#Homage to DIA

 
I was once so privileged as to be an official of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in various capacities.  (CV on the blog).  I understand that in the last years DIA has performed as the premier agency of the US intelligence community.  This has been reflected n the quality of its HUMINT operations and the brilliance and integrity of its anaylsis within the process of National Intelligence Estimation particularly in the matter of Iran.

LTG Burgess (the director), whom I do not know, is to be commended for the support he has given his people under pressure.

pl

Comments

[The Twisted Genius]

YAY TEAM!

Colonel Lang, what brought this on?

[Patrick Lang]

TTG

I think that the analytic force has recovered from the damage Clapper did it when director. They have good leaders and Burgess whatever his reasons backed them up. pl

[The Twisted Genius]

I remember there was quite a bit of reorganization of the "Defense Intelligence Enterprise" while LTG Maples was the Director. One of the biggest changes was incorporating the analytical elements of the COCOM J2s into DIA. As an outsider looking at the analytical side, their leadership did strike me as effective and forward thinking. The analysts I worked with on an almost daily basis were very competent and more than held their own against their counterparts in the other Agencies. The increasing cooperation between the analytical and operational was also very effective. This cooperation extended to mutual support on individual HUMINT operations and analytical questions. It worked both ways.

[Patrick Lang]

MJ

OK. I will try once again to explain to you that the intelligence community (including DIA) does NOT recommend courses of action to policy makers. This is true in both the civilian and military worlds. Soo... They are not recommending anything to the president. pl

[Patrick Lang]

TTG

"One of the biggest changes was incorporating the analytical elements of the COCOM J2s into DIA."

Yes. Sending much of DIA's analytic force out to work for the COCOMs and away from the synergy that co-location in DC brought was one of Clapper's genius moves when he was director of DIA. He and I differed on this among other things.

He made it clear that he did not like strategic analysis. He preferred anti-aircraft guns and similar air tactical matters. Open ended questions were something he clearly wanted to avoid. So he sent the analysts to England, Honolulu, etc., and wanted to be a MANAGER of resources instead. Maples started bringing them back. p

[smoke]

To an outsider on all matters of intelligence, the thoughtful, informed discussions and insights at SST draw one back again and again, when all other voices make no sense. This, and the quietly impressive intelligence officer on the command staff of my husband's brigade for 15 mos in Baghdad, have given me some confidence in military intelligence.

But one always wonders with such scant indicators whether any conclusion is valid. Also, one wonders what happens between intelligence and the generals.

Reassuring to hear Col Lang's praise. Interesting the references to possible problems in comments.

@ pl "He made it clear that he did not like strategic analysis."
Just discovered at Amazon a book which may have some relevance. It reports the CIA's war in Laos, written by one of the men who ran it on the ground. "Cash on Delivery". Reviewers highlight candor, details, and a thoughtful post mortem, "the lessons learned and lost", as one reviewer calls it.

The CIA appears a very different entity from DIA, and the author appears to be an operative more than an analyst. Nevertheless, some questions, esp regarding collection, integration, and analysis of intelligence, may be common. Would be fascinating to hear a discussion between both operatives, analysts, and all users of intelligence.

[William R. Cumming]

PL! Is the annual budget and staffing of DIA classified?

[Charles I]

smoke, this place turned me around on the military period, never mind intelligence. As Pat points outcollectioan an analysis is not policy making, nor should it be.

Now, if our most of our policymakers were of the apparent moral fibre of our soldiers, our policy would per force be sounder.

A similar problem/perspective/dichotomy distinguished Soviet Military Intelligence, the GRU and its civilian counterpart, the KGB, the former loathing the latter and considering them baseless careerists serving a criminally corrupt CPSU.

[Charles I]

WRC, apparently it is, most is in the DOD budget, and this is the most detailed current reference to dollars a cursory search turns up

http://www.crocodyl.org/spies_for_hire/defense_intelligence_agency_dia_and_its_primary_contractors

[Patrick Lang]

Charles I

The GRU gents say (with clear reference to the FSB).

Harrumph, but WE are officers of the General Staff. pl

[Charles I]

I read all the old defectors, hell, even old OGPU stuff - precious few GRU tho, apparently they were burned alive in a oven if caught! - I could find in law school. Another old addiction.

Wish I could read French, read Clifford's old history.

[William R. Cumming]

If the link posted by Charles I is consulted and compared with estimates of $65B to $90B annually for IC then DIA is definitely not getting its fair share. I know the NRO and CIA are very expensive, one for reasons of technology and one for reason of benefits. And of course the NSA must listen to all conversations foreign and domestic and that must be expensive. Wonder what its WH coverage is? Monica Lewisky used the phone a lot calling Bill. Well DIA is serious people and I think McNamara made good decision in creating. So wondering how it will survive the forthcoming cutting of bone and muscle as well as frills from the DOD budget. My understanding is 80% of the IC budget is controlled by the SECDEF so will be interesting play over the next decade. By the way the CIA just released its open source Global 2025 report. Interesting take on the future. Now if the IC could just find out what motivations and intentions drive the world's leaders, not just capabilities we (US) would really have some important analysis available. I believe that availability might just have scared the US into supporting NO FLY over Libya. A surviving MQ leading that nation was alwayls scary and even more so if he survives this one. Did you hear he has announced his oil will only go to Germany, Russia, India, China and Brazil. Germany made the BRIC list because it OPPOSED the no fly zone. But hey they always have looked at the long term and usually that means supporting a dictator or two even domestically. Why does the fact that the rest of the EU cannot even defend itself without German approval resonate with some of the other EU nations?

[William R. Cumming]

PL! I looked for direct discussion of DIA in US Code and DOD delegations and found little! I assume this is intentional but is there a good open source history of the formation and operation of DIA from inception? Is there a DIA historian?