"An NCO recognizes a flawed Afghanistan strategy" Will

 ".. the rules of engagement for U.S. troops are "too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes."

"Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy's location. The request was rejected "on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage." The NCO says that the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister, and the likelihood of it hitting someone or something was akin to that of being struck by lightning.

Returning from a mission, his unit took casualties from an improvised explosive device that the unit knew had been placed no more than an hour earlier. "There were villagers laughing at the U.S. casualties" and "two suspicious individuals were seen fleeing the scene and entering a home." U.S. forces "are no longer allowed to search homes without Afghan National Security Forces personnel present." But when his unit asked Afghan police to search the house, the police refused on the grounds that the people in the house "are good people."

On another mission, some Afghan adults ran off with their children immediately before the NCO's unit came under heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the unit asked for artillery fire on the enemy position. The response was a question: Where is the nearest civilian structure? "Judging distances," the NCO writes dryly, "can be difficult when bullets and RPGs are flying over your head." When the artillery support was denied because of fear of collateral damage, the unit asked for a "smoke mission" -- like an illumination round; only the canister falls to earth -- "to conceal our movement as we planned to flank and destroy the enemy." This request was granted -- but because of fear of collateral damage, the round was deliberately fired one kilometer off the requested site, making "the smoke mission useless and leaving us to fend for ourselves.""  Will

-----------------------------------------------------------

I know that I am boring and repetitive on this subject.  Nevertheless, I think the extreme nature of the restrictions on fire support for coalition troops is foolish and wrong.  Will is smart to listen to sergeants.  They are always the people to listen to if you want to know the truth.  

I know that I will now be lectured on COIN theory, "hearts and minds," etc.  I am not impressed by that.  I did COIN in South America,  Southwest Asia, and of course the "big one," in Southeast Asia.  I was taught COIN theory in 1964 at Ft. Bragg by some of the French and British authors of the dogma.  So, forget the lecture.  I have dug enough wells for people who should have dug their own wells to understand the faults of the concept.

COIN is a fragile instrument.  It is essentially a contest for control of the population.  The tools can be either sticks or carrots or some combination of these.  The "mix" of tools must contain both or the theory will not work.

Villagers "laughed at US casualties?"  What?  Afghans are not impressed by displays of weakness.  How can we expect the Afghans to trust us with their safety if we are so weak as to not be willing to defend our own soldiers.  Stanley seem to be intent on making infantrymen appear to be lightly armed social workers.  That is a bad idea.

Troops in contact were denied illuminating fires and smoke for fear that the brass casing on the round might fall on someone?  Well, I have had these casings land all around me.  If one hits you in the head you are a "deader," but the thing has to actually fall on you.  I am still here, for good or ill.  

Then, there is the issue of chain of command responsibility to the troops they are given the privilege of commanding.  That chain of command extends all the way to Obama and it includes him.  He is responsible for the lives of those who are sworn to obey his orders however foolish they may be.  That is a very special responsibility.  

McChrystal seems to have an honest man's doubts about the course of action he is following in south Afghanistan.   Petraeus has the look of someone who is not well.  President Obama had better stop listening to the generals and the business developers and start listening to the people in the field, the real people.  pl 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061803760.html

Comments

[Patrick Lang]

NR

thanks. You claim to be a civilian? pl

[Patrick Lang]

J

My candidate would be Stan. Odierno will disappear and Petraeus is too clever. pl

[Neil Richardson]

"NR

thanks. You claim to be a civilian? pl"

Indeed, Colonel. I've been one for the last 17 years.

[Fred]

Don't worry, the likes of Joe Leiberman are quite safe. I'm sure the Taliban are quite happy with that fact.

[confusedponderer]

Oh, there was that joke: I just found a copy of 'Vom Kriege' in a second hand bookshop. In pristine condition. It once belonged to a regimental library.

[Patrick Lang]

CP

Joke? Clausewitz WAS the god of war, not Napoleon as he claimed. I was a student and dare I say a colleague of the great Israeli-American scholar of Clausewitz, Michael Handel. pl

[Patrick Lang]

NR

You are nothing like a civilian. pl

[Adam L. Silverman]

Sir,

When I attended the COIN Leaders' Workshop at the CAC at Ft. Leavenworth in APR 2009 there was a discussion among several officers and civilians in the rows behind where I was sitting about Clausewitz. Someone, one of the civilians I think, wanted to know if someone had a good slide deck on him that made the material approachable. I turned around and offered to copy the one that I used to use when I taught international relations and international security. I explained that it covered the first 100 pages or so, ie the introduction/introductory material - all the conceptual stuff. The impression I got is that its being assigned to people at the various schoolhouses, whether or not they read it is another story. Amusingly enough this led to an interesting discussion between myself and a British major who was sitting next to me about what should be read and what shouldn't, let alone what COIN was and wasn't. Needless to say it was a long and interesting week. And the person looking for the slides never came back and got the copy I burned for him...

[FB Ali]

J

I would agree with the Colonel: Stan's the likely man. However, it's possible that he may dodge the blame by throwing a fit early next year and quitting. Then someone else will have to (figuratively) take that last helicopter out of Kabul.

[Adam L. Silverman]

Sir,

A couple of more pieces on neo-Conservatism. The first a news story from Raw Story:
http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0609/tank-neocons-influential-obama-years/

The second a report issued by Brookings about why neo-Conservatism still matters:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_neoconservatism_vaisse/05_neoconservatism_vaisse.pdf

[J]

Who is the 'real President'? Is it Obama or is it OSD Gates?

It appears that OSD Gates 'countermands' the President on 'official policy' at every given opportunity.

So who is the 'real President' and who is the 'real donkey'?

US officials downplay July 2011 withdrawal from Afghanistan
WASHINGTON (AFP) – US Defense Secretary Robert Gates rejected suggestions Sunday that US forces will move out of Afghanistan in large numbers in July of next year under a deadline set by President Barack Obama.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100620/pl_afp/afghanistanunrestusmilitarypolitics

Who sets policy, and who follows it? Again, who is the real president and who is the real donkey?

[J]

Doesn't OSD Gates get it that he really has NO REAL POWER as OSD. The Constitution gives war powers authority to the President - period. There is no war secretary, no office of secretary of defense, it (all of the war power) is reposed with the President -- period. Now what the President proposes to do with that power is a Presidential decision and Presidential prerogative. Thus most Presidents have 'delegated' the menial task to a carved out post most understand as the Secretary of Defense. But that OSD position is still ethereal no matter what the persona who occupies the seat at any given point in time. Gates needs to understand that he is the donkey who is supposed to do Presidential bidding, not the other way around.

[confusedponderer]

Mr. Lang,
the joke wasn't about Klausewitz or you but about officers not reading 'On War': Book, second hand, from regimental library, pristine condition = unused.

[Balint Somkuti]

Col. Lang
Not yet Sir. As of today I am only studying it. Being a civilian historian (and a future PhD in military sciences) I consider myself an artist (in your defintion). Question is: will I get a position where I can show my skills? Nepotism is running amok in times of civil morale decline (see late Roman Empire).

[Neil Richardson]

On a serious note Colonel, Vom Kriege wasn't really that popular back in the 1970s and 80s among junior and field grades. In fact most of the Heer field grades I knew in the late 1980s hadn't "read" it either. Those in cav and armor were mostly concerned with tactical and operational lessons and had read a lot of memoirs of Guderian, Raus, Balck, Mellenthin etc etc in addition to rediscovering the after action reports at the MHI. It was strange in the sense that everything German was in style as ALB matured (Schwerpunkt, Auftragstaktik, Kesselschlacht, Flaechen und Luekentaktik were actuallly thrown around quite a bit in actual discussions during staff rides and terrain walks) while most of us hadn't read Clausewitz (by this I mean active reading). Of course as I recall GEN Shelton had assigned McMaster's _Dereliction of Duty_ to all general officers to read back in the late 1990s. I'm not sure how effective that was in the following years.

[Patrick Lang]

NR

That sounds like a good reading program. GvonC is damned hard going as you know.

Did I ask if you know Dave Glantz? pl

[Neil Richardson]

"NR

That sounds like a good reading program. GvonC is damned hard going as you know.

Did I ask if you know Dave Glantz? pl"

Dear Col.Lang,

I'm not sure if he would remember me, but I met him back in 1987 when I was at the NTC. He was the guest lecturer for the indoc program and I thought his discussion on the Soviet forward detachment operations was just superb. I think I might still have those notes somewhere.