Is the US Army still competent in real combat?

"In recent months, the battle of Wanat has come to symbolize the U.S. military's missteps in Afghanistan. It has provoked Brostrom's father to question why Jonathan died and whether senior Army officers -- including a former colleague and close friend -- made careless mistakes that left the platoon vulnerable. It has triggered three investigations, the latest initiated last week by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And it has helped drive a broader reassessment of war strategy among top commanders in Afghanistan, who have begun to pull U.S. troops out of remote villages where some of the heaviest fighting has occurred. Senior military leaders have concluded that they lack the forces to wrest these Taliban strongholds away from the enemy and are instead focusing on more populated and less violent areas."  Jaffe

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Greg Jaffe is a great combat reporter.  I don't know him but wish I did.

He has another story today in the Washington Post about what happened at Outpost Keating and the aftermath of that fight in which eight American soldiers died.  

Those who follow this blog know that I have increasing;y been concerned over the planning and conduct of a number of small Afghanistan battles in which it seem to me that my beloved Army has neither planned nor fought well.  Not the men, not the men, the officers.  Over the last several days I have watched Sebastian Junger push his new book.  He spent a lot of time on another outpost with an understrength platoon of infantry.  At that place the troops were sent up a mountain to secure and build their own little fortlet.  They did that, under fire the while and then lived there for a month at a time with inadequate fire support, no hot food, no way to keep clean and nothing to do except fight all day against Afghans who would surely kill them all if the smallest error occurred.  

Is this my Army?  In my Army (Vietnam), a battalion of infantry would have occupied the area while engineers built a solidly entrenched post, heavily fortified and wired in behind several barbed wire fences with mines laid between fences, fougasse and a lot of pre-planned mortar and artillery fire registered.  Air support?  Don't make me laugh.  They are great when they show up.  Once all that was done, then the platoon would have been given their little post to defend.  Then the post would have been re-supplied or reinforced at night by helicopter.  There would have been clean clothes every few days, hot chow brought in Mermite cans, replacement weapons, etc.

Instead, men are left to rot in their clothes, clinging to each other, essentially abandoned by the Army.

What has caused this loss of competence in officers who are responsible for such failings?

Is it a failure to train for real fighting because von Rumsfeld did not understand ground warfare?  Is it the COIN obsession that distracts officers from the planning tasks that are needed to care for their men.

A price will be paid for these officer failures.  The troops will always forgive necessary deaths.  They do not forgive when their comrades' lives are uselessly thrown away.

This is necessary to practice COINism?  I think not.  pl

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/03/AR2009100303048.html

Comments

[Robb]

A little off topic I know but
Sebastian Junger didn't just write a book he and Director Tim Hetherington made a documentaty about their time in the Korengal valley and the soldiers that fought there.

http://www.restrepothemovie.com

I doubt it will get wide distribution.

[anna missed]

On my tour I (1969) spent time at four of the 196LIB firebases; Ross, Baldy, Ryder, & Hawk Hill#29. All 4 were in my estimation, poorly defended. Ross, Baldy, & Ryder had large sections of perimeter without any wire/flares/etc. Bunker line positions were all in decrepit condition if they even existed at all. I should add that my tour was equally divided between line company duty and base camp infrastructure construction/repair - mostly building bunker line defenses, first at LZ Baldy and then as advance team to prepare Hawk Hill before the Brigade moved there in the summer of 69. Hawk Hill was a total mess when we got there, partially because it was a 1st Cav (armor) base at the time and had only earth entrenched perimeter positions that were severely degraded, as were other infrastructure. Hawk Hill came under sapper/mortar attack 0300 Aug 25 and was easily penetrated. Fully half the base (it was really 2 separate hills) was totally overrun and many tracks and much of other infrastructure was destroyed. For some reason? we received no air or artillery support throughout the entire battle (which lasted till morning) and it was only the persistent ability of base arty to keep the place lit up (one flare at a time) throughout the night that probably saved the base from total annihilation (supposedly there was a battalion of NVA just outside the wire waiting for orders). The base CO (rumored to have been too drunk to function that night) was choppered out the next day, he looked dejected enough that he wouldn't be coming back any time soon. And as far as I know, never did return.

While I never got to LZ Mary Ann,from what I gather it also suffered from command problems coupled with bad infrastructure, and was in a transitional state (it was being turned over to ARVN) that when put together made the base highly vulnerable to attack..

[Patrick Lang]

anna missed

Wow! I can only say that i never saw anything likethat but I was never around the Americal Division.

What I was describing was what was the common practise in my part of the country. pl

[Tyler]

@PL

Was the SOP you laid out above for the CCN units or for all Army units in your AOR? I'm just curious because from what I heard from other SF soldiers in that area it seemed that the 3rd Mech units in that area were a soup sandwich for the most part.

[Patrick Lang]

Tyler

3rd Mech? What are you tslking about? I was in SOG but not in CCN. pl

[Cynthia]

If we are spending somewhere around a million dollars a year to maintain each and every one of our soldiers in Afghanistan (see link below), then they should have more than enough equipment and personnel, enabling them to effectively fight and decisively defeat our so-called enemies in Afghanistan. But since this is clearly not the case, then it's safe to say our defense contractors are profiting at our soldiers' expense.

And since neither the White House nor the Pentagon is putting a stop to this most egregious form of war profiteering, then it's also safe to say that President Obama and his inner circle of military advisers are in bed with most, if not all, of our highly profitable defense contractors. I suppose there's a distinct possibility that Obama mistakenly believes that the Afghan war is both winnable for our country while still being highly profitable for our defense contractors, enabling him to go down in history as being victorious in war.

So I think there is one of two things that can be said about Obama: 1) he couldn't care less if the US ends up six feet under in the graveyard of empires, or 2) he's using the presidency for his own personal gain. Either way, none of this speaks well of our president's character or leadership.

Plus I think that if Obama cared more about our country's future than his own personal future, and if he cared more about the lives of our soldiers than the profitability of our military contractors, then he would have appointed generals who are brilliant at devising military strategies to enable us to win wars, instead of ones who are artful at spewing our war propaganda to keep us in a perpetual state of war! Needless to say, our military contractors have the most to gain and our soldiers have the most to lose by keeping us in a perpetual state of war.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114294746

[William R. Cumming]

The Armed Forces of the US no longer learn from their mistakes but try to cover them up. Why?
They are largely social isolates who are unable to understand their abandonment by the broader society that no longer thinks they (the larger society) have a stake in the military other than funding. This mistake may end democracy as we have known it for over 200 years in the US soon I think rather than later.

[Arun]

I have no expertise, but found http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100521/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan_bullet_wars this interesting.

"KABUL, Afghanistan – The U.S. military's workhorse rifle — used in battle for the last 40 years — is proving less effective in Afghanistan against the Taliban's more primitive but longer range weapons.

As a result, the U.S. is reevaluating the performance of its standard M-4 rifle and considering a switch to weapons that fire a larger round largely discarded in the 1960s."

[vigilon]

Never let kids ride on or use the lawnmower. Of course at an appropriate age it is possible to let the children use the lawnmower, but that readiness will have to be at the parent's discretion. It is best to consider that only teenagers should be operating such machinery, if they are physically and mentally able and prepared to do so.

[Darrell Osborne]

In your post you mentioned "Hawk Hill came under sapper/mortar attack 0300 Aug 25 and was easily penetrated" I was on Hawk Hill with A Company 26th Engineers, and was a D-7 operator. We were hit a couple of times on the Hill during and after our move from Baldy. August 25th that you mentioned, was that in 1969? I was also part of Operation Nantucket Beach, where we lost some guys. Could you maybe contact me at d.osborne@wowway.com please.
Thank you