With the recent arrests of five young Muslim American men in Pakistan as part of an alleged attempt to take part in violence and terrorism on behalf of extremist Islam, the recent shooting at Ft. Hood by a Muslim American in the US Army, the interruption of a plot this past fall to create explosives out of common items such as hydrogen peroxide, and the failed attempt to use a crush detonator chemical explosive to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit, has once again led to a larger discussion about the radicalization of Muslims in the US and other countries; especially as it pertains to the threat from or countering of terrorism. All of the individuals involved with these incidents were part of immigrant or expatriot communities: Pakistani, Afghan, Palestinian, Nigerian and as such share similarities with the men who perpetrated the London suicide bombings in July of 2005 and Muhammed Atta – the ringleader of the 9-11 cell. Most, but not all, are second or third generation members of immigrant communities with the exceptions being the expats, such as Attah and the Nigerian underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
While it is refreshing to see the acknowledged experts on terrorism recognize that the perceptions of American actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and other countries with majority populations are a contributing factor to the choices that these men have made, and that others will likely make, it is actually necessary to drill down further and try to focus on what may be setting the conditions that create susceptibility to these perceptions and attitudes. Now that we’ve identified the drivers of the learning dynamic, the definitions that are favorable to engaging in extremist Islamic violence and terrorism and neutralizing of the prohibitions against it, we also need to identify the structural dynamic that is driving the learning process.
The comparative data on immigrant and ethnic communities clearly demonstrates that the children and grandchildren of immigrants have a very similar life course for drifting into illicit and illegal behavior. Most first generation immigrants, unless they specifically relocate in order to engage in criminal and illegal activities (usually some form of organized crime or terrorism, and often directed at their own communities) or drift into it as a result of exposure as foreigners living abroad, do not have the time to offend, rather its their children and grandchildren who begin to drift into illegal activities. While there have fortunately only been a small number of the members of these Islamic immigrant and expatriot groups who have drifted into extremism violence and terrorism, rather than more traditional forms of illegality, the pattern that is beginning to emerge seems to conform to that of other immigrant groups.
The significant difference is that when young second and third generation Muslim immigrants, as well as Muslim expats, drift, some of them are being captured by religious and educational institutions which have been specifically funded to promote the most extreme, reactionary, and violence justifying version of Islam available. For instance, MAJ Hasan, the recently arrested Pakistani-American men from VA, and the 2005 London bombers – all 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants conform to these patterns. When they felt the competing demands of their immigrant subculture in conflict with the surrounding culture and subcultures, as well as their other social identities they resolved their identity and ideational conflicts by through adoption of the most extreme, reactionary, and violent offshoot of Islam. MAJ Hasan was in correspondence with a reactionary cleric, as well as active on extremist websites. The five young men from VA who are being extradited from Pakistan back to the US are alleged to have travelled to Pakistan for training, and the 2005 London bombers had flirted with extremist preaching in British mosques, one of their members had travelled to the Pakistan/Afghanistan region for training, and all were active on the extremist websites.
A related concern is the drift into extremism not of immigrants or expats (both Atta and Abdulmutallab, from well off families, embraced violent, reactionary Islam while students in non-Muslim settings), but of young Muslims who reside in states that are majority Muslim. A number of foundations and charities, primarily funded from Saudi Arabia, seek to spread the extremist, reactionary, and often violence promoting Wahabbi offshoot of Islam throughout both the Muslim and non-Muslim parts of the world through the establishment of mosques, madrassas, and mosque schools (kutbs). As a result more and more young Muslim men are exposed to religious definitions favorable towards intolerance of other versions of Islam, let alone other religions, neutralizing to the prohibitions against violence, and to examples for imitation of martyrs whose violent behaviors and actions should be emulated. When the legitimate and constructed grievances of these young men are added to the structural and learning environments a powerful set of drivers for negative violent extremism and terrorism are put into play. There is little that the US can do to stop this dynamic, given that we are dependent on the Saudis, as a lynchpin of OPEC, for our energy needs.
The resolution to this social structural/social learning behavioral dynamic requires two reinforcing courses of actions (these are not to be confused for structural changes in security or institutions, those require change as well). The first is on the structural side and may in fact be the hardest part: better integration of Muslim immigrants into their new states and societies. While the US has, historically, done a very good job of this, there have been serious setbacks due to reactions from the 9-11 attacks. The American record, however, is clearly head and shoulders above those of many European states in which the attempt to integrate immigrants from Muslim communities has taken exceedingly strident forms: the banning of head scarves in France, the new ban on minaret construction in Switzerland, and the ghettoization of many Dutch Muslims as just a few examples. The American track record has always been better because America is not an ethnically homogenous society; our ideal, even if we do not always achieve it, is to accept those coming to seek a better life. So the first recommendation is to zealously try to achieve that ideal of welcoming newcomers and integrating them. That said we, as Americans, seem to be recently loosing too many young Muslim immigrants to extremism. While there is no quick or fast solution to this problem, the second thing that we do need to do is be vigilant about, is falling into the hysteria trap that we have seen sweep up many of our elected officials, media personalities, elites, and notables since the failed attempt to bring down that Northwest flight right before Christmas 2009. Part of embracing the freak out always seems to include bizarre calls for more profiling, even though all evidence clearly indicates that profiling is no more than the cold reading that mentalists use in their stage shows, as well as the demands that we invade and attack even more Muslim countries and areas, and get tougher in dealing with Muslims. These seemingly reflexive reactions by noted American leaders and commentators are seen by Muslims around the world and they provide free information operations and psychological operations for al Qaeda and other Muslim extremists by giving the truth to the lies that al Qaeda spreads about America and its intentions. As a result they become part of the grievances that both facilitate young Muslim men drifting into extremist violence and terrorism, as well as reinforcing the behavioral definitions that promote such violence and terrorism. This is not a call for political correctness, but rather to recognize that how we react and interact with Muslims as individuals, as a group, and as a socio-cultural system has an effect on social and political behavior, including violent behavior. By changing the dynamic through better integration, as well as showing greater care in our rhetorical and actual dealings with the Muslim world, we can help Muslim communities diffuse the life course and behavioral dynamics that make members of their communities available for recruitment into the world of extremism and terrorism
Adam L. Silverman PhD
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