#Libya - De Oppresso Liber - An Update

It has been a month since my original proposal to support the Libyan rebels with Special Forces ODAs. A lot has happened since then. At the behest of our host, I offer an update on the situation and my proposal. Let us not mince words. What I propose would actively aid the rebels in defeating Qathafi. There is nothing impartial about this. We should choose unequivocally to free the oppressed in Libya because it is both the right thing to do and well within our capability to accomplish.

The rebel forces are under equipped, under trained and disorganized. That is obvious. Yet they still manage to hold on in the face of mechanized onslaughts from Qathafi's army. They are a mobile force willing to give up ground rather than be cut off and destroyed when faced by vastly superior firepower. However, their mobility depends on light pickup trucks and late model sedans. This force is pretty much limited to the paved coastal road and not capable of cross country maneuver. Maintenance on this fleet of vehicles is probably nonexistent. Overloaded with rebel fighters, crew served weapons and ammunition, these vehicles will start breaking down in large numbers soon.  Another danger facing this road bound force is Qathafi's use of land mines. They've recently been seen in front of Sirte.  

The physical environment and available resources dictate that the rebels should remain a lightly armed, mobile guerilla force rather than trying to become a conventional mechanized army. To do this, the rebels do not need to be armed by NATO. They have the weapons they need.  If anything, NATO could provide fuel and supply trucks - preferably full. That would be helpful. The Libyan Army units and soldiers that have sided with the rebels are probably no more familiar with creating a mobile guerilla force than the youth in their pickup trucks. This is where the deployment of SFODAs would do the most good.

Rather than taking the time to formally organize and train conventional rebel military units from scratch, I would very quickly send several ODA's forward from Benghazi to the front lines to work with what's already there. Some informal small unit leaders have no doubt already emerged on the highway between Benghazi and Sirte. Begin by working with these natural small unit leaders and their followers to form units similar to the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) of WW II fame.  Judging only by watching news footage, it seems there are sufficient off road vehicles, 106 mm recoilless rifles, heavy machine-guns and light AAA to equip a number of small reconnaissance/raiding groups. The ODA's should deploy with vehicles (and possibly weapons) similar to what the rebels are already using, just newer with a lot less wear and tear on them. That way they can bring a lot more medical and communications gear than if they were just humping rucksacks. Whatever vehicles the ODAs bring in would be used to train the rebels and would not be part of any SF exclusive combat unit. Think of it as a small version of the lend-lease program.    

Training of these mobile guerilla recon/raiding units would include cross country navigation, mounted and dismounted reconnaissance patrolling, communications, and EFFECTIVE long range use of the weapons carried by the groups. That includes conservation of ammunition. Maintenance and logistics training will be critical. There must be a lot of mechanics in Libya to maintain all those pickups and cars. They can help the rebel force more by turning a wrench than by firing a weapon. I doubt this rebellion will be over in a week or two, and the side without effective logistics will eventually grind to a halt. Employment of these mobile guerilla units would begin with what UW doctrine terms confidence missions - limited objective missions to to train the rebels to operate effectively as a team and to build their confidence in their abilities. These actual combat missions would begin in a matter of days of the arrival of the ODAs at the front lines. No graduation certificates. No badges. Just on the job training to defeat Qathafi's forces.  As more rebel leaders develop or just surface in these initial units, new units would be formed around those new rebel leaders, trained and employed in combat. Special Forces soldiers will remain with the mobile units to train, advise and provide special skills such as coordinating air and naval fire support.

Recent reporting from the latest running of the Benghazi handicaps indicates that sandstorms may have hampered NATO interdiction of Qathafi's forces advancing from Sirte. Effective rebel LRDG-like patrols could continue to raid and harass Qathafi's logistical and fire support units when NATO aircraft are not available. When aircraft like the AC-130 and A-10 are available, they can be directed to targets by these patrols with the help of the embedded Green Berets. Qathafi's forces are apparently attempting to adapt to operate under NATO airstrikes.  The creation and employment of mobile guerilla units will become a necessary adaption for the rebels.            

I leave you with the NASA Pirate Code written by John Muratore, an engineer and NASA program manager renowned for his creativity and ability to get things done faster, better and cheaper. I believe his code describes how a mobile guerilla force of Libyan rebels trained, advised Special Forces professionals would operate and eventually bring freedom to all Libyans.    

- Pirates have to know what they’re doing.

- If we fail, there is no mercy.

- You’re operating outside the normal support structure of society. It’s all about knowing all the details.

- You hit hard and fast. Pirates don’t spend months wandering around.

- Pirates live on the edge or just in front of the wave that is about to catch them.

- Piracy is about taking risks. Occasionally we’re going to fail and you’ll get some holes blown in you.

- Pirates don’t have resources to waste. You’re always operating on a thin margin, not in fat city.

- We’re all banded together.

The Twisted Genius 

Comments

[The Twisted Genius]

Harper,

I don't think the rebel forces can take Tripoli by themselves or just with NATO air support. Qathafi could not take Misrata. I'm confident that the Qathafi regime and his security forces will continue to crack and the people of Tripoli will rise up when the time is right. It could still involve bloody street fighting against pockets of die hard Qathafi supporters. The rebels know that they either win or they die. Other than Qathafi and his immediate family, I doubt the pro-Qathafi supporters feel this way. That makes all the difference in the world.

[The Twisted Genius]

WFPIII,

You are probably right. Things never go exactly as planned. There could be false starts and leadership challenges. Special Forces soldiers are trained to deal with those challenges. Many now have experience in doing just that. I think the knowledge that they either win or they die will tend to focus the minds of the rebels.

[The Twisted Genius]

WRC - More hit and run rather than island hopping.

[Fred]

So the CIA is on the ground? I wonder what Qathafi's mercs are being offered? Join us and get paid 2X, 3X etc. They are behind his lines, afterall. Then there is the alternative; afterall it is rather hard to spend your paycheck when you are dead. It worked for Scipio against Hannibal, no reason it won't work now.

[dh]

"I wonder what Qathafi's mercs are being offered?"

Sliding pay scale I expect Fred. Depends how much Ghadaffi is paying rebel informants.

[Byron Raum]

I don't know whether it's just me, but I am getting the impression that MSNBC news hosts (Maddow, et al.) are feeling active disillusionment with Obama. If so, this leak would imply an attempt to stem that tide.

I also am one of those who feel that I should go back to voting Republican. Over the last decade, like many, I was chased out of the Republican party by the Tea Partiers. Ceding this ground was a mistake, allowing the fringe to control the center. Fortunately, there is no reason why this mistake cannot be redressed.

[par4]

@Byron Raum, The tea-baggers weren't around a decade ago. If your are feeling confusion about politics I suggest it's from watching corporate media.

[TamBram]

TTG,
Would missions deeper into the desert be worth contemplating, to indict mercenary reinforcements? I would imagine that would be difficult to do purely from the air. Daily Mail UK is reporting continued African merc. recruitment.

[Fred]

dh,

I think informants can be left to the rebels. A company of mercs might think twice if they were in the sights of an AC 130 or a couple of A-10s, at least I'm sure the second company would.

Byron,

I think the disillusionment has nothing to do with Libya and everything to do with Wisconsin, further tax cuts and no backbone in dealing with the current middle-class betrayals coming out of congress and multiple state legislatures.

[Fiorangela]

Naval Academy prof of Leadership & Ethics advises "Fighting Mercenaries with Mercenaries." http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-03-29/news/bs-ed-libya-contractors-20110329_1_unita-angolan-forces-angolan-government

Beyond absurd.
Israel is supplying Qaddafi's mercenaries -- the ones that are killing the citizens the US should, apparently, hire mercenaries to protect.

The difference is what it's always been in the US-Israel relationship: Israel takes in money, US shells out money.

[Charles]

I guess I still don't get it -- why we are there and why we think that the Rumsfeld way of war will work this time around?

Over the past several months State has been actively courting Qadhafi, even pressuring US defense companies to sell him arms and build him a Command and Control system as payback for his "coming in from the cold." Now he is a monster who must go (maybe) and a rebel group, whoever they are, should replace him.

And on the tactical discussion, we think that CIA/SOF supporting the rebels with airpower will bring down MQ, like Kabul, allowing the unknown rebels to form a democratic government and re-establish basic services that won't be destroyed by the regime, like Saddam. But I guess this time is different because our European allies will step up (like they are in the air campaign) to fix the things broken by the death throws of the regime and the inevitable bombing mishaps.

Am I the only one who thinks this is ludicrous?

[William R. Cumming]

NATO has formally announced that it will NOT repeat NOT supply arms to the insurgents in Libya.

[BillWade]

How about a 4 way civil war?

" Last week the issue came out in the open, as NBC's Richard Engel reported from Libya that one in five rebels was fighting Gadhafi because he believes the leader is Jewish."

Then there's the folks who will fight the "occupiers".

I was all for this in the beginning, now I'm not so sure, looks like a big mess forming.

[optimax]

A Republican could have leaked the covert op to the press. We don't know but as long as we're guessing, why not? Cheney/Libby proved they put party above national security when they outed Plame. G. Washington saw the dangerers of a party system where infighting took precedence over governing.

The desert horse race actually turned into an advantage for the rebels because it brought Quathafi's troops into the open when chasing the rebels, making them easy targets for NATO aircraft. The problem is the airstrikes seem to have dwindled since US took a backseat.

[dh]

"A company of mercs might think twice if they were in the sights of an AC 130 or a couple of A-10s, at least I'm sure the second company would."

Right Fred. This is why the Libyan army likes to trust mercenaries with all the important jobs. They also like to travel in large groups in clearly marked vehicles to make things easier for the pilots.

[The Twisted Genius]

TamBram,

Mercenary convoys would be a good target of opportunity, but launching overland missions to do this would be a waste of resources. Better to target Qathafi's command and control, logistics and fire support assets.

[clifford kiracofe]

TTG and Col. Lang,

1. "Arming the rebels" is getting a lot of attention in the media. In the instance where additional weapons might be desirable, sympathetic non-NATO states could make them available.

But my impression is that the professional military assessment here at SST is that they do not need additional weapons.

Please clarify for policy types who, hopefully, read this blog.

2. Arguably, Special Forces on the ground, integrated into covert ops with other elements, do not constitute regular "boots on the ground" and still less "occupation forces."

[dh]

They could probably be classed as temporary advisors or something. Plenty of wiggle room in 1973. But I do detect a certain reluctance among the rebels to embrace outside help.

[William R. Cumming]

Britain and France now arguing for supplying weaponry to insurgents!

[FB Ali]

TTG,

Secretary Gates was quite emphatic that there were not (and wouldn't be) any "boots on the ground". Does that rule out SFODAs? If so, do the Brits and/or French have the same capability? What about the CIA?

[The Twisted Genius]

Clifford Kiracofe,

1. From everything I've seen and read from the comfort of my Virginia home, I can emphatically say that the rebels do not need more arms. They have a higher concentration of heavy weaponry than any unit I have every served in. There were times when I would have given my left nut for the array of weaponry that the Libyan rebels now possess. Colonel Lang can speak for himself. He may not be as generous with his body parts.

2. Special Forces would definitely not be occupation forces. As far as "boots on the ground" is concerned, that might be mincing words. They would be advisors. Of course that invokes memories of Viet Nam. Just tonight, while listening to Gates say there will be no "boots on the ground" my wife asked me if I wore boots when I was on the ground. Interestingly enough, I sometimes wore lightweight Adidas running shoes... a nifty royal blue nylon model.

[The Twisted Genius]

Brigadier Ali,

I'm pretty certain that if Gates has the final word, there will be no SFODAs in Libya. The Brits and the French may have some capability, but they are primarily commando units. The CIA Special Activities Division can train foreign paramilitary forces. Most of their officers and their contractors are former Special Forces.

[FB Ali]

TTG,

Sorry to be so persistent. But would the CIA personnel or contractors normally try to act in the same role as SFODAs? Would they be capable of doing it?

My reason for asking is that the SFODA role that you have outlined appears to be very different from what the usual int or mil assistance/advisory role is.

[The Twisted Genius]

Brigadier Ali,

I never worked in the field with CIA Special Activities Division (SAD), so what I'm telling you is just my impressions and not policy. CIA/SAD officers are first clandestine case officers. Their approach to indigenous forces is as a recruited asset in service of the USG. The Special Forces approach to indigenous forces is different. An SFODA will organize, train and advise indigenous forces to assist those indigenous forces to attain their goals. Obviously the USG would support the goals of the indigenous forces before deploying the SFODA to assist them. Perhaps this is more of a philosophical difference, but if I were a rebel, I'd rather see the Green Berets than the CIA coming to help me.

Special Forces ase trained and organized to train indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare. That is different from the normal military assistance/advisory role.

You ask if the CIA could act in the same role as SFODAs. I'll give a qualified yes, but only because most of their paramilitary officers and paramilitary contractors are former Special Forces. That's where their core capability lies.

[arbogast]

I believe that the CIA does not wear boots. Or is not thought to wear boots.

Remarkably, I believe that's the distinction. Seriously.

In addition, what I read in the MSM is that the CIA is there to make sure that the Libyan rebels are supporters of the US... which is an excellent cover for whatever their mission might be.

Obama, with Krauthammer screaming in his ear about Clinton's amazing characterization of Syria's dictator as a reformer (it must be the start of the baseball season for Clinton to have thrown that fat a pitch), simply cannot affort to lose this one. Simply cannot.

Lots of CIA, no boots.

Thank you, TTG, for your posts. Thank you.