China: Projection of Power

From Aviation Week, Week of January 5: China to Build Carriers

This article contains a discussion regarding the trajectory of both the decision making political process and the more practical aspects of gathering the capacity to indigenously design and build a ship that fits into Sino mission aspirations. The article addresses the steep learning curve for a military to create competencies in operating fixed wing aircraft from a carrier. It does not mention the accompanying need to create competency in operating a carrier battle group, perhaps just as daunting a skill to acquire. However, I believe you have to be impressed with the determination that China has shown to acquire skills and assets to match their geopolitical trajectory and the persistence in work to make those asset indigenously developed.

Example: Their Long March line of space launch vehicles was once unreliable. One horrifying event had one losing control shortly after rising above its pad and plunging into a nearby village. They are now achieving significant reliability and are being sensibly ramped up in payload capacity. They are having similar issues with satellite design and it will be instructive to watch them tackle that problem.

The time line on acquiring carrier assets at a military and thus geopolitical functional status is elongated. True operational capability may be 5-8 years away. Financially, this is a massive commitment, a true power projecting blue water navy. There has been years of consistent reporting in Av Week on our militaries’ worries of China’s armed forces being converted from its traditional homeland defense role to one capable of projecting power through an arc that encompasses northern Japan through the Malayan SLOC and touching India. It appears to be a natural progression, matching China’s increasing globalization and self-image of its interests. Of note, India is developing its own carrier capability. In addition to attempting to buy an incomplete Russian carrier, they are building their own. This citation also demonstrates the lengthy build time involved, approximately 5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vikrant_class_aircraft_carrier

http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2008/05/russian-roulette-with-indian-aircraft.html

Areas of Power Projection

I believe it would be nigh impossible to find anyone on SST who did not recognize the situation with Taiwan as potential flash point. But, is that disappearing? I find it fascinating that signs of rising economic cooperation between the two continue to be reported and yet there is still very ugly talk from China about issues such as a Taiwanese president visiting the U.S. It would seem that there would be too many commingled economic assets at risk, if not now then in the not too distant future, for China to seriously think about military action. Is that reasonable to contemplate? Is the Sino governmental thought process now mature enough to see time as the key ally to an even closer economic rapprochement and a Hong Kong form of connection? Is Taiwan’s population evolving towards the ability, even the desire, to form a union under a special relationship? The Taiwanese land mass is within relatively easy flight time of military aircraft launched from China. Other than interdiction of Taiwan’s SLOCs, there does not seem to be a first order implicit threat for Taiwan that would relate to an invasion from these future assets.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/02/content_6729736.htm

Of a higher level of potential for friction is the South China Sea and my view is this is the area that will be most immediately influenced by China’s intent and actually gaining the capability of using carrier borne airpower. The Spratly Island area has known enormous potential for oil and gas. From Wiki: “The Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons (1.60 × 1010 kg), as compared to the 13 billion tons (1.17 × 1010 kg) held by Kuwait, placing it as the fourth largest reserve bed in the world.” It is one of the world’s richest fishing grounds. As the Av week article states, 8 separate countries lay claim to part of this region, including China and the Chinese have been in armed conflict with Vietnam over this area.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

I do not believe the future scenarios for the U.S. would be about containment. I will be interested in your views but it would not seem productive to even contemplate that word in association with the Chinese. However, who pays for the current level of counterbalance and geopolitical commitment are subjects of value to discuss. We certainly have tremendous economic interest in this area, with the countries so far mentioned being recipients of a huge part of our commercial/financial activity. And we have large expense in maintaining a counterbalance. We have carrier groups in the area near constantly, air assets based on Guam (we lost a B-2 there), and continuing submarine deployments (superb intelligence gathering platforms). We have increased our presence in the recent past.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_/ai_n6282566

Our allies in the immediate area, primarily Australia, Japan and Singapore, are owners of sophisticated military assets of their own but are not in the power projection business. However, the Aussies and Japanese already have maritime patrol assets, a first step in putting carrier type assets at risk. I believe, militarily, it will continue to be far less expensive for our allies to be able to threaten a carrier asset than for China to build and then protect them. The U.S. had Pegasus class hydrofoils armed with Harpoons for just this role. The Russians have excellent anti-ship weaponry and, by past practice, would welcome cash purchases from their clients in the area. The Vietnamese are also potential users of this kind of counter-asset.

I would like to ask the SST audience this. What level of help to counterbalance do we want to further offer or give our allies and what do we change about a possibly prohibitively expensive commitment to a military presence, other than intelligence gathering? Given our interest, is reducing our expense/commitment in this part of the globe is it even reasonable to discuss anything other than our current level of presence? Could we even contemplate serious military confrontation with China, given our economic ties?

MCC

Comments

[David Habakkuk]

"The Russians have excellent anti-ship weaponry and, by past practice, would welcome cash purchases from their clients in the area."

An important question is whether the readiness of Russia to sell military technologies to countries whose natural use for them is to counter U.S. (or Israeli) military power is or is not affected by the state of the political relationship between Russia and the U.S.

So for example, after weird contradictory reports on whether or not it was going to go ahead, the sale of the S-300 surface to air missile to Iran now appears to have gone through.

Was this purely a commercial matter -- or is there an element of payback for U.S. and Israeli arms supplies to Georgia, and the plans to install anti-ballistic missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland?

[Stormcrow]

The two things about the PLA that frighten me the most are -

1) Their utter devastating candor about their own shortcomings.

These people seem to be coldly realistic about what's withing their grasp and what isn't.

Such people make very good allies and very bad enemies.

2) Their utter disregard for the confines of "the box" most military analysts in other places prefer to stay within.

Expect them to play into our own estimates even less than most of our enemies have done.

[Ken Roberts]

What is the medium-term (30-50 year) projected and /or desired relationship with China? That seems to me the important determinant of stance re military systems.

I don't really see China as one of "our enemies". That is a cognitive trap, old history. Rather, likely a valuable ally. Exceptionally rational, and a useful counterbalance to impulsiveness. Think of how well the combo of Chinese and US economies worked - individually unbalanced, but seen together, soundly structured operationally. (Well, more-or-less, there are always dumb-ass details in any large enterprise.)

[Watcher]

We would do well to make China an ally and not an enemy. The combination of their search for reseources to sustain their economy and desire to assert their mandate from heaven is a tinderbox simply waiting.

The chinese have no qualms with coming into conflict with us if it suits their long term strategic interests. Many argue that is impossible due to the heavy investment they have in us and that would ruin them and on and on. The problem is that is the western and not the chinese view. Ask yourself why the chinese buy oil on the spot market which is more expensive than trying to in the futures? Because the chinese see oil as strategically so important that it is worth the cost. The Chinese will care little about trying to crush us as they can accept the costs in the long term.

With the cost of oil potentially going back up in the future, the concern about Eurasia should be Russia and who we choose as allies in that issue. Though Russia will continue to Re-arm once oil becomes profitable it faces another potential future collapse in it's society in the first half of this century. The collapse will be due to the combined effects of a graying population bulge, alcoholism, HIV, a shortened life span, a mentally and physically incompetent population and no foreseeable uptick in healthy children being born. We would be best served to have China as an ally along with Europe to catch the fallout of a Russian Collapse. Unlike Zimbabwe, Rwanda, or Somalia, it will be a collapse so big we cannot ignore it.

Overall, to have China as an ally with carriers is better to have them as an opponent in the pacific ocean.

[doug]

The fascinating question is how Lord Acton's dictum will play out against China's isolationist culture. The immovable and unstoppable collide.

[Daniel Shays]

I think American statesmen really ought to aim for something like a Concert of the Pacific in our relationship not only with China, but the other heavies in the area, e.g. Japan, Australia, S. Korea, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore, etc. The Chinese are actively expanding into not only Africa, but also Latin America; that is their prerogative, given that the US is up against China's very borders in the form of Japan (the local unsinkable aircraft carrier). However, one can certainly imagine that, in a geopolitical moment of resource scarcity, that these incursions in one another's backyards may lead to friction, or even outright violence, between the US and China. Responsible leaders on both sides would seek to create some clear delineation of influence.

The other big question, of course, is India. I tend to view them as a natural ally, occupying crucial territory between the Islamic and East Asian worlds.

[curious]

China ship building is booming phase, similar to Japan in the 70's, Korea in the 90's.

I think they are second biggest container ship maker or so (don't have exact data. Korea, Norway are the big player. They make container ship like they make toaster oven)

http://img00.madeinchina.com/industry/2007/1132646.jpg

Interesting to note: aircraft carrier was first use effectively only starting the WWII. It's relatively new equipment. Japan at that time was the early innovator and have the best battle group during the opening of pacific front. But their economy is not big enough to sustain combat lost. (plus they don't radar and their subs is weak.)

Had the German invest in carrier group like Japan instead of basic gunboat, combined with sub, they would have won the WWII. But than again. They couldn't build big war ship by treaty after WWI. So they were lagging on big ship technology.

[Jose]

Why must China and India be either allies or enemies?

I look at them as competitors in a game of global leadership, neither can stand up to America now, but time is on their side.

Both need us right now, but soon we will need them since we no longer make anything of value apart from movies, iPods, and military weapons.

Everyone wants to play in this game:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_carriers_by_country

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_carriers_in_service

[YT]

Perhaps the leaders of U.S. of A can take a page off Sun Tzu (sorry, Col., sir), what was it... "winnin' without fightin' is the acme of skill"?

Methinks, IMHO, the reasons that the Chinese have continuously engaged in armin' 'emselves to the teeth are : #1. fear of conquest by foreign powers ("Evil Western Imperialists" ideal propagated in schools) & the ensuin' humiliation along with occupation (read up on China's track record of DEFEATS, 'specially the past 2 cent.), & #2. G.W.B.'s fat trap, i.e. : "America's Strategic Competitor".

The Chinese, after the "defeat" of the Soviets after the Cold War, probably viewed American bases as the same sorta of "encirclement" that the U.S. of A used on the Russians. Since American leaders can't do without fightin' foreign devils, China was very much a convenient foe durin' the 90's.

Once read an article witten by an American C.E.O. (can't recall his name, could anyone link me to his paper?) 'bout the Ming Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho). Perhaps there is much that American leaders could glean from the diplomacy of this naval ambassador?

[YT]

"Those who fight monsters should take care that they never become one. For when you stand and look long into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you." ~ Frederich Nietsche

[William R. Cumming]

Increasingly it looks like the 550 years of western military dominance might be ending. The joker factor in US and China relations for me is the Japanese. There is some evidence that even now the Japanese have conducted the world's largest short-sale ever of the US Economy and convinced the Chinese to play along. WOW. US being played like a dummie by both China and Japan as implicit economic allies, can a military alliance be far behind? How about an analysis of Japan + Chinese navies two decades down the road. What is the saying--countries really have no allies just interests!

[ads]

curious: How would the Kriegsmarine having aircraft carriers won WWII for Germany? They could have won the Battle of Britain and successfully carried out Operation Sealion, and therefore defeated the Soviet Union because they would not have been fighting a two-front war?

I wonder if the Chinese will name their carriers after the ironclads of the Beiyang Fleet (1894), Dingyuan and Zhenyuan.

[Michael Chevalier]

RE: Kriegsmarine with carriers.

They would have been hard pressed to protect them. Unlike blue water, to help with Sea Lion, they would have been exposed to land based airpower. The Repluse and Prince of Wales are a testament to how bad that might have gone.

I believe the failure of the Germans and Italians to deal with the British Carriers is a sign of how little regard for this kind of asset they had.

MCC