Restrepo - 2

Having watched "Restrepo" again and having re-read the available material on the operations of 2/503 PIR as part of 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Korengal Valley of Kunar Province of Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008 my conclusion is that the letters of reprimand given to the commanders of 173rd Airborne Brigade, 2/503 battalion (LTC Ostlund) and 2/503 C company in connection with the action at Wanat were deserved.  (see my earlier posts on the battle of Wanat) 

Furthermore, the level of leadership and planning displayed in the operations of B 2/503 as reflected in the "Restrepo" film are unimpressive.  Neither LTC Ostlund, (the battalion CO) nor (then) Captain Kearney (B Company) seem to have been able to comprehend the need to maintain firm but respectful relations with village elders and tribesmen in the AOR.  Both Ostlund and Kearney are shown in the film in interactions with these people.  In these settings they are aggressively confrontational, disrespectful in speech and posture and unwilling to really listen to the other side or understand what they are saying.  The incident involving the death of a farmer's cow at Restrepo is representative.  When approached by elders with a request for compensation, the battalion or brigade command refused payment in specie and instead offered to pay in mess hall supplies.  This is inherently unfair since the cow was a capital good for the farmer and the food supplies were consumer goods.  At other points in the film Captain Kearney decides during operations to employ tactical air against buildings likely to house family members of local farmers.  As a result several children and villagers are killed or wounded. Kearney is seen in the film saying that he needs to learn to do this better.  He was correct.

The general impression given by this film is that the officers of these paratroops were particularly inept in the command tone that they imparted to relations with the villagers in the Konergal Valley.  LTC Ostlund was quoted in the news reporting about Wanat as saying that he was puzzled by the villagers and determined to impose his will on them and make them faithful supporters of the Kabul government. This attitude imparted to his command (2/503) in both the Wanat and Restrepo situations probably contributed to the continuing willingness of the villagers to participate in combat operations against 2/503.

There are, in fact, some curiously and sadly humorous moments in the "Restrepo" film.  Captain Kearney's "high school" locker room pep talk to his men represents a particular low in the display of troop leading skills.

I could continue on such "issues" as the inadequately dug in position at OP Restrepo. One of the NCOs on the position actually says in the film that the locals could over run them at any time.  How often were these particular men rotated off Restrepo for rest?  After a while they started to act more than a little squirrelly up there. What were the available all weather fires for close in defense of this position? etc.

I will welcome corrections of fact but not interpretation about all this.

We lost in the Konergal Valley?  This should not be a surprise.  LTC Ostlund and his officers were not of the Major Jim Gant variety.  Too bad.  pl 

Comments

[patrick lang]

Cadet

It is so easy to be just one of the men with no better standards. You must be more than that. You must be the sacrificial leader who will lead them to right conduct. Our vocation is in violence and destruction in service of the state and for that reason you must be an educated person so that you know where the boundaries lie. pl

[walrus]

Watched Restrepo on TV last night.

I was not impressed by the lack of leadership on too many levels even to mention.

The only way that place was viable would be with OP's on the hills and enough artillery at Restrepo to cover them.

[Alpha53]

I had 3 commands in my army career. I never criticized my predecessor. Kearney repeatedly makes disparaging comments about Capt. McKnight in front of his men and the Shura. That's an indication that he is thinks about showing how much more effective HE is compared to McKnight. Unethical and makes the troops view him as petty. Who knows what the Shura thinks?

[Patrick Lang]

Alpha

Yes. Not my first rodeo either and I was immediately struck by the lack of professionalism in the remarks. My wife, a fine judge of things military, looked ill at the thought. The whole unit reeked of greenness, although they must have had more experience than was showing. The ourpost,the company Hq., all of these installations looked like they had been built by boy scouts on a weekend. Instead of letting these guys sit around tattooing each other and playing grab-ass all day why didn't this CO keep them working improving the position? One more thing - did I understand the cow incident to have involved a couple of these Afghans walking into the position from ABOVE on the hill? pl

[JD]

I've watched this documentary twice and was disturbed and embarrassed by several things.

1) A Company Commander who makes no attempt to learn about or study his AO/Enemy prior to touchdown in the AO. He just assumes he's going to walk-in "kill the enemy" and suddenly end the fire fights.
2) Awful interactions at the Shura with the local elders. Act like an officer, stop swearing, know the personalities and power brokers in the village, and attack that network.

In general the whole company seems over matched, especially the senior leadership. I'm glad, Col Lang wrote his thoughts and concurs.

And as for the cow incident, pay for it, there are FOO Funds and many other sources of money a the Company level to handle incidents like that.

Speculation: It's unlikely a cow entangles itself in C-Wire and needs to be shot and killed. It's much more likely a group of bored troops wants to eat some fresh cow and are bored out on post.. look at the SFCs eyes, reaction to the incident, and how he handles calling it in, and judge for yourself.

I'm a former Marine Captain, with plenty of fighting in two Helmand, Afghan tours, one which was training Afghans and a lot of my opinion is based upon my own experiences.

[Trent]

In Junger's book about the same subject he details the soldiers shooing the cow into the concertina wire, killing and barbequing it.

War, Junger, pp. 199-202

[Mustang6]

I'd hesitate to judge these soldiers so quickly based on edited film. I'm not saying that some of these things aren't accurate, nor am I making excuses for the apparent leadership deficit. I just know that sometimes you have to see the whole picture to understand the thought process a Commander goes through. It is not the critic who counts......

//Marine Maj sends

[turcopolier]

Mustang6

Rubbish I have a lot of combat service and I know trash when I see it. pl

[Tyler]

This post is a blast from the past.

After reading COL Hackworth's "Steel My Soldier's Hearts", it sounds like Restrepo was devolving into the situation COL Hackworth wandered into. The Army's policy of taking in anyone who could fog a mirror by breathing it on it is definitely showing its failings by this point.

I'm not officer trained, but it seems like the mission given to B Co. would have been more appropriate for a battalion sized unit. Doing more with less only works up to a point.

As far as on the soldier level, it seemed like the NCOs were too chummy with the enlisted. I don't remember seeing anyone getting dropped in the front leaning rest, on a punishment detail, or anything like that. Instead it seemed like mugging for the camera was the order of the day.

I laid 15KM of triple strand concertina shortly after arriving at FOB Salerno. Why the hell they weren't busy building gun emplacements and bunkers I'll never know.