Dealing with change - FB Ali

Barack Obama was elected as the apostle and agent of change. He hasn’t been able to bring about much change, but is now likely to get his fill dealing with it ‒ not in the US, but in the Muslim world. What has happened in Tunisia and Egypt is not some passing phenomenon. There is a wave of change surging through Muslim countries, and it is likely to ebb and flow for a long time. Obama (and his successor) are going to have their hands full coping with it. As will other powers. For this is the latest phase in the relationship between the Muslim world and the rest.

The first phase of the West’s encounter with Islam was one of conflict, from the containment (and later eradication) of Moorish Spain, to the Crusades, and then the inroads of the Ottoman Empire into Europe. The second phase was the colonial one, when Europe occupied and ruled over Muslim lands. The third began with these countries winning their freedom after the Second World War, but was characterized by Western influence (and even control) being exercised in them through dictators, monarchs and oligarchs. The fourth phase is beginning now, with the Muslim peoples rising up against these rulers and seeking to wrest power from them and their Western patrons.

The relationship of other powers to Muslims has generally followed the same pattern, but has not yet fully matured. Russia still holds some Muslim peoples in colonial subjugation, while controlling others, nominally independent, through friendly dictators. China’s Muslims are still at the colonial stage. Both Russia and China face the same challenges as those the West has already faced or is facing now.

To deal with this surge sweeping through the Muslim world, the West (and, principally, the USA) needs to understand what is behind it, where it’s coming from, where it’s going. The first point to realise is that this phenomenon is occurring throughout all the Muslim lands, though its intensity and form will differ in different countries due to their particular circumstances. However, there are certain generic factors causing this upsurge in all of them, though to varying degrees.

The major factors underlying the turmoil (actual or potential) in Muslim countries are: over-population, economic privation, large disparities in wealth between those at the top and the rest, lack of opportunity, large-scale corruption, state repression and lack of freedom, absence of governance and rule of law, and foreign dominance. Certain recent positive trends have caused these negative factors (which have prevailed for long but have recently intensified) to now acquire the potential to lead to an eruption: a preponderance of young people in the population, wide access to information through the internet and TV, and in some countries (e.g, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran) lots of educated young people.

The above factors only make the ground ripe for change; what transforms that potential into an actual movement for change is the work of activists. These are of two basic types: the educated, secular-oriented young (whom we have seen appear prominently in Tunisia and Egypt), and Islamists. The former are limited to the few Muslim countries that have large numbers of educated young people, in most the agents of change are likely to be the latter. Even in the former countries, because the educated youth have no political organization (none were tolerated by the dictators), the Islamists, because of their organization and dedication, are likely to play an important role in how the change develops.

The term “Islamist” has been bandied around a lot in recent years in Western discourse ‒ in the media, academia and policy-making ‒ but without much understanding of the reality behind it. However, to deal with the change taking place in the Muslim world in any rational and coherent fashion, it is necessary to understand this phenomenon objectively, and not as it has been painted by those with vested interests (such as Muslim dictators, Israeli functionaries or neocon ideologues): as religious extremists or worse.

There is no generally accepted version of what Islamists are, or their different kinds. I shall not adopt any particular academic view of the phenomenon, but will discuss it from a perspective that makes it easier to understand developments in the Muslim world, and the role that Islamists play (or may be expected to play) in them.

Islamists are activists whose main motivating force is Islam; their aim is to improve the condition and status of Muslims, to bring them to a level appropriate for followers of this faith, a level that they believe they were at sometime in the past. There are two main types of Islamists: political and religious. Both seek inspiration from Islam’s earlier days, but they look at different aspects of that history.

Political Islamists hark back to the glory days of the Islamic empire, when Muslims were not only the principal power in the world but also had the most advanced civilization of the time. What they seek to achieve is to increase the political, economic and military power of the Muslim world, and to bring these countries closer together. They can be thought of as Islamic nationalists, with the ‘nation’ being the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community. That is why it is easy for them to work with (plain) nationalists, and vice versa. Some examples of this category are the ruling AKP party in Turkey, the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and the Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party) of Tunisia.

Religious Islamists derive their inspiration from the idealized “perfect” society of early Islam, and seek to recreate it through the observance of Islamic laws (shariah) and practices in their country. As such, their horizon usually does not extend beyond their own country, and they are not much interested in international or regional power dynamics. Since the laws and practices they espouse differ between various sects/schools, they are sometimes in conflict with other religious Islamists (especially sharp are the divisions between their Sunni and Shia versions). They are mainly conservative and inward looking (in contrast to political Islamists). Examples of such organizations are the various religious parties and movements in Pakistan and India, the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The concerns of these two types of Islamists are not mutually exclusive. Political Islamists accept and often adopt Islamic practices, and pay at least lip service to shariah, though, generally, their primary adherence is to Islam’s values and ideals, its ethos and culture, its spirit rather than form. That is why such Islamists of all denominations, including Shia and Sunni and even the non-practising, can easily work together towards their common goal.

Similarly, religious Islamists acknowledge the desirability of Muslim countries getting closer and becoming stronger. Within each category there can be variance among their members in the degree of importance they attach to these objectives. However, the principal goals of the two types of organizations are different, and they do not let these other (theoretically) desirable ends prejudice the pursuit of those. Consequently, they sometimes work with each other, but often engage in competition or even conflict.

Due to their different goals and approaches to Islam, these two types of Islamist groups appeal to different types of adherents. The political variety attracts younger urban dwellers, generally better educated, often professionals, relatively well off, whereas religious Islamists tend to be from rural or small-town backgrounds, with lower educational and income levels, older and more conservative in outlook.

There are two other types of Islamists, who lie at either end of the spectrum. On the lower-impact side are the missionaries; their main activity is to bring people into the fold of Islam through proselytising, as well as to bring about a spiritual reformation among secular or non-practising Muslims by persuading them to become more observant of their faith (the biggest example is the Tablighi Jamaat). Their (unintended) impact is to increase the numbers of potential adherents to the other Islamist categories.

At the other end of the Islamist spectrum are the jihadis (jihad basically means “struggle”, but this term is now generally used for those who resort to violence or armed struggle in the defence (as they see it) of Islam). The modern jihadi phenomenon was, interestingly, created with the active assistance of the USA. Eager to intensify the Afghan insurrection against the 1980s Soviet occupation of their country, the US encouraged and assisted Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in converting a nationalist struggle into an Islamic jihad. Its success in ousting the ‘mighty’ Soviet empire served as incentive and model for other Islamists.

Those Islamists who take up armed struggle (jihad) do so in response to what they perceive as attacks by foreigners on Muslims or their land, or its occupation, including through the agency of local Muslim “puppets”. Such have been the jihadi attacks in Kashmir and its occupier, India, the Pashtun jihad currently under way in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan, Hamas’s campaign against Israel, etc. Even the attacks on the USA by al-Qaeda were claimed to be in response to US support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Jihadis can be Islamists of either kind ‒ political or religious ‒ and, while their immediate aims relate to their struggle, their ultimate goals are those of their original category. Thus, the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are religious Islamist jihadis, while al-Qaeda is a political jihadi organization, as is the military wing of Hamas.

To sum up, Islamists are activists whose main motivating force is Islam. The two main types of such parties or movements are political Islamists and religious Islamists. It is wrong to think of these parties as exclusively either one or the other type, rather the criterion is: which is their primary orientation? These distinctions are not academic, but have important practical implications for the policies these organizations follow, many of which affect the rest of the world. Jihadis are offshoots of one or other of these two types of Islamists, and have the same ultimate goals as their original type.

As we said earlier, to deal rationally with the change bubbling up throughout the Muslim world, the United States and the West need to understand it, especially the aims and motivations of the activists who actualise and lead it. This point is illustrated by discussing a few examples below.

The upsurge in Egypt is making headlines these days. The US has welcomed the change and lauded the young people whose actions brought it about. At the same time it is expressing anxiety as to the role the Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan) might play in the future. If it is understood that the Ikhwan are political Islamists (i.e, Islamic nationalists) then it should be clear that they are not going to prove to be religious extremists. This is important because the Ikhwan are likely to play an important role, in alliance with secular nationalists, in the future of Egypt. (This same situation prevails in Tunisia with respect to al-Nahda).

In Afghanistan, the US claims that its principal goal is to prevent al-Qaeda from re-establishing a base there. Because it believes (or, at least, says) that AQ and the Taliban are linked, it is continuing its war against the latter. The fact is that these two are different types of Islamists, with differing ultimate goals. The Taliban want to re-establish their religious state in Afghanistan (or, at least, part of it), not to wage jihad outside their borders (they appear to have offered as much several times). Understanding their goals would have enabled the US to end its Afghan war while achieving its stated goal (if it had really wanted to). As it can still do today.

The problems of economic deprivation and governance that led to the Egyptian uprising have all been present in Pakistan for some time now. But it doesn’t have the secular, young, middle-class activists who triggered it there. The other main reason that Pakistan didn’t blow up before Egypt did is that its Islamists are of the religious variety. They are not interested in the issues that caused the Egyptian revolution. However, when there were some signs that the country’s blasphemy law might be amended, they shut down the country with a strike call and brought out enough people in protest to form a 2-mile long procession in a provincial metropolis, causing the government to hastily back down. The story here would have been very different if these had been political Islamists!

Iran is ruled by a (often uneasy) coalition of religious and political Islamists. The former are predominant in the clergy and the judiciary, while the latter are prominent in the presidency and government. A failure to understand this dichotomy led to the US and the West rebuffing the attempts by the moderate President Khatami to establish better relations. Similarly, the 2009 protest movement was seen as an uprising of secular youth against the religious establishment. While many of the young people were undoubtedly secular-minded, the leadership comprised political Islamists; if they had succeeded, the government would still have been an Islamist one, though more moderate.

An important development in the Muslim world took place recently in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan consolidated the position of his AKP party in the country, which enabled him to turn outwards. From being the sick man of Europe and the poor man knocking on Europe’s door, he brought Turkey back into the Muslim world as its leading nation. Led by political Islamists, Turkey will play an important role in the renaissance of the Muslim world. Western observers who view Turkish actions through the paradigm of the Ottoman Empire completely miss what is going on.

The changes occurring in the Muslim world, both on the surface and beneath it, are going to affect the rest of the world for quite some time to come. To deal with them sensibly and rationally it is necessary to understand the forces and the dynamics behind them. The United States, with its worldwide interests, has a lot at stake in getting it right.

© FB Ali  (Feb 2011)

Comments

[Kerim]

Well, well, well it would seem these moslems are a complex lot...
It will be interesting to see if the western world is capable of dealing with that complexity and the new challenge.
Thanks FB Ali for this piece which should be mandatory reading for those who would like to understand the dynamics at work in the muslim world.

[judith weingarten]

"Even the attacks on the USA by al-Qaeda were claimed to be in response to US support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine."

This was only one of Osama bin Laden's three reasons for war against the West and it wasn't originally his primary grievance. His fatwa of 1998 is quite clear, giving his reasons in this order: First, was the US presence in Saudi Arabia, the holiest of places; second the First Gulf War which he blamed for over 1 million Iraqi casualties, as well as the continuing blockade of Iraq; third was the state of Israel and occupation of Palestine.
It's as well to get the actual history right.

[ISL]

Thanks FBI Ali for a very insightful (and largely lacking in the mainstream) analysis. I would like to propose that if the US is to understand these important aspects, it must be willing, yet there always is significant resistance to change and preference for consistency in any large institution.

For example, despite ample evidence that business as usual on Wall St. crashed and nearly destroyed capitalism globally (absent an unprecedented and ongoing expansion of the money supply) the Obama admin. has preferred consistency and made no meaningful changes.

Thus, IMO, the changes to date in Egypt are insufficient to cause a reassessment of policy against the agents that benefit from the status quo.

I would greatly appreciate feedback from the SST community on what level of change would suffice to cause a non-superficial reassessment of US ME policy.

IMO it will require an Shah-Khomenei level of change (note islamicistic or true democratic are both equally challenging to US ME policy) in Egypt, the House of Saud, maybe Pakistan, and potentially one or two other countries (but not most).

I appreciate your mention of Turkey, where the changes have been equally significant, but have (I argue) occurred so slowly as not to incite a re-think (Consider, a NATO ally refusing US airplane passage against one of Turkey's long-term enemies, Saddam's Iraq).

[FB Ali]

Kerim,

I wrote about activists. However, the general beliefs and attitudes of political and religious Islamists are reflected in the general Muslim population, though they push only a relatively small number into activism. So, yes, a “complex lot”. Like any other world community.

Judith Weingarten,

Thank you for supplying the other reasons for AQ’s attacks on the US. You will have noted, of course, that both these others fall squarely within the general jihadi motivation that I had stated: attacks on Muslim peoples or their lands.

[VietnamVet]

Brigadier Ali,

Excellent Presentation.

Islam and Christianity are evangelistic religions always in conflict that around 1600 settled into an uneasy lines of separation south of Europe, up through the Balkans, across the Hindu Kush and in Asia across the Southern Philippine Islands. In response to this conflict, the Reformation in Europe led to capitalism, science and secularism (i.e. Thomas Jefferson). All tried to understand the world as it really was. This gave a profound advantage to the British. The sun never set on their Empire and their language. After WWII, America tried to take up their mantle. It did a passable job up to 1989. Then in a profound tragedy, as a result of the Eastern European revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the neo-liberals seized power and the United States and the UK made the Great Jump back to Robber Barons, Colonial Wars and the 19th Century.

Four decades ago when I was in SE Asia, there was a profound difference in outlook and temperament between native speakers and those who learned English in school and could communicate clearly in English like you. There are Islamists who never learned English. They have power locally, maybe nationally, but never internationally. This is why our colonial war against the Taliban is so stupid. Then, there are the English speakers that turn into Islamists and fly airplanes into high-rises.

In the 21st Century there are the new secular international English speakers. As an Egyptian girl said on TV, “Of course I speak English, I am Egyptian.” Since the US and UK have jumped back a century, and are cutting government spending in face of the Great Recession and continuing the forever wars, there will be millions and millions more unemployed in America, Ireland and Great Britain. They will learn from the secular Egyptians through the internet, facebook and tweeter. The next Western revolutionary generation will take up the Egyptian cry; ‘We are prepared to die because we are already dead.’

We are all Egyptians now.

[judith weingarten]

FB Ali, You are right, of course, that all three reasons reflect the idea of an "attack" on Muslim peoples/lands -- but it should also be emphasized that the US bases in Saudi Arabia comprised a metaphorical "attack" -- their mere presence, and not their hostility -- which is somewhat different. In theory, then, any Western presence in any Muslim land could fall into this category and invite reprisals.

[JLCampos]

It seems to me that Islam and the State being coextensive any failure of the State is tacitly a religious failure and therefore the rise of a fervid religious man that promises prosperity through religious strictures is a necessity for the maintenance of both the State and religion.

[BillWade]

I think Obama missed a great opportunity to enhance relations with the Muslim world by not providing a mechanism to remove Mubarak forcibly (along with his staff) and quickly. Heads should roll over this mistake. But then again, I said the same thing the day after 911.

"They hate us for our freedoms", makes me sick every time I recall that propaganda from Bush.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

To "get it right" the US would have to drop its Israel-centric foreign policy. Will "domestic politics" in the US allow such a change in policy?

Republican presidential hopefuls are making journeys to Israel right now with a view to 2012. Ritual travel to Israel for the 51st primary? (or 1st?)

[FB Ali]

Judith Weingarten,

....the US bases in Saudi Arabia comprised a metaphorical "attack" ‒ their mere presence, and not their hostility....

For the US their troops were just “present” ‒ indeed, at the invitation of the Saudi government. That is not how it seemed to AQ and other jihadis. To them it was an “occupation” (which is what I wrote in the article), facilitated by the US lackeys who ruled the birthplace of Islam. Hence justifying an attack on the homeland of the occupier.

JL Campos,

You have missed the whole point I was making, namely, that Islam is viewed differently by different Muslims. For political Islamists (and ordinary Muslims who think on those lines) the “State” isn’t a religious entity, but mainly a political and economic one. Such Muslims don’t respond to any fervid religious man that promises prosperity through religious strictures.

[Medicine Man]

I have always regarded al-Qaeda's first grievance, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, as being a convenient way to attack the Saudi monarchy. I realize that this theory doesn't contradict your observations about the motives of Islamic groups, Brigadier FB, given that any political group — Islamic or otherwise — must first be interested in attaining power, often at the expense of the existing rulers. Is this cynical view of AQ somewhat plausible though, or are they strictly ideological in your opinion?

[JLCampos]

FB Ali:
I don't want to appear to be contentious but my statement regarding Islam requires some background. I have in mind people like ibn Tumart Khomeiny and al Wahhab and the many Israelite prophets. They preached that the evils of society were due to a distancing of customs from the real religion, and that only by a return to what they understood as the pure religion felicity may be obtained.
In other aspects Condorcet's paradox shows that the majority choices are self annihilating that only a minority rules the state.
This is clear in economics where the cost at the margin rules the prices in general and it is the Lenins and Maos whose will eventually rules the day.
I wish the Muslims the greatest happiness but from the standpoint of experience one cannot deny the power of the single man or the small dedicated group.
Hegel defines fanaticism as the impossibility of seeing nuances. Many religious men have this problem and they may be eloquent enough to convince a large amorphous majority of their truth.

[Grumpy]

Sir, I am not a Muslim, but I don't expect the world to believe the same way as me. I want everybody to have the right to choose their own faith. As I read you were please, I appreciated the fact that you tried to explain the differences for dumb old Vets, like me. If I step back and clinically look at this, I should see no threat, but that is not the case. You suggest that this is a regional issue, for only the Middle East. The more radical segments have objectives of absolute dominance of the whole world. This is one of those times, where I would be glad to be wrong. At this point in time, I don't see the necessary evidence for that response.

[Saeed Malik.]

A very good analysis indeed. One point generally missed out is that nearly in all cases, including that of al Qaida, all Islamist movements, of either stripe, have been built up, at one time or another,with the help of the West.This was done to counter socialist,secular, and nationalist movements in Islamic lands.And these latter were sufficiently beaten down, so that they did not remain a threat during the cold war. However, these were the movements that could check the Islamists at the political level. Their dismantling has left the field to the Islamists, and now has come the time to reap what has been sown, in a better part of the Muslim world. But if the West has to make a start to dousing the fires of upheaval that have erupted, or threaten to do so, it would be worth their while to start with dispensing justice, and seen to be doing so.
Saeed.

[Cal]

Grumpy..

What leads to think that radical Islam want to dominate the 'whole world'?

And how do you think they would go about dominating the whole world?

With what?

[Charles I]

Thanks FB.

Nice rubric. Fits nicely with what we saw on Taheer Square,and the contrast with recent news video of Pakistani's demanding erstwhile consultant Mr. Davis' execution comports with your analysis.

[Peter Principle]

Certain recent positive trends have caused these negative factors (which have prevailed for long but have recently intensified) to now acquire the potential to lead to an eruption: a preponderance of young people in the population, wide access to information through the internet and TV, and in some countries (e.g, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran) lots of educated young people.

So is this the Muslim world's 1968? Or will it be something more significant and lasting?

[JimTicehurst]

Yes Saeed..
You are very correct..
Ironic isn't it...
We don't even learn from past Mistakes..Even the Russians Keep it Simple..
Seems Best not to Cook to Many Meals..If you Burn the food..or Don't like the Taste later..
The Dirty Dish's Just keep Piling Up..Don't they..

[rjj]

@Grumpy - "If I step back and clinically look at this, I should see no threat, but that is not the case. ... The more radical segments have objectives of absolute dominance of the whole world."

Islamists, Grumpy? Not the radical Mammonite fundamentalists who have stripped our production capacity, indentured us to China, and raided the treasury?

[Grumpy]

Cal,

Are you saying that radical Islam is*not*trying to dominate the whole world? I should be more accurate, does their behavior support that viewpoint? As I look at the recent behavior of many of the Islamic hierarchy, I see the readers imposing their viewpoint on passive Muslims. Without getting into too much detail, it should be each individual's choice. if you are going treat women a certain way, the same should be true of men, including leaders. There are many ways to deal with transgressions. Please, tell me why the men were the leaders, many times are not punished at all? When we look at the term, “leader”, what do we mean? First, a leader is an example in all of the ways. When a leader fails, the punishment should be much worse for him. But when that very same leader is compliant to a basic respect of all faiths, then I would have no problem. We all need to respect each other's faith.

[Jake]

General,

Thank you for the education and writings.

What is the likelihood that the Ikhwan can be compromised by extreme religious factions? The reason for this line of questioning is that the PEW Research Poll seems to indicate a very sharpe difference and a religious bent to governance in the ME which in some cases means Egypt as well. Or do you see another Turkish style of governance developing?

http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-hamas-and-hezbollah/

[FB Ali]

Jake,

One needs to be cautious in interpreting the results of such polls. The methodology requires them to use as representative a sample as possible, but, due to the highly stratified structure of most of these countries, the views elicited by the polls may not be the “effective” ones, ie, those that guide the actions of the governments or even the peoples of these countries.

For example, in April-May this Pew poll found that 67% of Turks had an unfavourable view of Hamas. Who could have predicted from this result that, barely a month later, Turkey would break its deep ties with Israel over Hamas and Gaza (of course, Israel’s stupid and brutal response to the aid flotilla helped)?

I don’t think more conservative, religious sentiment in Egypt (not well organized) will stop the Ikhwan from pursuing a “political” policy ‒ though they will continue to pay lip service to the concerns of this constituency.

Grumpy,

I can assure you that Muslims, Islamists and even jihadis are not even dreaming of “world domination”; they’re too busy trying to get out from under the control of the power that does dominate the world ‒ the US.

As many people have been saying on this blog, there are powerful interests in the US which want its people to be so scared and concerned about this ‘looming danger’ that they don’t notice they’re being robbed blind, of their wealth and their liberty, by these interests.

For many decades they had people s*** scared of the big bad Commies who were seeking “world domination”. When that paper tiger collapsed, they had to find another bogeyman to keep people scared and under control.

There are dangers around you, my friend, but they are not Muslims seeking world domination.

[Jake]

General,

Yes while you are very correct to advise caution on interpreting poll results. We however, also have to be very cautious on interpreting reactions by a government and how its views its foreign policy issues and responds to it verses, how it's citizenry understandings it and responds to it...

Both are not always on the same wave length.

Hence, part of the cause and effect of revolutions.

[Ingolf Eide]

Apologies for being so long in responding, Furrukh. What a marvellously clear conceptual framework. Thank you.