Yesterday's attack in Kunar Province

"NATO officials reported that nine soldiers were killed in the Kunar attack but did not specify the nationalities, in accordance with the policy of letting member countries report them first. A senior military official in Washington said that all nine were American.

The Kunar attack also left at least 15 other NATO soldiers — almost certainly Americans — and 4 Afghan soldiers wounded, and it was one of at least three significant attacks on Sunday, including a devastating suicide bombing in a southern city’s bazaar that killed at least 25 people, 20 of them civilians.

This year of the Afghanistan war is already proving to be the deadliest since the American-led invasion. Bush administration officials are now considering a redeployment of troops to Afghanistan from Iraq to help deal with the rising threat."  NY Times

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A single tactical event such as this attack in Kunar is of interest in itself, but may be the result of local circumstances of terrain, misjudgment, good judgment, weaponry, sheer numbers, weather or any number of other factors singly or in combination.  The command will undoubtedly examine the event to decide what happened.  Evidently, the hostiles penetrated the position before they were repulsed.  That is not good.  The difference between that and losing the position altogether is often just a matter of luck and passing determination on the part of some of the defenders.  Evidently the action lasted several hours.  I would be curious to know if the position was reinforced by air during the battle and how much fire support the garrison was given.

The fact that there were several other attacks more or less simultaneous to this one, that is worrisome.  It

That may be reflective of a new ability to command and organize on the part of the hostiles.

Information would be welcomed.  pl

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/world/asia/14afghan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

SLA Marshall wrote a series of small books on small unit combat and ops in Viet Nam. Operation Bird was an example. I hope some similiar military history is written because from a distance hard to know which of the factors mentioned in the posting predominated. Always a tragedy to lose good men (and women) even to incompetence as Marshall sometimes identified. Still it is interesting few stories of op orders being delievered by field grades and flag ranks from overhead in heliocopters as in RVN.

[anonymous query]

Juan Cole believes that growing insurgency in Afghanistan is from disgruntled Pushtans, and general nationalist-style oppostion to occupation by groups that we have not favored (though, by that he means, Pushtans and other Pakistan-Afghan border tribes, I think). He thinks this is more likely that it being alQaeda or orginal Taliban that supported al Qaeda. Concludes that, as in Iraq, over reliance on military strategy and tactics.

What do you think of this?

http://www.juancole.com/2008/07/obama-on-iraq-and-afghanistan-friendly.html

PS. As a regular reader of Barnett Rubin, I do think we have over emphasized military solutions in Afghanistan.

[jonst]

I was struck by the CNN report of the event that quoted "NATO spokesman Mark Laity" noting that the coalition soldiers' efforts were "heroic". Indeed, I have little doubt that they were not "heroic". But that is beside the point, is it not? Unless the point is to encourage one to disregard the battle itself, and what, if any implications, it might hold, and instead focus on the personal attributes of the soldiers involved. This is a rather obivous attempt at manipulation of the American public. Ok, nothing new there. Or even worthy of much condemnation. My concern is the self manipulation/deception going on at the civilian level in DC. Perhaps. A manipulation that tries to say, 'don't think about the strategic and tactical variables involved in the overall mission. Look at the heroic sacrifice. 'how could you turn your back on these boys?". If this is what is happening, I for one, think we have had a bellyful of that kind of thinking. It basically implies...'thou shall not think...thou shall, instead, emote' to reach tactical and strategic decisions.' That is Bush think.

[Green Zone Cafe]

I remembered this article from the NYT Magazine, it is informative.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html

I believe the Korengal Valley described is in Kunar Province.

[b]

Such frontal assaults on U.S. positions have been seldom in recent times.

This year the Talibs refrained to IED's and propaganda effective stuff like the prison break in Kandahar. Frontal assaults are deadly for them and they know it.

I therefore wonder if this might have been something different like a revenge attack by locals for the recent bombing of a wedding party which killed some 50 civilians in that area a few days ago.

"Local circumstances" would fit that theory.

[mo]

The BBC says the position was given both Apache and fighter jet support.

What is interesting is that it seems the US military has pointedly refrained from naming the Taliban as the attackers and that this attack was not far from where the 47 civilians were recently killed.

Maybe the locals have had enough of being cannon fodder.

[Curious]

If we don't patch it up with the Pakistani diplomatically, we are going to lose afghanistan/pakistan within 2 years.

The western Iraq mistake will be repeated in afghanistan. Except in afghanistan the entire population know what guerilla war is.

It will also be Iran training ground to practice post UN Iraq occupation.

[Bobo]

From what I gather from early news reports was that this partiucular outpost had only been erected in past few weeks and that the majority of the losses were at an observation post detached from the main group. Now I also have heard the enemy numbers grow from 100 to 200 thus who knows what is accurate.

It sound like new tactics from a disciplined force which may be a harbinger of tougher skirmishes to come.

God Bless those still there and my deepest respect to those families who have lost a loved one.

[Walrus]

There appear to be plenty of narcissists in Washington and in the American General Public that believe that nothing can stop the "American Fighting Man". Anyone using the term "Warrior" as a description of a soldier usually suffers from this disease. The simple answer to what happened is that the Taliban are much better infantry soldiers than we are, and no European is going to beat them.

Before some of you go apoplectic, I have not and never will fault the courage of American soldiers, but some things are beyond them although your leaders won't tell you that, because it would shake the public's confidence in a Neocon "victory" in Afghanistan.

Fighting has been in their blood and culture for a thousand years. Were it not for our presence, they would cheerfully be out killing each other every fighting season in innumerable tribal feuds.

My guess as to exactly what happened is as follows.

1. Our operations have to be assumed to be always under observation, except perhaps at night if my assumption that they lack NVG's is correct.

2. Any, and I mean any, weakness in a defensive position or procedure will be spotted immediately. This could be merely a fold of dead ground (ie unviewable from the position) no more than twelve inches high according to British experience, or a carelessly sited latrine.

3. My guess is that the Taliban spotted a weakness in this position and exploited it in a successful set piece attack

And no. Forget the face saving notion of some "human wave" desperate frontal attack. The Taliban attack will have been very well planned and organised and very skilfully executed - and that's why it was a success for them and a loss for us.

God help us if the Taliban ever source enough modern manpads to counter our air advantage. I don't think many of our troops would make it out if they did.

[JfM]

While I have yet to read a credible after action report, I can surmise afew assumptions as to what happened. First, an attack of this scale and success is only the fruit of extensive planning. This was not a hasty attack of opportunity. I suspect the outpost was effectively penetrated by the enemy and certainly well rehearsed. The routine of the defenders was known and the fire support plan understood. Further although there are distinct differences with this incident and the 1966 attack on LZ Bird in Binh Dinh or later Firebase Mary Ann in Quang Tin (I was just south in Quang Ngai for that one and listened throughout that night to the 196 LIB nets buzzing), there are some undeniable parallels. This attack apparently went at 0430 and had seen the enemy move close to the camp using the immediate surrounding village. Apparently there were few if any civilian casualties as the village inhabitants had all high-tailed it before shots were fired. This attack, like those decades before in Vietnam, may have been disrupted or prevented if there had been active patrolling in hours of daylight and listening posts (LP) put out overnight. Spending the night on an LP is a hairy, but does much to secure the larger force behind the wire. Further, the need for local intelligence is absolutely vital. In the case of the 1971 attack at remote FB Mary Ann, the occupying unit had no connection with the few folks out of the wire. The NVA were able to successfully infiltrate and completely surround the target without detection and launch at a predetermined time most disadvantageous to the defenders. The need for an integrated defense plan rather than just pulling the wire across the front gate is paramount to security. Again, without specifics I cannot and don’t criticize the position’s organization. This is a devastating and very sobering result. These sorts of set -backs are almost inevitable in this sort of fight. I hope a honest timely accounting of what happened is forthcoming and needed corrective actions taken.

[Warren Street]

I expect that you will see pushback, denials, or outright lying when it comes to this, but the situation was not an attack that was repulsed--the position was overrun.

Overrun.

Now, having said that, I'm also certain that we won't be told the full scope of the fallout from this--whether outposts manned by fewer than 50 Americans will be consolidated or whether we will have to bring more firepower to bear more quickly when these positions are attacked.

But make no mistake about it--this position was overrun. And that means they will be making drastic changes and soon. If not, relieve every commander in Afghanistan, because the fight against the Taliban has entered a new phase. We are beyond IEDs and hit and runs. We are now in a stage where they can operate at company if not battalion strength and then melt away after inflicting serious damage. It Iraq, the Mahdi Army and the militias have never been able to mount sustained attacks and fully rout a platoon or more of US troops. In Afghanistan, they just proved they can do just that.

[Mad Dogs]

From CNN (caveat emptor):

A U.S. official told CNN that as many as 200 insurgents were involved in the strike, which NATO said occurred at an outpost in Dara-I-Pech. However, other officials could not put a figure on the number of insurgent casualties at this time.

The official said militants didn't get into the outpost but they did overrun a small U.S.-led observation point outside the base, where it is believed most of the American and Afghan fatalities and injuries occurred.

[Mad Dogs]

More info from AP (again caveat emptor):

...The coordinated assault at Wanat sent a strong signal to other insurgent groups that "America cannot resist them anymore," said Tamim Nuristani, who was fired as provincial governor last week by President Hamid Karzai's administration for criticizing a U.S. airstrike that Afghan officials say killed civilians July 4 in the same area as Sunday's attack.

Nuristani said the attackers at Wanat were a mix of Afghan- and Pakistan-based militants, some with al-Qaida links — a sign, he said, that cooperation is growing between what had been often fractious factions fighting the Western military presence in Afghanistan.

"The (attackers) were not only from Nuristan but from other districts," Nuristani said. "They are not only Taliban. They were (Pakistan-based) Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hezb-i-Islami, Taliban and those people who are dissatisfied with the (Karzai) government after these recent incidents. They all came together for this one."

The attack — which U.S. and NATO officials said happened in Kunar province but which Afghan officials said was in neighboring Nuristan — reinforced recent assessments by U.S. officials that militant attacks are becoming more complex and better coordinated.

A NATO official said the attackers used houses, shops and a mosque in Wanat for cover during the hours-long battle.

The militants showered the small base — which had been established just three days earlier — with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to release the information.

Some of the militants breached the wall and got inside, killing nine American soldiers and wounding 15 others, he said.

Other American soldiers managed to drive out the attackers and called in air support. Attack helicopters swooped over the battlefield, and in hours of fighting dozens of insurgents were killed and about 40 were wounded, the NATO official said...

And of course, this silly nonsense from a REMF:

...In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack expressed regret that American lives were lost, but argued the attack was a sign of the pressure being put on the insurgency.

"Instead of looking at it necessarily from the perspective of the Taliban or terrorists being more aggressive in coming after NATO or U.S. forces or Afghan forces, in this particular case it was an example of NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces being aggressive in combatting cross-border infiltration," McCormack said.

[Sidney O. Smith III]

William R. Cumming:

You wrote: “SLA Marshall wrote a series of small books on small unit combat and ops in Viet Nam.”

Are you referring to Slam Marshall? If so, then I think Col. Hackworth played a very significant role in the “after-action” interviews and analysis that lead to what is now titled, “Vietnam Primer”. Hackworth, aka “Hack”, wrote extensively and colorfully about this experience in the book he co-authored with Julie Sherman, “About Face.” Make of it what you will. Others would have to comment. But, if nothing else, odds seem fair to middlin’ that Michael Ledeen -- a principle architect of our foreign policy and leading guru of the spirit of “creative destruction” -- did not read Vietnam Primer, much less Bernard Fall. Much less Martin Van Creveld. Much less Bard O’Neil. He did spend an enormous amount of time in the 1960's reading about some dumb ass fascist. Can’t recall his name right now. Ah yes, I just looked it up. Renzo De Felice.

Here’s a link to Vietnam Primer:

http://tinyurl.com/6rqgjk

[Mad Dogs]

And from the NYT (again caveat emptor):

...The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation is under way.

With nine Americans dead and at least 15 injured, that means that one in five of the American defenders was killed and nearly half the remainder were wounded./blockquote>

That is a 53% casualty rate for the US.

[Jose]

Why do we tie the number of dead as an acceptable count so long as we got more of them?

To me it seems foolish that we could explain nine dead Americans because we got two-hundred dead "Terrorist".

We should look into why the G2/S2 failed to understand the OFOR in the area.

We should also look into how the "Terrorist" knew enough to make such a bold attack, perhaps their G2/S2 is better informed?

Also, we need to make a better plan than simple reacting to their tactics or kicking down doors of the past.

Just remember, so long as the Taliban/AQ/etc all have safe haven in Pakistan we can not defeat them, where are Condi and Dumbya in all this mess?

My two cents but, more attacks like this and our NATO allies will start bailing out on us like in Iraq.

[pat]

Maybe the Colonel or someone else could answer this regarding a drawdown in Iraq.

Say within 16 or 24 months, there are only 50k-70k US troops in Iraq. We have small groups of Special Forces trainers spread around the country. Would these trainers be overun on their bases in a similiar fashion as the raid in Kunar?

God knows that our troops have been betrayed while on IA turf before and the gates may be left wide open for their insurgent friends to kill our men.

Also, was there any collusion between our Afghan allies and the Talibs during this raid?

[Curious]

approximate location on wikimap. (It's a real crazy spot. high mountains with valleys. tons of hidden ridges and farms)

http://wikimapia.org/#lat=35.3308119&lon=71.7736816&z=9&l=0&m=a&v=2

[505th PIR]

Hey Gang,

Read today that some of the indirect fire originated in PK. Let's see, guerilla ops/company and batallion sized units operating from across a "no-go" international border....raids, patrols, setting up buzz saw defensive positions, bleeding US troops and melting back across the border to strike again after a good re-fit. Hmm, who has the initiative here?

Anyone see a 40 year-old yet very familiar scenario re-emerging?

[Curious]

okay found the spot.

http://wikimapia.org/#lat=35.0429273&lon=70.9133148&z=11&l=0&m=a&v=2

this blog entry has more info about the location. (it's really exact damned area since the beginning of war)
http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/2008/07/13/civilians-join-the-fight-after-taliban-attack-district-center/

youtube clip (That outpost is practically a sitting duck surrounded by mountain)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjSqExZj2Kk

[Mad Dogs]

And lastly before I call it a night, from the TimesOnline (again caveat emptor):

Western and Afghan officials have admitted that Taleban militants breached the outer defences of a remote US base during a battle in Kunar province on Sunday that claimed the lives of nine US soldiers and wounded 19 coalition troops.

In the first detailed account of the assault on the US “combat outpost”, Nato confirmed yesterday that the insurgents had come close to wiping out the base, which was only three days old. It was “a pretty close run thing,” a military source said...

~snip~

...The combat outpost was rudimentary, a ring of barricades and sandbags designed to shield the occupants from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Its defensive towers and fortifications were still under construction. On three sides it was overlooked by the village of Wanat, high in the restive Weygel Valley...

[not a taliban]

see this article explains in good details between this incident and the massacare of the wedding party recently
Reading Maps of Incidents in Afghanistan

[Shrike58]

Jose.

That's always been the issue with troop levels in Iraq, in that it's not clear that we can do force protection with much less than 100,000 troops. If you go below that level you might as well do a complete pull-out.

[jonst]

Just out of curiosity, are there any commentators out there that think that sending 10K more soldiers to Afghanistan is going to help? Help at all? Other, that is, than helping Obama look 'strong' on national security?

[Mad Dogs]

A couple of additional points that surfaced during my overnite dreaming hours:

While I've not yet seen what organization these US combatants were from (10th Mountain Division, 1st Marine Division, etc.), it is unlikely that they were Special Operations Command folks.

SOC like the Army's Special Forces tend to deploy in smaller groups (12 man A Teams for example) than the 45 US combatants described in this engagement.

At rare times, SOC do deploy in larger numbers, but those tend to be specific attack missions that are highly focused and of relatively short duration.

From all reports, the 45 US combatants were not on such a specific attack mission profile.

When I mentioned the 53% US casualty rate, I should have also related what the means in the military's terms.

A unit that is below 85% of its strength is said to be "combat ineffective".

In this case, the unit had 53% casualties, so in essence, it would have been considered "destroyed".

The experiences of this particular unit lends credence to the point that Pat made a couple of days ago:

...You should get some perspective about casualties. You like to talk about WAR. In my experience of war men die by the thousands with great frequency.

Afghanistan and Iraq are wars but there are few sizable combats. Fallujah and the recent fighting around Kandahar sound like the real thing, but most of our casualties in Iraq have been caused by roadside bombs that killed while people were sitting in vehicles.

You haven't lived until you have seen a friendly rifle company destroyed in a day's fighting. Destroyed attacking...

This unit was "destroyed" defending.

As Pat has stated, the cause of this unit's "destruction" will (or at least, should) be subject to much investigation and analysis.

Some investigations are whitewashed, and some are bluntly and painfully accurate. Only time will tell which kind is delivered in this instance.

In any event, IMHO there are folks back up the line who's heads ought to roll.

Given the number of 45 US combatants, that sounds like a "platoon-sized" unit.

Platoons are headed by junior officers (lieutenants typically) who don't have any say in where they go or what their mission is.

Platoon leaders are "Yes Sir! No Sir! 3 bags full Sir!" kind of folks.

The people that made the decisions on what the mission was, are the folks back at the company, battalion, or even regiment or brigade level.

These are obviously more senior officers (Captains, Majors, Light and Full Colonels, etc.).

These are the folks who own this mission!

The deployment of this unit, the support or more likely the lack of support they got (timeliness in artillery, Close Air Support from both the fast movers and vertical aviation as this reportedly dragged on for hour) is hauntingly familiar to battles described occuring almost 7 years ago in Afghanistan like Operation Anaconda as described in Sean Naylor's book "Not a good day to die : the untold story of Operation Anaconda".

The way it sounds to me at this very early stage of information, is that some fools back higher up (Majors and/or Colonels), basically sent the platoon out butt-naked to "camp" out by themselves in Indian country.

Without a completed base camp, without sufficient timely fire support (one should really read Sean Naylor's book about the lack of artillery (a command decision by General Franks almost 7 years ago), the lack of sufficient and/or timely aviation assets, particularly vertical attack helicopters, etc.), insufficient surveillance assets (where are all these vaunted UAVs like with their Infrared capabilities that could help with perimeter security at night - in Iraq of course, stupid! That is the central front on the GWOT, not Afghanistan doncha know?), and apparently just the loosey-goosey mission profile of a picnic in the country, seems to say in screamingly bold letters, "A Command Screw-up!

But what the heck do I know? I'm just a wee civilian these days back in the world.