Sharpsburg or Antietam (take your pick)

 I went to the battlefield yesterday with a friend.  I have been there many times.  It is about two hours from my house.  It was a beautiful, not too warm day.  The national park was being heavily visited, a good thing.  We went there to remember the ground, the topography itself.  It is a remarkable piece of ground, chosen with a 19th Century Engineer's eye.

In the Autumn of 1862 Robert Edward Lee was seeking a decisive engagement with a big Union army.  He wanted a victory somewhere in the North, a victory that would shake the capitals of Europe and perhaps bring on European mediation of the quarrel.  The North had not yet abolished slavery as an institution and so the struggle could more easily be seen as a sectional struggle than would later be the case.  Lee had wanted to fight his battle near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania or perhaps near Baltimore, Maryland, but circumstances made that impossible and he decided to fight a defensive battle on the ground just north of the Potomac River and south of Antietam Creek. There, the ground rises from the creek in a series of small ridges that seem almost to be stairs, each twenty or thirty feet high. What needs to be known is that the advancing Union infantry could not see over each successive little ridge.

With his army spread all over that part of present West Virginia and Maryland Lee decided to wait for George McClellan and the Army of the Potomac on that open ground just south of Antietam Creek.  He waited there with about thirty thousand men, having sent couriers to Stonewall Jackson seventeen miles away at Harper's Ferry.  "Come quickly" was the message.

This was a remarkable decision.  Lee knew that even when Jackson arrived McClellan would outnumber him by two to one.  He knew that there was no bridge across the Potomac to his rear.  The only way back to Virginia was across a rocky ford twelve miles behind his right flank.  This did not seem to bother him very much.  He knew George McClellan well.  "Little Mac" was a fellow Engineer Corps officer.  McClellan had worked for Lee in Mexico when they were on Winfield Scott's staff.  He knew how timid McClellan really was.  Lee also knew that McClellan had a copy of one of Lee's orders, an order that described how spread out Lee's forces really were.  Some fool had lost this document and it had been found wrapped around two cigars.  In spite of this, Lee waited on his stony ridges for several days until the blue army arrived.  By that time Jackson had also arrived over that distant ford. He had left one division behind at Harper's Ferry.  They were processing Union prisoners of war (disarming and paroling).  Their commander was Ambrose Hill.

McClellan finally attacked on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862.  He attacked "en echelon" by army corps from right to left (north to south) the idea being to draw your opponent's reserves to the south and then attack in crushing strength with your own reserve straight through the center cutting the enemy's force in half.  It was a good plan.  It was pure Napoleon.  All these West Pointers on both sides had had their heads filled with old "Bony" at West Point by Dennis Hart Mahan.  Lee used the same plan the next year on the second day at Gettysburg.

The battle developed according to plan, but many Union leaders were wounded or killed, and Confederate ferocity was incredible.  Their resistance and counter-attacks blunted the "art" in the plan and turned the day into a swirling, roiling mass of local fights and "systematic killing."  Nevertheless the action moved steadily south, away from the center of Lee's line of battle.  By late afternoon the federals had pushed Lee's weak right flank back across the complex stair step ridges almost to the road that ran south from Sharpsburg to the ford across the Potomac.  Confederate attention was altogether focused on this crisis.

Across from Lee's center waited the fresh, powerful, Sixth US Army Corps with twenty thousand men.  They were waiting for the order to smash through the hollow shell and drive straight forward half a mile into the center of Sharpsburg.  One of my great-grandfathers waited with them. The order never came.  McClellan evidently "funked it,' overcome by "the horror, the horror."

While he dithered, AP Hill finally arrived from Harper's Ferry and Lee was able to stabilize the situation.

Actually, Lee, incredibly, then wanted to attack on his left where the wreckage of Jackson's Corps stood.  Jackson pondered this and then asked his chief of artillery, Porter Alexander, about the state of his ammunition supply.  He received the answer he wanted. The battle was over.

Lee waited all the next day to see if McClellan would try again.  He waited on that blood soaked field covered with dead men and animals and others who had not died yet.  Thre was a 'truce" to collect dead and wounded, What a farce,  my great grandfather told my father that all they wanted was to get their hands around the others' throats.  McClellan had no stomach for more and during the following night Lee and his men slipped away over the ford and back into (West) Virginia.

There were about five thousand dead, and over twenty thousand wounded.

McClellan could have destroyed Lee that afternoon and failed to do so.  He did not even pursue.  Lincoln rightly relieved him for that.  A chance to end the war had been missed.

Lee?  The level of his recklessness is hard to express, but it is the stuff of legend.  Incredible.

We are not the men our fathers were.   pl

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Antietam

Comments

[matt]

Awesome! What a timely thing to share ...people in similar roles (Petraeus, et. al.) should be held to similar stds. and be expected to seize opptys. to end this war...

[Ronald]

Pat,

Were the many colossal blunders in the Civil War (North and South) typical of war? Or was there truly a level of recklessness unique to the Civil War? In my recent reading on the Civil War, I have been impressed at how haphazardly units were arranged and how political stature determined officer rank in the early years . . ..

[Howler]

Lee? The level of his recklessness is hard to express. Incredible.

Sir, a partial answer can be found in Nolan’s devil’s advocate approach: “Lee Considered” Here’s a link: http://uncpress.unc.edu/browse/book_detail?title_id=99.

Another partial answer, without encroaching on your junior senator’s territory, is the Southern soldiers’ and commanders’ willingness to pursue for audacious even reckless offensive tactics. I’m also certain that your regular correspondents know far more than I and I look forward to the ‘comments’.

[Patrick Lang]

Howler

Yes to all that but he was still reckless to a point beyond reason. What he risked repeatedly could not be replaced. The Confederacy's only war aim consisted of the pursuit of independence. To achieve that required the destruction of Northern will to continue what was essentially a war of invasion and occupation. What was called for was a war for the attrition of will by frustrating Northern plans. In that context, the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns make no sense. pl

[VietnamVet]

Colonel,

I spent a part of the day at Antietam. The Confederates had all of the high ground. I don’t know how the Union troops attacked up those hills. They did and in the end Lee had to retreat.

Looking at the hills from Burnside’s Bridge all I could think of was; “Spread Out” and “Fix and Encircle”.

A Century later in 1967, the 2/503 attacked an entrenched enemy on Hill 875, all over again, but this time for no good reason.

Robert E Lee could no more recognize the need for entrenchment and a defensive war than Frederick Kagan can recognize the futility of fighting corruption in Afghanistan when his family's paychecks come directly from companies dependent on fighting a never ending war there.

In old age, I am convinced we never learn, and the young never listen. War is never ending. What is good for Halliburton is good for America.

[fbg46]

Of all the unit monuments at Antietam, the one that stands out the most is the one in rose - colored marble erected by a Texas brigade. If memory serves, the monument states that 80% of the brigade's soldiers were KIA/WIA at Antietam, the single largest loss sustained by any American combat unit of that size ever.

[Redhand]

As a confirmed Irish Yankee who, when I reflect on Civil War soldiers, thinks first of the slain in "The Irish Brigade" at Fredericksburg, and of Midwestern stalwarts like "The Iron Brigade" at Gettysburg, it is a shame that Lee was not crushed at "Sharpsburg" when "The Young Napoleon" had a perfect chance to do it.

So many lives would have been saved if the Army of Northern Virginia had been decisively defeated then and there.

My preferred book about Antietam is Landscape Turned Red by Thomas W. Sears. A great read that "puts you there." I only visited the battlefield once: walking those fields is an unforgettable experience.

Re "Bobby" Lee's recklessness, I used to think that the Turner movie "Gettysburg" grossly miscast Martin Sheen as the General. Now I feel that the slightly manic edge Sheen gave Lee, especially in dialogue where Lee refers to "those people," isn't that far off the mark. He sure sent enough of his own people to their deaths trying to defeat them.

[Robert Murray]

Thank you Col. Lang,
We have a mutual friend who said he has been fortunate to have to visited Civil War battlefields with you and said they literally "came alive" in your company. Our friend is a fortunate man, indeed. I believe I mentioned to you a few years ago that Gen. Tommy Franks' actions in Afghanistan reminded me of McClellan. Again, thank you for your remarkable insight and those of your contributors.

Sincerely,
Bobby

[Patrick Lang]

redhand

Lee called them "those people" because it wounded him to call them the enemy. I think that your description of him is insulting to his memory. BTW, political comments about that war will not be posted here. They are futile and pointless. pl

[scott s.]

"Landscape Turned Red" I guess is sort of a standard, but I think it is important to realize Sears has his biases which come through strongly. For comparison, you might check out Ethan Rafuse's "McClellan's War" and Joe Harsh's "Taken At The Flood".

I think it can be agreed that McClellan wasn't particularly well-served by his Corps commanders though I suppose that can be seen as excuse-making. Certainly the decision not to commit VI Corps is McClellan's alone and of course in hindsight the "correct" decision is obvious.

[Patrick Lang]

fog46

McClellan should never have been given field command of anything. As an organizer he was superb. He should have been in charge of a reserve army that trained replacements, created new units, wrote doctrine and procured better equipment, or they could have sent Halleck off somewhere and made him Chief of Staff. On the equipment front, repeating rifles with fixed ammunition and breech loading cannon were easily attainable for a country with an ever growing industrial base. pl

[oofda]

Colonel Lang,
How did "Lee also knew that McClellan had a copy of one of Lee's orders, an order that described how spread out Lee's forces really were. Some fool had lost this document and it had been found wrapped around two cigars."
Amazing intel, and even more amazing that he went ahead.

[Patrick Lang]

scotts

Anyone remember when "The Bavarian" was a restaurant in downtown Washington and not a strange institution in Shepherdstown, W.Va.? I had lunch in the place yesterday. The restaurant was a great place. I particularly remember one blond waitress in a dirndl (?). Ah... And then there was the jagerschnitzel... Ahhh... pl

[Patrick Lang]

oolda

Ah. I was informed by my friend yesterday that according to the author of "The Gleam of Bayonets," McClellan had a meeting near Middletown, Maryland with a group of local civilian victualing contractors in which he told them that he had a copy of "Special Order Number 191." The story goes that one of them sought out Lee to tell him this. pl

[Bart]

Wasn't the Bavarian in the neighborhood between Woodies and Hecht's? What I remember is a German restaurant in that area in the late 1950s. Also Harrigans in Southwest.

[Patrick Lang]

bart

The very place. I was here in Spanish language school. and was an habitué of the place. "Harrigans?" pl

[frank durkee]

I remember going to both and enjoying them.

[oofda]

Colonel,
Thanks for relating that about how Lee knew about McCellan's awareness about his plans.

Regarding the largest losses of a unit, at Gettysburg, on July 2, the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Regiment lost about 85% in only ten minutes charging an overwhelming Confederate force that outnumbered them 5-1. They stopped the charge of the Alabama and Mississippi and regiments and allowed the Union forces to reform and win the day. They are considered to have sustained the most casulties of an American combat unit--and it was all in about ten minutes. It is an inspiring story.

[Medicine Man]

Is it possible that Lee was looking for a quick, decisive conclusion to the war, similar to the one that McClellan failed to pursue? Or would it be completely absurd for a person in Lee's shoes to think that such an outcome would be possible?

I ask because in hindsight it seems that the North's superior manpower and industrial base would steadily run the odds against the South the longer the war were to go on. I must be missing something... perhaps several somethings.

[Larry Kart]

The author of "Landscape Turned Red" and a number of other books about the Civil War/War Between the States is Stephen W. Sears, not Thomas W. Sears.

[Patrick Lang]

MM

Lee was a man of honor. pl

[Grimgrin]

I wonder if a crushing defeat for Lee would have ended the war at that point. In the fall of 1862, the Confederacy still held most of the Mississippi, it's territory was largely intact. Would the loss of Lee's army have caused them to give up on the cause of independence at that point?

The Union would have had a huge advantage, but it also would have been stuck with McClellan, as removing him after a victory such as that would be politically tricky to say the least. How long would a Confederacy forced into a defensive posture, and low on manpower been able to hold? Well, Gettysburg was July 1963, and Jefferson Davis Surrendered on May 10th 1965 so, a while at least.

[Patrick Lang]

grimgrin

Davis never surrendered. Lee did and then Joe Johnston and the others in the Trans-Mississippi. Technically the Confederacy is still at war with the US as is the pretender (whomever he is) to the throne of Jerusalem. None of these men were ever tried for anything.

Let us not forget that Lee's army fought on with great effectiveness for a long time.

He would not have done that to his friends and neighbors if he were not committed to the cause of Southern independence.

I think they could have won. pl

[Medicine Man]

I'm not disputing General Lee's honor, Col. Lang. I'm just trying to understand your appraisal of him as reckless. What I'm asking, specifically, is if perhaps Lee sought out a decisive battle because he felt a quick resolution of the war in the South's favor was both possible and preferable?

[Patrick Lang]

MM

Of course he sought as quick a resolution as possible, pl