Restrepo - 2

Having watched "Restrepo" again and having re-read the available material on the operations of 2/503 PIR as part of 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Korengal Valley of Kunar Province of Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008 my conclusion is that the letters of reprimand given to the commanders of 173rd Airborne Brigade, 2/503 battalion (LTC Ostlund) and 2/503 C company in connection with the action at Wanat were deserved.  (see my earlier posts on the battle of Wanat) 

Furthermore, the level of leadership and planning displayed in the operations of B 2/503 as reflected in the "Restrepo" film are unimpressive.  Neither LTC Ostlund, (the battalion CO) nor (then) Captain Kearney (B Company) seem to have been able to comprehend the need to maintain firm but respectful relations with village elders and tribesmen in the AOR.  Both Ostlund and Kearney are shown in the film in interactions with these people.  In these settings they are aggressively confrontational, disrespectful in speech and posture and unwilling to really listen to the other side or understand what they are saying.  The incident involving the death of a farmer's cow at Restrepo is representative.  When approached by elders with a request for compensation, the battalion or brigade command refused payment in specie and instead offered to pay in mess hall supplies.  This is inherently unfair since the cow was a capital good for the farmer and the food supplies were consumer goods.  At other points in the film Captain Kearney decides during operations to employ tactical air against buildings likely to house family members of local farmers.  As a result several children and villagers are killed or wounded. Kearney is seen in the film saying that he needs to learn to do this better.  He was correct.

The general impression given by this film is that the officers of these paratroops were particularly inept in the command tone that they imparted to relations with the villagers in the Konergal Valley.  LTC Ostlund was quoted in the news reporting about Wanat as saying that he was puzzled by the villagers and determined to impose his will on them and make them faithful supporters of the Kabul government. This attitude imparted to his command (2/503) in both the Wanat and Restrepo situations probably contributed to the continuing willingness of the villagers to participate in combat operations against 2/503.

There are, in fact, some curiously and sadly humorous moments in the "Restrepo" film.  Captain Kearney's "high school" locker room pep talk to his men represents a particular low in the display of troop leading skills.

I could continue on such "issues" as the inadequately dug in position at OP Restrepo. One of the NCOs on the position actually says in the film that the locals could over run them at any time.  How often were these particular men rotated off Restrepo for rest?  After a while they started to act more than a little squirrelly up there. What were the available all weather fires for close in defense of this position? etc.

I will welcome corrections of fact but not interpretation about all this.

We lost in the Konergal Valley?  This should not be a surprise.  LTC Ostlund and his officers were not of the Major Jim Gant variety.  Too bad.  pl 

Comments

[b]

Having seen the movie myself now, I agree with the Colonel's analysis. I'd have used some harsher words ...

I am not sure though that Major Jim Gant's way is that much better. Very early in his paper he tells how he sided with one tribe/village against another without really knowing about either. He made some friends, but also some enemies. Sure that's better than what was done in the Korengal and at Wanat. A solution for the conflict it was not.

There is a Danish documentary, "Armadillo", out now that was filmed over a complete tour of a Danish platoon. (It is not in English but easy to "get" even not knowing the language.)

I recommend it for comparison with Restrepo.