I think this film should be required as an experience of the present war in Afghanistan. I think the production by Junger and Heatherington is very good.
At the same time I have questions about what I see in the film. I know that according to some famous dictum it is impossible to observe something without changing the thing itself.
Nevertheless, I have spent a lot of time in my "sort of life" hanging out with combat troops in combat, ours, theirs, etc. and this film disturbs me in a number of ways.
This half platoon of parachute infantry and the officers who stuck them out on the end of a ridge finger in "apache" country for a year without apparent relief seem odd to me.
I am going to write some more about this after I see the film again and read the comments of the veterans who visit this place. pl
Col,
I saw this about a month ago. I'd like to see your comments. Both this unit and their predecessors seem to have been left in limbo. There is the tactical aspect, then the strategy. Does anyone really think people from this valley are a threat to US national security?
Posted by: Fred | 30 November 2010 at 12:04 PM
Hisenberg principle! Perhaps the most famous physicist of the 20th Century in the long long run.
Hey were these guys bait of some kind?
Are there LURPs in Afghanistan?
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 30 November 2010 at 12:27 PM
Sayin Albayim,
Your opinion about this film is of professional importance to me, I am looking forward to your further comments. I am downloading the film as I write. I am familiar with this project from its inception, looks and feels great, much on the lines of Samuel Fuller Korean War films. Much underrated...
I am at the start of a Korean War themed film, perhaps someday I can access your knowledge about the fighting men in desperate settings. Strange thing is, the more one becomes familiar with a subject, military and tactics, strategy and much more too in your case, the more critical one becomes of new work. Then, it becomes more difficult to watch a movie on a particular martial subject, challenging one to remember to lean more towards the artistic and humanistic qualities of the work on hand than the historical or tactical accuracy.
Posted by: Kunuri | 30 November 2010 at 12:31 PM
It's available from NetFlix now and they'll also offer it in streaming video on Dec 7th. I just ordered it.
Posted by: BillWade | 30 November 2010 at 02:04 PM
Dvd Bluerays available here today;
http://shop.nationalgeographic.com/ngs/browse/productDetail.jsp?productId=2000175
Posted by: Charles I | 30 November 2010 at 02:53 PM
Does anyone remember a very thoughtful review by an Afghan vet made queasy not only by Junger as war-lover, but especially by his simplistic depiction of "grunts" as lacking in a deep and nuanced thoughtfulness about the larger political and moral questions about this war? Did I read this here? Does anyone have a link?
Posted by: rst | 30 November 2010 at 02:56 PM
I am thankful that I got the chance to support that location and those in the rest of the Korengal as part of my last deployment. I was proud to provide DUSTOFF for them. It was always an adventure working missions in and out of that entire valley. Every 9 line I flew there made me very glad to be an aviator. I was so glad to see the footage from this spring when we finally pulled out of that godforsaken valley and blew those positions. There was a saying from the Viper soldiers we supported, "Damn the Valley!" I hope many people see this film and realsie just what they are asking of their soldiers. I am thankful for the opportunity to help those guys get to safety and treatment when they needed it!DAMN THE VALLEY!!
Posted by: Chopperdoc | 30 November 2010 at 05:00 PM
Chopperdoc,
I appreciate your comment and your service. For some reason, because of your name, I thought you fixed motorcycles. Duh, slap to the head!
Now, I'm inclined to see this film on the damned valley.
Posted by: Jackie | 30 November 2010 at 06:01 PM
Jackie et al
Let's stop thanking people for their service on this site. After the way my fellow Americans treated soldiers during and after VN it makes me want to throw up and it enrages my lady wife. pl
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 30 November 2010 at 06:09 PM
At the risk of speaking as a civilian, I was not much impressed by the captain of this unit. Especially by his behavior while interacting with the locals (the shura councils) which I found remarkably unprofessional and disrespectful. It is not my experience that those traits are effective in leadership, in building alliances, or in negotiation. The elders in these villages may be poor and uneducated, but they aren't stupid, If you can't treat them with respect, bother to arm yourself with knowledge of their concerns, or at least avoid swearing every third word while in a formal meeting with them, then send someone who can.
Do I need to add, that kind of example flows downhill?
Posted by: okanogen | 30 November 2010 at 06:21 PM
Regarding the stationing of the unit in the Korengal for a year - this kind of thing has not been unusual in the Army since 2003.
Soldiers are sent out to their area and stay there for a year. In the past, plenty of units did 15 months on station in Iraq.
Most of them do get a two week R&R though.
Then they go home for a year, maybe two if they're lucky and get to do it all over again.
Posted by: Green Zone Cafe | 30 November 2010 at 10:22 PM
GZC,
Yes, and to what strategic value do we scatter infantry companies to the wilds of Afghanistan? Where's Karzai's army, they've only had most of a decade to build it?
Posted by: Fred | 01 December 2010 at 09:32 AM
GZC
Was this same section (two squads) kept in that outpost (Restrepo) for a year? pl
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 01 December 2010 at 09:41 AM
From what CPT (now MAJ) Kearney and the other soldiers said in the film, I believe they stayed either at FOB Restrepo or the larger KOP. Squads must have rotated back and forth between the two FOBs. The company stayed in the Korengal for a year minus whatever theater in- and out- processing there was.
Brigade Combat Teams deploy to their AOR and disperse their units at the beginning of their deployment. The units do not move and the LTCs and CPTs become responsible for their own component AORs.
Posted by: Green Zone Cafe | 01 December 2010 at 05:48 PM
GZC
OK, although I didn't see any rotation from Restrepo. IMO Major Kearney did not have a clue on how to do this job in the Korengal. Who was the Captain Knight that he kept knocking in the film I know that was his predecessor. pl
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 01 December 2010 at 06:04 PM
Dear Col.Lang:
Thank you for the recommendation of the film. Since I didn't pay much attention to the Korengal Valley (other than reading your comments on Wanat here), I had no idea that the 2-503IN's area of responsibility was that big (the Caldwell report described it as about the size of Connecticut). I look forward to reading your thoughts on the film.
Posted by: Neil Richardson | 01 December 2010 at 08:43 PM
Heatherington killed in Libya!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 20 April 2011 at 10:27 PM