A visit to the Levant - Kieran Wanduragala

Kieran sent me this letter account of his travels in the Levant some days ago and has today allowed me to post it.  pl

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"Recently I had the opportunity to travel as part of a student-organized delegation of 30 Harvard graduate students (mostly from the Kennedy School, though I'm at the Center for Middle East Studies) to Lebanon and Syria. We met with most of the major players, with whom we engaged in generally quite freewheeling debate. I imagine that the kind of discussions we had were quite rare simply because students have a certain freedom (and allow a certain freedom to the other party) that politicians, diplomats, journalists, and certainly citizens of the countries concerned do not. We were also there at a very historic time for Lebanon (May 19 - June 1), just after the Doha agreement. I thought you might be interested in hearing a few of my impressions.

Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces and a key figure in the March 14th coalition, was the first person we met. The extent to which his discourse mirrored that of the most extreme elements in the Bush administration surprised me. His talk was full of references to the Global War on Terror, Good versus Evil, Light versus Darkness, and such. After about 20 minutes of somewhat unproductive Q&A (we had not yet learned the art of simply interrupting longwinded and off-topic answers) he veered off into a discussion of his spirituality, which seemed genuine if bizarre, talking about how he "lives in the second dimension". I suppose he did spend 11 years in solitary confinement. None of the LF people were happy about Doha and they seemed to be looking forward to the day it would fail. By chance I ran into Geagea's foreign policy advisor, Elie Khoury, in a cafe. I asked him whether the LF were not placing all their eggs in a very dubious looking basket. He responded that his consultations in Washington convinced him that the next administration would end up pursuing a similarly confrontational policy in the region, whether the president is Obama or McCain. Overall, I was impressed by the LF's PR machine and the way in which their 'youth movement' escorted us around touristic sites in Christian regions while subtly pushing the virtues of their leader and movement. Nonetheless, there was something a bit Lyndon Larouche about the whole setup.

Our next meeting was with Bahiya Hariri, the sister of Rafiq. She was her brother's favorite and apparently wields a great deal of behind-the-scenes clout in the Sunni community and with her nephew Saad. She was not very forthcoming about anything, but I found what she did not say more interesting than what she said. I prodded her with a question designed to unleash a tirade against Syria, but she responded that she felt the way was now open to restore normal ties. Perhaps this is a long shot, but in the context of the Doha agreement and the near-simultaneous announcement of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, I hypothesized that a broader short-term Saudi-Syrian-Israeli patchup was in the works to save the Levant from whatever transpires with Iran, tying Hezbollah into the Lebanese government and taking the heat off Syria.

The same day we went from Ms. Hariri's palace in Sidon to the Ain al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp outside the city. The camp is outside the control of the Lebanese army and as soon as we entered through the gates we were surrounded by an escort of dozens of gunmen from various PLO factions - predominantly Fatah but also the DFLP and PFLP. The sense of danger was palpable - there were clashes a few days before we arrived and again days after we left, involving Islamist groups in the camp. Conditions in the camp were unsurprisingly bad, though children were running around smiling, laughing, and practicing their few words of English on us. There was a real sense of fragmentation, of one bit of the camp belonging to one faction and one bit to another, as we were handed off from one set of gunmen and officials to another as we passed from alley to alley. My conversations in Arabic with various people in the camp impressed on me just how much the return to Palestine is a cornerstone of their worldview.

A couple of days later we travelled to Damascus to meet Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma in the visitors' palace on a mountain overlooking Damascus. Bashar spoke with us for three hours, all Q&A. He impressed the whole group with his willingness to actually answer the questions asked, his ability to provide logical defenses of his positions, his command of English, and his forward-looking mindset. A number of anti-Syrian Lebanese in the group walked away shaken by the experience. We were furthermore surprised that, in contrast to almost every other politician we met, we were not searched or put through any kind of physical screening. Only one (massive) bodyguard attended him and he seemed to be present more to pass the microphone around.

I asked him why he had not allowed the IAEA in to inspect the 'nuclear facility' in order to disprove US-Israeli allegations. He responded that there was no use - Saddam opened his sites up to inspectors but the US attacked anyway. He indicated that he does not believe in dignifying these kinds of allegations, or in setting the precedent of allowing weapons inspectors to run around his country. I told him I thought he underestimated the value of public relations - he was standing on a point of principle, but this would have real costs in terms of Syria's image in the media. He replied that he did not think so: the Western media would paint him as a bad guy in any case, and moreover in his view the key strategic decisions are taken without regard to public opinion (he again used the invasion of Iraq as an example).

Someone else asked him about his worst and best case scenarios for the region during the next 5 years. He said that the worst case scenario was a US or Israeli attack on Iran, which would have repercussions everywhere. The best case scenario was a US president committed to seeking peace accords with Syria and the Palestinians ("a genuine commitment, not like Annapolis"). I got the impression from this (and later from a sly 'yes we can' from his wife) that they saw a significant difference between Obama and McCain. Nonetheless, when explicitly asked about this, he replied that his country had learned to be skeptical of US campaign rhetoric.

As to the Syria-Israeli talks Assad said that the intention was genuine but that he doubted Olmert's ability to actually reach an agreement.

On Lebanon he was reluctant to discuss the details of Lebanese politics, though he was clearly pleased by the Doha agreement. He was ready to establish normal ties in principle (embassies and border demarcation) but sounded reluctant to do so with the government of Fuad al-Siniora. We (especially the Lebanese among us) pushed him hard on this issue, but it was not clear whether or not he appreciated the importance of Syria making a symbolic gesture of reconciliation. He considers Walid Jumblatt an enemy of the state.

The only point at which he became emotional was in discussing the regime's fight against Islamists during the early 80s, responding to a question about Hama. He talked about the various atrocities committed by the Islamists, then saying "what would you do with these people?"

When asked about Alawi dominance of key levers of power and the impact of that on political reform, he responded obliquely, talking about the new party law designed to end the Ba'ath Party's dominance of political life. When we pointed out that the problem was not just in the Party but in the military-security apparatus, his response became vaguer still. It was clear we were not getting anywhere on this issue.

Overall, Assad performed extremely well. Still, he could get off easy as the darker side of Syrian involvement in Lebanon is (somewhat) plausibly deniable. It struck me that one reason he may have consented to such an extended discussion in such a freewheeling format is practice for him in the hope of eventually making the transition to a more conventional or at least Western-style politician, giving press conferences and such.

After three hours his wife Asma showed up. If they were not in love it was a hell of a good act. After chatting informally for a bit and taking photos he left, and she sat in his place. She is beautiful, charming, and thoroughly English. She is also extremely intelligent and had a remarkable grasp of the minutiae of domestic social and economic policy that he himself did not exhibit. It occurred to me that a woman in her position may be in effect a second president. She discussed the importance of education as the key strategic domestic issue. She also mentioned that she was personally key in shaping the new companies law, which aims to shift the emphasis from the development of existing large enterprises to small and medium businesses, including startups.

After our return to Lebanon we met with Walid Jumblatt, who frankly appeared to be somewhat in pieces. In addition to a generally stoned demeanor, he gave answers which ranged from completely inscrutable to impolitically frank to obviously evasive. I tried hard to pin him down on the issue of the impact of US domestic politics on his 'bets' in Lebanon. After interrupting him about four times, steering him back to the issue from long lectures about nothing in particular, I asked him "do you think the US will trade Lebanon? [to Iran and Syria]" and got what I think was an honest "I don't know." He pushed what I find an implausible conspiracy theory of Syrian involvement in the death of Mughniyeh. His old dog lay loyally -or listlessly- at his feet the whole time. He said that Nasrallah and Hezbollah are fascist organizations and drew tired comparisons to 1930s Germany. His position towards the opposition was uncompromising, though I personally wouldn't be surprised to see him back as a Hezbollah ally in a few years if the US does not continue its strategy of confrontation in the Middle East. He was very pessimistic overall, though it was not clear if this was due to the broader strategic situation or the very humiliating defeat he had recently been handed by Hezbollah.

We met for two hours with Siniora, who seemed to be genuinely excited to see us but unfortunately proved to be very boring, lacking charisma or a sense of interactivity and choosing to lecture us about Lebanese history despite our protestations that we were familiar with it. He confirmed his technocrat image. In contrast to other March 14th figures he seemed quite optimistic and full of energy. He admitted that he personally had been against the two decisions that precipitated the crisis of the last few weeks, confirming reports that it had been Jumblatt behind them. Of all the orange juice served to us by the various figures we met, his was of the lowest quality.

We later met Saad Hariri at his Qoreitem palace, who, when I asked why he did not take the premiership, replied that he could do much more outside the government. He somewhat gauchely added, "Siniora is me!" When asked, he said that he did not believe the US would strike Iran, but that there would be a war perhaps 5 years hence, much bloodier than that which could be had now. Another question centered on his role in SecurePlus, a private security company that effectively constituted a militia, which was routed a few weeks ago. Saad admitted his connection to the company but denied that it was a militia. Saad had the demeanor of the playboy, lacking in finesse and genuine charisma, but full of confidence regardless. His orange juice was the highest quality. The security surrounding his palace was incredible, consisting of multiple checkpoints, barricades, and armed men everywhere. Pictures of Rafiq Hariri were displayed in abundance, including, as usual, in the central chair during the meeting.

Amin Gemayel was not particularly forthcoming, and seemed badly out of touch. When pressed for details on a number of points he was completely at a loss. He seemed to resort to stock politician phrases even in personal conversation. My impression was of a man losing vitality. I tried to push him on the question of what a real 'national defense strategy' would be, seeking some common ground between him and Hezbollah. He replied that he envisaged a 'Swiss model' of every citizen owning a gun. Incredulous, I asked him if that would really deter Israeli or Syrian aggression. He responded evasively, citing the importance of various UN resolutions. When I cornered him privately after the session, he said that in the 1970s they had tried to acquire Crotale air defense systems but were thwarted by Israeli pressure, indicating that similar factors were at play today.

Overall, none of the March 14th figures seemed to think there was any realistic prospect for Hezbollah's peaceful disarmament in the short to medium term. Geagea seemed to be the furthest from admitting this fact, while Jumblatt, Siniora, and Hariri were closest. Only Siniora and to some extent Hariri seemed upbeat about the Doha agreement, which struck me as odd considering that the agreement effectively redistributed seats from Sunnis to Shiites and Christians. This reinforced my feeling that the Doha agreement represented some kind of Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, considering Hariri's (and by extension Siniora's) very close ties to the Saudis.

The March 14th people unanimously condemned the actions of Hezbollah and its allies, and the phrase 'attempted coup' popped up repeatedly. Nonetheless, the general mood amongst the population was upbeat. There was broad satisfaction at the election of Michel Suleiman as President and the formation of a unity government. There was happiness too at the return of normal life to downtown Beirut, with the removal of the opposition protest camps. I had the feeling that Hezbollah and its allies could translate these developments into major political gains if they take the initiative to sustain political movement after a year and a half of paralysis. The upcoming elections in summer 2009 are the major political event towards which all the parties are working. 

We spent two days with Hezbollah. The first day involved being shown around the south by various low-level Hezbollah people. We were shown various scenes of Israeli atrocities (Qana, Khiyam) and presented with the families of martyrs at Bint Jbeil. The quality of the PR was exceptionally low and the propaganda exceedingly unsubtle, although our guide was a very lively and interesting woman with a show on Al-Manar. The reaction of our group was overwhelmingly negative, many feeling that the various tragedies and massacres were being very callously exploited.

The second day began with a tour of the Wa'ad rebuilding projects in the Dahiye. We were shocked by the speed and scale of the project - dozens of large residential buildings at various stages of construction, where last summer I saw only rubble. More than one person in our group contrasted the Hezbollah program with the US government's response to Katrina. People passing in cars and minibuses honked and cheered when they saw our group checking out the construction sites. [An aside to show just how out of touch the diplomatic community is: at a diplomatic party the night before a number of embassy people from various countries were assuring me that Hezbollah was not doing much construction.] Seeing the "Hezbollah stronghold" in person dispelled for many in the group the images the phrase conjures. There were no gunmen in the streets and many women walked around in tight jeans and revealing shirts. We met for several hours with Nawaf Musawi, Hezbollah's 'foreign minister' and a member of the politburo. He was very impressive - fiercely intelligent, an excellent debater, and a flexible thinker. While speaking formal Arabic, he understood our questions in English and frequently corrected his translator (as did those of us in the group who speak Arabic), who endured so much abuse from both sides that he eventually cried, "give me a break!" The event started badly, with a number of the Lebanese in our group attacking Musawi, and him clamming up in response, but we soon 'warmed up' to each other in the sense of frankly exchanging views. He thought that a US/Israeli attack on Iran was probable in the short term, partly in order to install McCain as a war leader (rather interestingly indicating that he saw genuine differences between McCain and Obama). He promised that such an attack would mean "Hell" for the region. However, he indicated (though not in so many words) that Hezbollah would not initiate hostilities with Israel even in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. He did however believe that an Israeli strike on Hezbollah would be virtually inevitable in the event of a strike on Iran, as Israel could do what it wished while the world's attention was on the Gulf. On the question of peace with Israel, he was relatively uncompromising, but indicated that Hezbollah would accept an agreement ratified in a referendum by all the Palestinian people - inside and outside the occupied territories. On domestic issues he was very hostile to the March 14th people, calling them traitors and singling out Jumblatt as "a liar! a big, big liar!" Disarmament would be impossible with the present government, which represents US and Israeli interests in Lebanon, but would be possible in the context of a government seriously committed to a strong national defense. When pressed on Syria, he criticized Ghazi Kanaan and Abdel Halim Khaddam - not exactly controversial targets nowadays - for their misdeeds in Lebanon.

I came away from the trip with a heightened expectation of a US/Israeli strike on Iran or other associated step to increase tension in the region. People on both sides seem to be openly placing their bets on that basis (Geagea) and fearing it as a serious possibility (Hezbollah and Syria). Jumblatt and Hariri were more cagey on the issue but my impression was that they are hoping for it, possibly expecting it, but politically smart enough not to openly indicate as such. My assessment of the broader situation is that hard-line elements in the West have only a few months to change the domestic and international political map by escalating US involvement in the Middle East. Otherwise there is a strong, and I believe for them unacceptable, danger of an Obama presidency that could reduce US involvement in the Middle East. This in turn could precipitate a collapse of the imperial system they are working so hard to implement, based around networks of individuals and interests binding the US, Britain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and their more minor pawns in the region. They will surely do everything in their power to avoid this scenario. "  Kieran Wanduragala

Comments

[rjj]

Question: is this inferred [apparent or suggested or indications of or hinted at] approval of Obama based on what they've heard of his campaign speeches?

[zanzibar]

Wow!

Thanks for your first hand report on the region. It seems Doha is just a temporary truce and each party is preparing for a major conflict.

Your report just goes to show what a piss poor job our corporate media is doing in informing the American people. The caricatures they sell us!!!

[condfusedponderer]

Kieran, Col,
thanks for sharing this very interesting account.

[jonst]

"My conversations in Arabic with various people in the camp impressed on me just how much the return to Palestine is a cornerstone of their worldview"

(Deep sigh)Then this is never going to go away. As to Assad....it is too bad he is under the impression that the majority of Americans did not support the Iraq invasion. That is a fundamental misreading of history. I wish he had been right about that. His mistake shows me the does not understand the dynamics of the 'game' here. Or some of the dynamics, anyway. That is not meant as a criticism of him. He certainly knows more about us than our 'leaders', present leaders, know about Syria.

[JohnH]

Wow! Thanks!

[Peter]

Thank you Kieran and Mr. Lang
I found your account very informative and well written.
Even if this implementation of a new imperial system fails, it's hard to believe that the people in the region might finally get the opportunity
to actively shape their own future without corrupt elites in league with outside forces continuing to successfully be able to hinder true independent paths of development that benefit more than a tiny minority.

[William R. Cumming]

Terrifically insightful post. Hope the open source scholars at the DNI and 33 other intelligence orgs in Executive Branch read this blog. Thanks for posting in its entirety. Insightful nuances also. I read big trouble in little Lebanon down the road.

[Mad Dogs]

Hmmm...based on Kieran's most interesting travelogue, I may not be crazy after all. *g*

[Helena Cobban]

Great reporting. Thanks! (Interesting-- and enviable-- degree of access you guys all got!)

[Walrus]

Wow! Thank you Col. Lang and Kieran for sharing this with us!

What concerns me, since I know so little about the region and it's politics, is the sense of fatalism, inevitability and complete lack of trust towards the United States and Israel.

This is the stuff - a series of miscalculations and preconceptions, that starts wars.

[Sidney O. Smith III]

Veritas! Go Cantab!

Kieran writes: “My assessment of the broader situation is that hard-line elements in the West have only a few months to change the domestic and international political map by escalating US involvement in the Middle East.”

Looks like the Wurmser option is still the name of the game. O7NIE caused major problems as how to execute the option. Odds increasing that step one of the three steps may materialize as some type of economic warfare, including a naval blockade of Iran, with the neo-pundits drawing a historical comparison to Cuban Missile Crisis to sell to Am. Public. (I believe C. Krauthammer has already laid the pipe for such an analogy in an earlier screed).

I agree with Mad dog and Arbogast in another thread. All moves by US and GOI appear consistent with implementing the Wurmser option or a variation thereof. The intent is to make everything as stable as possible with other neighbors before the big scha-bang.

It’s fantastic that Sic Semper Tyrannis is moving among Harvard grad students like a fish through water. Betcha’ Ruth Wisse would not like this extraordinary report from Kieran.

[arbogast]

Fascinating.

Required reading.

Kieran should become a journalist, possibly for Le Monde, more likely for either The NY Times, Washington Post, or The Guardian.

It does look as if the McCain Presidency will be sealed with a major military move into Iran.

[Mad Dogs]

Laura Rozen over at her blog War and Piece, has excerpts from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's remarks on Iran at the AIPAC conference here in the US:

The most serious and imminent threat to global security and stability is undoubtedly Iran. Iran is the world's largest exporter of terrorism, a fundamentalist dictatorship, motivated by utter contempt for the values represented by the free world and an uninhibited ambition to achieve military superiority and regional hegemony. It openly calls for the elimination of Israel and actively seeks nuclear capabilities to enable it to translate its sinister plans into action. Iran's fingerprints are evident in almost every terrorist organization across the Middle East, from Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip to Hizballah in Lebanon. Hizballah, Iran's major protégé, receives its directives, ammunition and finances directly from Tehran, with the help of Syria, and is actively engaged in torpedoing any chance of calm in Lebanon. Its long-standing record as a ruthless terrorist organization has earned Hizballah a place of honor on almost every list of global terrorist organizations...

...Israel and the United States have long understood the acute danger embodied in a nuclear Iran, and are working closely in a concerted, coordinated effort to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear. Israel will not tolerate the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and neither should any other country in the free world.

In addition, Laura also references the primary reason for Olmert's trip to the US in addition to cheerleading the AIPAC crowd, which is Olmert's meeting with Bush on Iran strategy per this from Ha'aretz:

"Olmert will try to convince Bush to set aside the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program in favor of data presented by Israel, and determine the administration's policy on Iran accordingly."

[arbogast]

Actually, taking into account the former press secretary's book and Sanchez' book, the likelyhood of a strike against Iran before November 5 is overwhelming.

But the economic waters are lapping around the gunwales and are getting much higher. The American public is very tired of this war that has lasted longer than WWII. The trick will be to avoid making the Iran strike the final straw that, in fact, elects Obama not McCain.

If I were the Bush Administration, I would sit tight and let AIPAC's fear of Iran mount to such a degree that Obama is creamed.

Or I would concoct a casus belli (cf. Sidney O. Smith III)

Obama really has put a spanner in the works of AIPAC. They had Hillary all set to go: the illusion of change, etc.

Shut down the Internet?

[arbogast]

What you need to know about Mark Penn is that he started out in Israeli politics working for Begin. He is the Voice of AIPAC.

Former top strategist Mark Penn, reviled by many on Hillary's staff but still an important voice in the candidate's ear, has emerged (to no one's surprise) as the strongest advocate of her remaining in the race regardless of what happens in the next 24 hours, according to sources inside the campaign.

In contrast to the "realist faction" (which reportedly includes Penn's replacement Geoff Garin, communications chief Howard Wolfson and others), Penn is advising the Clintons to remain in the race through the convention -- just in case another Rev. Wright-type scuffle breaks out.

His argument: Suspend the campaign if you must, but don't end it, because all those Obama supers will flock to Hillary if more dirt on O emerges before the convention.

Wright-type scuffle? Does that include the Bobby Kennedy scenario now drawn twice in public by Clinton?

[Joshua Landis]

Many thanks Kieran, for a fascinating report. I have taken the liberty of copying a hunk onto my blog. I hope other members of the trip will write up their impressions as well.

Best to you both and thanks again for an excellent blog and fine writing.

Best, Joshua

[David Habakkuk]

Absolutely fascinating -- a first-class piece of reporting.

'An aside to show just how out of touch the diplomatic community is: at a diplomatic party the night before a number of embassy people from various countries were assuring me that Hezbollah was not doing much construction.'

If our diplomats are so ignorant and incurious that, although they live in the country, they cannot find out crucial information available to a group of inquisitive Harvard graduate students, one's heart really sinks.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Helpful reporting, many thanks.

This piece by Anthony Sullivan resonates with Kieran's.

"A recent extended visit to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt leaves little room for optimism about the geopolitical stability of the Levant or the likelihood of Middle East peace. Most Arabs believe that more bad times are coming to the region, including another Israeli-Hezbollah war, which many now expect to erupt as early as the summer of 2008...."
http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol15/1Sullivan.asp

I spoke with Tony at a conference this past weekend. He is concerned about an Israeli attack on Lebanon-Syria.

[Paul]

Thanks to Colonel Lang and Kieran we are current with some of the thinking in the Middle East. Many Americans do not understand that situation and this blog is the only one that offers cogent thought on the difficulties there.

There is a long history in that part of the world and we are late players who threw away history books. The U.S. seemingly ruined every chance it had to make a meaningful difference in the lives of ordinary Arabs and Muslims. The huffing and puffing over Israel clouded our path. Lieberman’s admonition of “shared values” with Israel is sickening to hear. Strafing Gaza with F-16s one of them, Joe?.

Does anybody in the “Middle Eastern Hands” community believe that a father with young children in Kansas City gives a crap about events in the Levant? What about the real estate agent in Modesto who witnesses multiple foreclosures day after day? How about the unemployed textile worker in Henderson North Carolina? How does the Middle East “play” with ordinary Americans? Results in November will surprise a lot of “experts”.

Wall Street, OPEC, AIPAC, Multi-national corporations and the DOD are feeding at the public trough as never before. The rape of the lower and middle classes that began with Reagan and continues unabated to this day has created a never before seen rage with the common man and woman. That rage continues to manifest itself.

Who is going to pay for the continued adventure in that part of the world? Where will the troops and military force come from? The Army and MarCor are worn down and yes, beaten; the Navy is clueless, and the Air Force, if called upon in a large scale way, might bombs the wrong places given their relatively poor state of readiness.

Americans are, by and large, lazy and ignorant about the rest of the world, but they do understand that $10/gallon of gas results from chicanery in the Middle East, and they are upset by the foolishness of putting so much money into Iraq and Israel’s infrastructure ahead of their own. Though they may be a bit dense, they are flexible. New sources of energy will be developed by the will of the people and not by government fiat. It’s only a matter of time.

It is my belief (and hope) that the still unwashed populace of this weak country will rise up against their empty-suited masters.

Though it is important to understand the history of the Middle East, this blog has convinced me that an “eye for an eye” mentality reigns supreme and it will not change anytime soon. Let them kill each other if they are worried about the slights of the past.

[Martin K]

Sir, now that Obama has won, do you agree that its time to work on that project? I would really like to hear an endorsment from you to the democratic candidate, out loud & clear, even if I understand that it may be a bit galling. You are one of the few beacons inside the mil/intel blogsphere, and your voice is heard quite far, so in the name of all that is good & constructive, I would urge you to do this.

This is on-topic, because a lot of scenarios in the ME are hanging on the outcome of the US election, and if I had been allowed into your country I would have gone over and worked volunteer. Unfortunately, visas are not allowed for folks who have been arrested in passive demonstrations outside the US embassy. As can be seen from al- Assad, at least the Syrians are rational actors, not evil fanatics. This needs to be heard all over the USA, because the ME is going to have a unprecedented effect in this election.

Over at Abu Muqawama I suggested some democratic veterans sit down and write "The Middle East for Dummies: As authorised & written by certified US veterans". With maps, easy pictures and some statistics that you yanks love. I would repeat that idea here, something to slam on the table and say "read this, and then well talk" to those facing the haters in the workplace.

[Patrick Lang]

Martin K

I would have no "problem" with the election of Obama to be president, but I am not much of a "joiner." I joined something once and do not intend to repeat the experience. I have no interest in becoming one of his supporters. I also have no interest in becoming one of McCain's supporters. I do not wish to be a part of any "project."

The wave of support for Obama may well be a passing phenomenon. European sttitudes toward him are largely irrelevant to his possibilities for election. Obama finished the Democratic Party internal struggle on a descending note of declining support in polling across the country. This was within the Democratic Party. Obama has not yet met the Republicans. The polling data shows that there is still little support for him among white American workers, white women and Hispanics. One or two more incidents involving U-tube videos could be devastating to his prospects. pl

[Alex]

What is meant to be so ridiculous about a Swiss militia system? It strikes me that Hezbollah and the other parties down south successfully executed exactly that in 2006. It would also be an effective figleaf for the parties to retain their own forces whilst binding them into a national command structure.

[david]

Excellent, Kiernan. And thanks for sharing. Please let readers know if at some point we can find our way to other reports of the project/trip.

A word of caution, however, with respect to your conclusions (and please don't take offense as you seem quite knowledgeable on Lebanese affairs). In my opinion, the Lebanese do place 'bets' on the outcomes of regional power plays, but one should never underestimate the myopia of the Lebanese political class. Alliances there -- be they domestic, regional or international -- are highly ephemeral transactions. Thus, it is relatively unimportant whether Geagea thinks the US/Israel will or won't attack Iran and/or Syria. What matters is that Geagea thinks there are short-term political benefits, financial or otherwise, for staking out such a position. Geagea repeats WH talking points because it helps him raise money in the US, gets him access to USG funds, and resonates with part of his base. Geagea's enemy is not Iran, Syria or darkness or evil or terror, it is his Christian rivals (here Aoun, there not Aoun).

To be sure, the Lebanese have perfected the skill of telling foreigners want they want to hear (HA is stumbling to sound 'anti-colonial' notes to a global audience). But I remain convinced that Tip O'Neill was right on Lebanon: all politics are local.

Indeed, if you spend extended time with any Lebanese politician, you will see that the vast majority of their time and energy is spent navigating local quarrels, whose complexity and minutae are mind-numbing to those who do not know the 'village.' This is, of course, a bit strange, because on first brush (be it hours, days, weeks or even months), Lebanese pols when given a foreign audience have a strong prelidiction for waxing on world affairs. Such is the fate for those in a small, weak country, but the bizarre quality of their formulations on such matters belie the fact that it is something of a sideshow for the 'real game.' Some may find charm in this kookiness (think of any Western journalist having lunch at Mukhtara); others may find it dangerous. But it is a fool's errand to underestimate the political judgment of the local players. To a certain extent, we all change, but they stay the same.

Some say Lebanon has always been a staging ground for regional competitions, but I think more accurately it is a place where regional competitions die ignominious deaths in the mud of an abiding feudal system. This, for me, above all else, is what is meant by 'resistance' in Lebanon. And in this sense, I do not fault the Americans for always having a poorly calibrated policy in Lebanon. It is literally beyond their managerial capacity from a cost-benefit perspective. Even those with a more preferential balance sheet -- the Israelis and the Syrians -- have found stable profits hard to come by.

Thanks again for sharing your astute and insightful analysis. It pleases me to see that some latter day Harvard grads know that the 'great university of the West' finds an educational rival in the 'East.'

[Jose]

I got a different impression form reading the article by the fact that the pro-West forces were preparing for war and not fighting.

To me it shows how weak the American influence in the Middle East has become because Lebanon settle it's problem via the Arab League, Israel is negotiating with Syria via Turkey and Iran is negotiating a settlement between all the Shiite factions in Iraq.

In none of these places is America leading.

Once America adopted the Neo-Conic view of the world, America suffered from an isolation and resentment that has spread across the world but most severely in the Middle East.

On Mark Penn, Obama could not have done it without you even more than the damage done by Bill.

[Cloned_Poster]

Great post. Kieran manages to display all the subtleties that Bush II thinks will be solved by a Bud and clearing scrub in a ranch in Texas.