the Pakistanis will ever accept. The metaphor is apt, they are indeed their teeth. They will fight it with all they have. Seals, Rangers, Delta Force and Special Forces are surely top trained troops, but they are still mortal and can they die just as anybody else.

If such an attempt was made, the Pakistanis will throw at them what they have. To give them a chance of survival air cover would be a necessity. Essentially we're speaking of an all out war against Pakistan. Madness.

It is worth keeping in mind that the lifeline to the US contingent in Afghanistan runs from Karachi through the Khyber pass.

[Patrick Lang]

CP

"Essentially we're speaking of an all out war against Pakistan. Madness"

Yes, I do not think this is a practicable option. pl

[Patrick Lang]

Arun

Well, then, since nothing one says will be believed, I guess it will have to be Article Nine. pl

[FB Ali]

Arun,

Re your latest objection (regarding Obama's nature), perhaps you'd like to write up a post for here explaining why you think Obama would have chosen to launch the SF raid (without assurance of Pakistani non-interference) rather than picking the other option of a drone strike.

I'm sure we'd all find that much more interesting than this dribble of nits you can pick.

But first, do read again the pros and cons of these two options that I have listed in the article.

[The beaver]

I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that Obama would not have launched the raid unless he had assurances from Kayani and Pasha that there would be no interference. However, there must have been a contingency plan in case there was a double-cross.

Brig Ali,

Didn't Pasha meet with Panneta in DC just two weeks before the killing of OBL? And there were rumours that Pasha left in a hurry after his meeting.

May be he was given an ultimatum!!!!

[Fred]

Perhaps if ISI had moved OBL the raid would have snatch Kayani and Pasha instead?

[used to post here]

CP,

OK. Fine. Not practicable, not feasible.
No swagger intended.
Now, find a way.
I know you can do it!
Fight entropy.

[confusedponderer]

utph,
somehow the US managed to cope with the prospect and the real risk of national annihilation in nuclear fire during the Cold War. Nothing in Pakistan poses a comparable threat. Nothing.

I know, it is anathema to the vaunted 'can do spirit', but there are limits to American power, and hard power proper for that matter. Some things you have to learn to live with in dignity, like a nuclear armed Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or a nuclear armed Pakistan.

[FB Ali]

The Beaver,

Yes, Pasha met with Panetta and Mullen in Washington on 13 April. He had planned a 3-day stay but left the same day after the meeting.

I had referred to this meeting and hurried departure in my article, "Something's happening.....", though at the time I did not know that it was linked to the ObL affair. The piece is at:

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/04/somethings-happening-fb-ali.html

[used to post here]

CP,

Hmm. what about Iran and it's proxies? They are conspicuously absent from your list, my friend. In any case, I appreciate your posts.

[Peacemaker]

Interesting Discussion. But let's just go to the basics. OBL and his AQ attack US by bringing down WTCs. US retaliates and counter attack AQ in Afghanistan. After 10 years of relentless pursuit they incapacitate AQ and finally get their man OBL. Where, how or when is inconsequential. Fact is he is dead.
Now the only way out of this mess is for US to make a graceful exit while they can, from Afghanistan. Leave the country for its neighbors to rectify. As for Talibans, their cause of fighting a 'war of liberation' from perceived Western Occupation forces, will loose steam with the departure of US Forces from Afghan soil.
Otherwise, the radicalization of Pashtun masses will continue with every drone strike and collateral damage in Af Pak region thus destablizing the whole region making even the western world more dangerous with time.

For God sake, stop war mongering and give peace a chance.

[Patrick Lang]

peacemaker

"For God sake, stop war mongering and give peace a chance."

Not referring to the SST crowd, are you? That would be egregioous. pl