The End of Combat Operations in Iraq - Adam Silverman

The End of Combat Operations in Iraq: a Few Thoughts Before the Presidential Address

Adam L. Silverman PhD[1][1]

            As we wait for President Obama to address the nation this evening regarding what is now the second official end to combat operations in Iraq, despite our keeping approximately 50,000 military personnel reflagged as advisors and the State Department’s presence – including its huge private security buildup, it is important to take a moment and reflect on what our endeavors there have accomplished.  Despite having largely safe and secure elections, Iraqi leaders are still unable to form a government.  While the sectarian conflict for resources masquerading as an electoral dispute continues, with wrangling, accusations, and attempted deal making the current hold over Iraqi government lurches forward punctuated by attacks against governmental and other targets.  In fact the recent attacks against police recruits is eerily reminiscent of the inability to protect earlier trainees back in 2005. 

            What is perhaps more distressing is trying to determine what we have actually accomplished.  It is clear that we have not reached the COIN end state of Iraq having a functional government that is legitimate in the eyes of its citizenry, that is tethered to that citizenry, and the societal elements tethered to each other.  This follows on failing to take advantage of the COIN break and opening afforded by the Awakenings, the Baghdad ethno-sectarian cleansings, and the Surge to pressure the Iraqis to seriously work on and work out reconciliation.  Instead we squandered that so dearly paid for opportunity in attempting to negotiate an unrealistic status of forces agreement and being embarrassed by the Iraqis in the negotiations and planning for the 2008/2009 Provincial elections.  Instead we have the current PM, Dr. Maliki – whose political organization was established in Iranian exile and supported by the Iranian clerical authority – attempting to retain power by once again partnering with his closest allies of the past several years the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SIIC or ISCI) and their Badr Militia.  Yet SIIC was also established in Iran, by the Quds Force, which also established its armed and militant wing the Badr Corps, much of which now forms the Arab and Shi’a portions of the Iraqi Army.  Additionally, and despite the fact that the US was the recognized occupying power in Iraq for almost five years, the Iraqis still do not have a functioning power grid or even more than three hours of electricity per day on average.  Without the electricity running the water does not flow.  And without the water flowing the agricultural areas of Iraq, were agriculture was invented, lie dry and unplanted, which leads Iraqis to the towns and cities to seek their fortunes.  Once there they become potential recruits for the extremists; not because these economic migrants are themselves extremists, but because they need to put food on the table.   While it is true that early attempts to fix the electrical grid were hampered by both years of infrastructural neglect by Saddam Hussein, as well as sabotage by Iraqis in the aftermath of the invasion and early portions of the occupation, we still had a responsibility to fix it[2][2].  What is most frustrating here, what was frustrating to the Army personnel my team mates and I worked with, as well as the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) folks, was that we were ordered not to fix the grid because the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) passed down rules[3][3] that were then followed by the Iraqi Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) that the Iraqis would do this for themselves, over a ten year period, by privatizing the generation and transmission of electricity.[4][4]

            Perhaps the real measure of what we have accomplished can be seen in the numbers:

·      Cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom: $748.2 billion

·      Projected total cost of veterans’ health care and disability: $422 billion to $717 billion

·      Total deaths: Between 110,663 and 119,380


·      Coalition deaths: 4,712


·      U.S. deaths: 4,394


·      U.S. wounded: 31,768


·      U.S. deaths as a percentage of coalition deaths: 93.25 percent


·      Iraqi Security Force deaths: At least 9,451


·      Total coalition and ISF deaths: At least 14,163
- Iraqi civilian deaths: Between 96,037 and 104,7542


·      Non-Iraqi contractor deaths: At least 463


·      Internally displaced persons: 2.6 million


·      Refugees: 1.9 million

At some point we need to seriously ask ourselves not just were we mistaken about the intelligence and the threat assessment, but whether our strategies and policies in Iraq and the Middle East (Afghanistan and Central Asia is a discussion for another day) have made us, our allies, and the region safer?  Perhaps if we have a rare moment of national reflection we might be able to actually keep from repeating at least some of these mistakes again.

---

[1][1] Adam L. Silverman, PhD is the Culture and Foreign Language Advisor at the US Army War College was the Socio-cultural Advisor assigned to the 2BCT/1AD from OCT 2007 to OCT 2008 as the Team Leader and Field Social Scientist assigned to Human Terrain Team Iraq 6 and was deployed in Iraq in 2008.  The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army War College, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command  or the 2BCT/1AD.

[2][2] All the rules and explanations for occupying powers can be found at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPF6

 

[3][3] For a complete list and description of all CPA rules and regulations, including the one that tells the Iraqis that they can never change the rules that the CPA has handed down, please go here: http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/.

When one peruses the regulations what you will find is that Iraqi reconstruction was used to test many movement conservative social, economic, and political ideas.

[4][4] Please see David Cay Johnson’s Perfectly Legal for a very readable explanation of why privatization of energy in the US has failed miserably to deliver on its promises.

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

Well I put this speech up there with the "mission accomplished" one as being one soon to be repudiated by future events. Could be wrong of course?

[vas]

Read this one?
http://www.stiftungleostrauss.com/bunker/

[Medicine Man]

Strange, I've been reading a bit of chatter here and there giving credit to Bush for negotiating that Status of Forces Agreement--was it not a good idea after all?

And yes, I don't think the mayhem in Iraq is over, whatever Obama may say in his speeches.

[batondor]

MM,

I have a particular (and perhaps peculiar) view of the SOFA w/Iraq because I was bothered by it more for what it represented in the context of US domestic law and politics than its specific significance in Iraq...

... because it was (and remains) my understanding that Status of Forces Agreements are not normally formulated or intended as accords that authorize the use of force in a sovereign territory but rather have been more pragmatic statements of the legal and institutional bases (no pun intended) on which US forces may reside in other countries.

The bottom line, of course, is that the Bush administration used this mechanism rather than go back to Congress - and the United Nations - for the formal reauthorization of the mandate that allowed for the use of force in the first place. This may seem like semantics, some might be additionally skeptical about the utility of the "international mandate" in any case, and I might be wrong about the whole thing...

... but in my humble opinion, it was a huge risk to continue the US presence in Iraq on terms that left us holding the whole thing together if it went south before we could drawdown (and the next chapter is still being written, of course).

[Adam L Silverman]

Medicine Man: what was negotiated was not a SOFA, but rather a security agreement. What the Bush Administration wanted were permanent bases in Iraq for perpetuity with very liberal operating perameters for US personnel when operating off a base. What we got was an agreement to stay for a fixed period beyond the end of the official UN recognized occupation, restrictive rules of operation for when off of the base, and a concession at the Iraqis could vote to kick us out of the country at any time. Basically the Iraqis figured out they could stall us on the negotiations and then roll us on the final terms. They did the same thing with the provincial election parameters, which is why those were conducted under the very bad combo of open list/proportional representation. Basically they realized that we had time hacks we had to meet - the UN mandate for our occupation or actually having them hold an election, and they just acted accordingly.

[Redhand]

The absence of posts here by a normally vocal commentarium is striking to me. Perhaps "the real measure of what we have accomplished" is just too depressing to write about.

Especially when contrasted with Bush's obscene braggadocio starting this war, Obama's ending comments do convey a real "not with a bang but a whimper" feeling to the whole, tragic, disastrous undertaking. And, the political turmoil, mindless killing and death in Iraq is far from over. With our painful disengagement it is simply entering a new phase.

[Patrick Lang]

batondor

There were two agreements. pl

[Kathleen]

Have folks read Prof Cole's Iraq speech that OBama should give about Iraq but will not.

[batondor]

Pat and Adam...

I gather you're both saying that there was a SOFA in the "classic" sense and a security agreement that defined the evolving rules of authority and engagement. I seem to remember that, too, now that you've pointed it out...

... but the bottom line, if I may, is that we remained at war with neither a renewed international mandate nor the consent of the Congress.

On the one hand, I think Adam described the process more accurately... though on the other, I think this process did, at the very least, create a template that allowed the incoming Obama/Biden administration to prepare for the concrete drawdown and withdrawal that had been promised in the campaign.

Who knows what a McCain/Palin administration would have concocted...

[Adam L Silverman]

Batandor: I can't speak for COL Lang and wouldn't presume to do so, but what I understand was going on is that up through the end of 2008 we were covered under UN authority as the occupying power and that rolled into this was the agreement or protocols allowing for US personnel to be based in Iraq and to operate there. The Bush Adminstration, in 2007 and 2008, with the UN authority set to expire and the Iraqis making it clear they wouldn't ask for it to be renewed (it could not be renewed without an Iraqi request to the UN), tried to negotiate what would have been a proper SOFA, if not a SOFA on steroids. The Iraqis ran the clock and the table on us in those negotiations and we had to settle for the current security agreement. I think the confusion is whether the UN occupation authority was itself separate from a SOFA up through the end of 2008. Given COL Lang's response my guess is that it likely was.