Considering the deaths in Syrian cities, the regional revolutionary upheaval, and the quietly simmering frustrations of ordinary citizens, Bashar al-Assad’s jovial address to the nation Wednesday struck a jarring note. Many - apparently including some in his own government - expected him to announce fundamental reforms, even lead a reformist ‘coup’ within the regime, a new ‘corrective movement’. Others thought Assad too weak to deliver real reform - but nonetheless expected conciliatory noises and gestures. Few expected the strong, confident, smiling, laughing - and utterly unyielding - figure we saw on display. In the context of the bloodshed, it was a chilling performance.
The news that the speech would be delivered in the Majlis ash-Sha’ab might have alerted us as to what was coming. The audience would not be a young, diverse, open-minded group of university students but a chamber full of grey-haired Ba’athist apparatchiks (and company) taking turns interrupting the President’s speech to declaim verses of poetry and other gems (“Syria is too small for you, O President! You should rule the world!”). It was, perhaps, the last hurrah of what increasingly looks like a vanishing age in Arab politics, an era of rehearsed spontaneity, leader-cults, and silence about the real issues, buttressed by an undertone of menace. What made all this deeply incongruous was to see a young, intelligent, coherent, apparently modern-minded man happily taking his place at the centre of the charade. Assad offered no concrete proposals for change - nor did he evince any sign that he felt the pain of his people or understood their sense of urgency. He was wise not to try giving this speech at the University of Damascus.
What is Assad up to? According to him, he has been confronting a conspiracy. To be sure, the Ides of March had come, but not gone, when the first unmistakable crack appeared in Syria’s decades-old political-security lockdown. “Dozens demonstrate” may not have been an eye-catching headline amid the mass tumult elsewhere in the region. But for a small group of protesters to challenge the regime in the symbolic heart of Damascus, marching from the Ummayad Mosque through the cavernous Hamidiyeh souq chanting “God, Syria, Freedom” instead of “God, Syria, Bashar”, was a real act of faith. Footage of the event shows the chants being started by a few; others soon find their voice. Ingrained fear of the occult security presence fades away amid shouts of “la ilaha illa allah”. As it turned out, the ‘legendary’ Syrian mukhabarat was taken completely by surprise. Most of the protesters got away. The next day, March 16, a somewhat larger, if less conspicuous protest was held outside the Interior Ministry demanding the release of political prisoners. This time, there were many arrests and beatings.
On March 18th, major protests erupted in Dera’, close to the Jordanian border. People were killed. Funerals were held. Over the subsequent days, the protests grew and spread to surrounding towns and villages. Efforts to appease the protesters were made by figures from the civilian government. Security forces killed more people. On the 25th, things started going wrong in the coastal city of Latakia, and many were killed, apparently by snipers, in ambiguous circumstances. Smaller protests occurred in other cities - and continue.
It is not easy to know for sure exactly what is going on. It goes without saying that the claims of the regime about “armed gangs” and “foreigners” cannot be taken at face value. Perhaps less obviously to some, nor can the claims of the Syrian opposition, eyewitnesses, Youtube videos and so on that constitute the unverified substance of most foreign media reports. As the Iraqi exile ‘Curveball’ told The Guardian last month, “I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime. I and my sons are proud of that and we are proud that we were the reason to give Iraq the margin of democracy.” The truth probably lies somewhere between the regime’s stone wall of denial and the uncritical revolutionary frenzy of the Western media. Thousands in Dera’ have rebelled. The security forces have employed brutal and deadly repression. Smaller outbreaks of dissent have occurred in other cities. It is not a revolution - yet. The main cities are calm. The government is operating normally. Unrest is real but sporadic.
When states are shaken by spectacles of violence, it is customary to blame foreign enemies. It is much more difficult otherwise to restore a sense of unity, security and normalcy. Unfortunately this means that the real culprits and underlying causes are often overlooked. The conspiracy, according to Assad (and fleshed out in some official Syrian news outlets) involves networks linked to usual suspects Israel, Prince Bandar, Elie Khoury and Jeffrey Feltman. Thug networks would stage violent incidents; sectarian networks would stir communal hatreds; media networks would create incendiary recordings of the violence as well as providing ‘eyewitnesses’ for the foreign media. Although Assad conceded that “not all of the demonstrators are conspirators”, conspiracy, he made clear, was the substance of the matter. “They’ll say I’m talking about conspiracy theories,” he said. “In fact, there is no conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy.” In an aside unreported in the official transcript, he added, “conspiracy is a part of human nature.” Bravo. But as Assad knows well, the biggest conspiracy in Syria is not foreign. It is the regime itself, the shadowy and unaccountable networks of power that belie the formal government.
This is not the tired argument about an ‘old guard’ holding back Assad’s reformist impulses. Assad himself was at pains to pop that myth on Wednesday. After 11 years as President, Assad is in control. The people in key positions now are his people, not holdovers from his father’s era. He shuffles and reshuffles the deck. The networks of power and patronage center on him and his close relatives. As Raymond Hinnebusch writes, “Patrimonial politics is run from close to the apex of the political establishment where elites preside over shillas and clientelist networks which take their cut of public resources and dispense patronage… This process is dominated by senior Ba’th officers, especially Alawis… The tentacles of clientelism reach downward through the structures of the state, incorporating many middle and sub-elites and their clients into the patronage game.”
Such a system allows the leader to sit at the center of the machine and play geopolitics with relative freedom, insulated from domestic pressure. This was Hafez al-Assad’s legacy to Syria: vastly over-developed systems of coercion and co-option that allowed a divided country to thrive in rough-and-tumble regional power plays. But there is also the matter of the ability to force the machine itself to change - to come closer to the impartial, legal-rational bureaucratic administration of the modern state, an indispensable prerequisite to real reform. Here the pyramid of the ‘military-mercantile complex’, patronage networks and security fiefdoms assembled to anchor the minoritarian regime core and to give the leader the maximum possible leeway in matters of foreign policy flips upside down and reveals him a prisoner. The patron controls, but the clients expect. To do any more than selective shuffling of positions and piecemeal reforms might threaten to bring the whole structure of control crashing down.
Since coming to power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad has curtailed some of the most visible excesses of this shadow government. Yet far from dismantling the system, he has renewed it, perpetuated it, ‘upgraded’ it. Maybe history will vindicate his choice during that period to focus on reviving the stagnant economy and confronting foreign threats rather than undertaking fundamental reforms. But times are changing.
After Ben ‘Ali’s fall and as Egypt seethed, Assad told the Wall Street Journal, “to be realistic, we have to wait for the next generation” for such fundamental changes, and evinced no concern that regional developments would force the pace. “Why is Syria stable?”, he asked rhetorically. It was because his foreign policy, “very closely linked to the beliefs of the people” in its hostility to Israel and independence from American dictates, made Syria immune from the unrest elsewhere; “people do not only live on interests; they also live on beliefs, especially in very ideological areas. Unless you understand the ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is happening.” Assad’s analysis was shrewd as far as the decade gone by. However, the same analysis might have alerted him to the importance of the dramatic shifts in ideologies and beliefs that would emerge from the Arab revolutions. The same publics inspired in the last decade by examples of successful resistance against American and Israeli policies are now transfixed by examples of successful popular mobilization against repressive, corrupt, and unrepresentative governments.
As a result, this young generation of Syrians (65% of the population is under 35) is not likely to wait another decade for reform. It is not because they hate Bashar (they don’t); nor is it because they agree on an alternative program (they don’t); fundamentally, it is because demonstrators in Egypt and Tunisia seem to have shown the way out of a decades-old Arab malaise, and young Syrians have no intention of being left behind. Syria is not yet in a revolutionary situation, but the seeping away of fear, the compelling precedents elsewhere in the Arab world, and the despair among young Syrians of a ‘revolution from above’, mean that it soon might be.
What can Assad do? Syria does not have the money to buy off its people’s demands for participation as Gulf Arab states are attempting, but the regime’s hold over the military, security and intelligence is much, much tighter than that of Mubarak, Ben ‘Ali, or Qaddhafi. Assad could keep beating, imprisoning, and shooting his people for some time to come. The security apparatus he inherited will do that for him automatically - encouragement is not necessary. The official story about “foreign conspirators” being responsible for the deaths will grow old quickly. At some point, through an escalating spiral of rebellion and repression, either the revolutionaries would pour over the walls, or he would suppress them in one final bloodbath and remain as president of a second North Korea (things have changed since 1982). Assad doesn’t want this, the people around him don’t want it, no one wants it. But this is liable to happen by default, sooner or later, unless another course is decisively plotted.
Some may talk of a ‘war option’. Certainly the fluid situation in Egypt and unrest throughout the region has put Israel on the back foot. Arab-Israeli fighting at this time could shape the regional outcome in a very undesirable direction for Israel. There will be a temptation for radicals in the resistance front to launch a provocation. For the Syrians, it could be a valuable and unifying distraction. They were evidently impressed by the success of Hezbollah’s tactics and strategy in 2006, and have modified their own accordingly. Nonetheless, it would take a special kind of madman willingly to subject Syria to wholesale bombardment by the Israeli Air Force. The Syrians have wisely stuck to a ‘hands off’ approach to fighting Israel.
There are certainly forces in Syria pushing another way. The sycophants Bashar surrounded himself with on Wednesday are not only unrepresentative of Syrians generally, they are not even representative of the people Bashar himself has tried to bring into positions of influence over the past decade. There are many competent, clean people in and around the Syrian government. There are doubtless influential voices pressing for the security services to be put on a tight leash, for citizens to be allowed to speak, write and gather freely, for networks of high-level corruption to be dismantled. Such changes have been resisted, perhaps for fear of unleashing sectarian hatreds. But new technologies, increased interconnectedness, and diminished fears are already opening up new political space, whether the regime likes it or not. Sensitive issues are more safely handled through institutions than on the street - but for that to happen, space has to be created, boundaries drawn, and power delegated. Upcoming local and parliamentary elections offer a conspicuous opportunity. The announcement on Thursday of committees to (1) replace the emergency law, (2) resolve the status of stateless Kurds, and (3) investigate the recent events might be positive steps - if they ever see the light of day. The composition of the next cabinet, when it is announced, may yield more clues. But while Assad’s explicit warning against “flight forward” in reaction to events contains a grain of wisdom, his speech on Wednesday suggests an alarming - if more traditional - tendency towards “flight backward”.
Assad is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the Middle East’s new age. He emerged a ‘winner’ from the War on Terror decade. He is still broadly popular (unlike his regime). He controls the levers of power. These factors together offer Assad a chance to be something more than a prisoner of a failing system. Still, he doesn’t seem to ‘get it’. His speech to the Syrian parliament epitomized everything that won’t fly in a post-Tunisia, post-Egypt Middle East. Maybe this is a cunning feint to show strength and rally the troops before making risky changes. If not, trouble lies not far ahead.
Couldn't have described how i feel about Syria now any better than the author. I fear Bashar is another Obama. Talks the talk but isn't strong enough to force his own crew to pastures anew and thereby deliver tangible change. The people would accept half measures but they will get nothing.
Posted by: anonymous | 01 April 2011 at 10:40 PM
A remarkably insightful and balanced review of the situation in Syria.
I do not have any special knowledge of the area or country; it is based mainly on what I read in the media. And, perhaps, long observation of turbulent times, here and elsewhere. I would like to suggest that more weight should be attached to the scenario that Kieran merely alluded to in his closing paragraph.
It is entirely possible that Bashar al-Assad has correctly understood the significance of the tide that is sweeping the Arab world today, and accepted that his regime has to loosen up the iron control that it has exercised over its people. But he also realises that any precipitous move towards reform would be taken as a sign of weakness, and result in a greatly increased surge towards dismantling the structures of control. He has enough support in the country to proceed at his own pace. If he really has deciphered the situation, he will move fast, but in a measured way. We shall soon find out.
The rhetoric about ‘conspiracies’ is not all empty. After all, he has seen how the perjured testimony of some tainted witnesses was used by an international process to hold Syria responsible for Rafik Hariri’s murder, which resulted in such frenzy being whipped up in Lebanon that he was forced to withdraw his troops from there. (Perhaps it is that experience that now steels him not be panicked into any quick move). It is also very likely that his country is subject to a continuous barrage of plots and subversions from the many enemies that it has in the region and beyond.
To sum up, based on what Bashar al-Assad has done so far, I would not reach any definitive conclusion as to how he plans on dealing with the problems that his country and regime undoubtedly face. It is quite possible that he does ‘get it’, and that he will proceed in the right direction. It is far too soon to assume that he has chosen to dig in and crush all attempts to change the sysytem.
Posted by: FB Ali | 02 April 2011 at 12:07 AM
An excellent analysis. Too many of the descriptions of patronage also apply to the US, sadly.
“... an era of rehearsed spontaneity, leader-cults, and silence about the real issues, buttressed by an undertone of menace.” This is going to be the 2012 US presidential election campaign.
Posted by: Fred | 02 April 2011 at 11:40 AM
FB Ali,
Based on his last speech, it is more likely to be a "flight backward". The kind of mentality shaped by the very nature of similar regimes makes it very difficult for the beloved leader to get it.
Posted by: Yusuf Al-Misry | 02 April 2011 at 11:41 AM
Maybe this was the plan Assad had previously formed, to execute in the event of some unrest.
A plan formed well before Egypt and Tunisia, and designed not to answer the populace's desire for political freedom, but to provide order during unrest caused by lack of work, stresses from political refugees, and poor harvests.
If Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Libya had not just happened, the Syrian protests and response would fit perfectly into the "poor harvest + refugees = revolt + brutal baathist response" framework. Western analysts would see events as occuring within that framework, and would not be perplexed.
Posted by: crf | 02 April 2011 at 10:14 PM
Help me understand how the Aliwites (sic) fit into Islam? Is it true that that Sect is only 6% of the population in Syria? But has rules for 4 decades?
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 04 April 2011 at 07:43 PM
WRC
They are Muslims because they say they are, just as Mormons are Christians because they say they are. pl
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 04 April 2011 at 07:59 PM
Just got back to town, so i'm behind in my reading. Col Lang, my wife, who has Syrian family, did a 'spit take' when I read her your comment vis a vis the Alawites and Mormons. Great answer, you nailed it!
Posted by: Roy G | 04 April 2011 at 11:26 PM
Thanks PL! But like Sunni and Shia they (Alawites) are considered "others" by other MUSLIM sects? I am trying to get at the cohesion if any between MUSLIM sects as it plays out in Syria!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 05 April 2011 at 02:31 AM
WRC
Islam is a strictly monotheistic religion for both sunni and Shia. The Alawi believe in a trinitarian arrangement. The Druze are another spin-off of Shia Islam that IMO cannot really e considered Islamic except for political reasons. pl
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 05 April 2011 at 12:13 PM
Thanks again for the explanation PL! OMG! Heresy? Let all schismatics be punished. Let the one true religion rule.
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 05 April 2011 at 01:11 PM