The whole issue of counterinsurgency as a doctrine and method is alive and well after the successful application of the resurrected doctrine in Iraq. This is an old, old doctrine in the US Army. It was thoroughly worked out in the 20th Century and successfully applied in many places by the US as it had been by the British and Frinch as well. This idea will be anathema to many, but classic counterinsurgency doctrine has always been a "winner." Logical thinkers should come to grips with the idea that France won in Algeria and America won in Vietnam employing this doctrine only to have public opinion at home and resulting political decision turn away from the fruits of victory. "Stab in the back?" "Nous sommes trahis? No, but the truth is that these counterinsurgency campaigns were won and then the results were negated by poliitcal action at home. Do I feel bad about that? Yes. The sacrifice of my comrades cries out to me, but democracy decides. We must accept that.
Most of the "scholarship" about Vietnam is drivel. If you want to fight me over what you think happened there, I am waiting.
President Obama seems inclined to follow a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan with its concomittant "investments" in a large "shield" of coalition conventional combat forces behind which a massive "nation building" investment and advisory activity on the model of CORDS takes place.
General McKiernan, an honest and disinterested man, said yesterday that reinforcements sent to Afhanistan should be expected to be there for at least five years. Given the relative absence of educated human resources, physical infrastructure and institutional sophistication in Afghanistan I think that "five years" is a serious unerestimate.
It also appears that Pakistan would serve as the "sanctuary" for the varied Islamist forces that would face us in the long COIN war in Afghanistan. Are we seeking to replicate Vietnam?
The United States is a poor country now, We did that to ourselves. Who can say what kind of economic condition we will see in a few years down the road? We would need a larger ground force to fight and sustain a COIN war on the roof of the world. How much farther should we push the endurance of the brave and selfless people who carry the real burden of all wars, the soldiers and their families?
Do we want to fight a COIN war in Afghanistan, or do we want to forget about the welfare of the Afghans and turn to the methods of using one group of potential enemies against another to protect ourselves?
I heve been involved in both. I wrote the "post' below in 2005.
I wrote the post quoted below on 26 August, 2005. At that time there had begun to be talk around Washington in neocon circles of reviving the 20th Century French inspired counterinsurgency doctrine known as the "Oil Spot Method." This method, worked out in the "school of hard knocks" in Indochina and Algeria essentially holds that it is control of the population that is the right goal in a revolutionary war situation and that combat operations are merely a "means" to that "end." In pursuit of that goal the development of the civil communities in the country and their self-perceived welfare has first priority. This is not to say that police and combat action will be especially benign during his process. In extremis, the theory would hold that negative methods of control will suffice if positive ones are not possible. The awfulness of what happened in the Casbah of algiers in the mid-50s is an example.
We attempted to apply that doctrine in the 20th Century with success in some places and failure in others. Vietnam was the most spectacular failure at the national level.
Nevertheless, it should be said that our local attempts at the application of this method from 1967 on in Vietnam met with a good deal of success.
Yesterday, Condoleeza Rice appeared before the Congress to announce that we will adopt the strategy of putting civil/military teams of advisers in the field in Iraq. They will be called "Province Reconstruction Teams." I presume that this is CORDS come again. CORDS worked in that it took control of much of the countryside away from the GUERRILLAS (as opposed to the North Vietnamese Army). I was in a position to see the system as a whole across the country. It was impressive, but it was massive, and it was designed to "work" over a long period of application. This will be interesting.
("Counterinsurgency=Political Warfare+Civic Action+Counterguerrilla operations." Roger Trinquier and Bernard Fall)
Pat Lang
"Brooks on Vietnam and Iraq
This evening David Brooks of the New York Times offered the opinion that in Vietnam our Army "At last" got it right at the end of the war and began to concentrate on what the French used to call the "oil spot" technique (tache de huile) in which one secures inhabited villages, towns, etc. and gradually expands the area of control into the spaces between until the oil spots meet and, voila! No more guerrilas. The French fastened on this method through the efforts of some very bright and creative French officers, most notably, Colonel Roger Trinquier as expressed in his masterpiece, "Modern War" (La Guerre Moderne) which was required reading in 1964 at the "US Army Special Warfare School's" "Counterinsurgency Staff Officer" course.
This theory worked quite well for the French in Indochina and Algeria. They essentially defeated the guerrillas in both countries, but lost the wars anyway. In Vietnam they lost to the main field forces of the Viet Minh who were a real army with regiments, divisions, uniforms, artillery, tanks ,etc. The French chose to fight their war in Indochina "on a shoestring" and in the big battles, like Dien Bien Phu, they were often badly outnumbered and outgunned. In Algeria, the French Army eventually pacified most of the country, but after a quiet couple of years, DeGaulle was elected and made the wise political decision to leave Algeria. He felt that the time had passed for such things as "Algerie Francaise." He was right.
Why do I know so much about the "oil spot" method? I know because it also worked for us in Vietnam. I worked there in the application of this method. I am not sure what year Brooks thinks was "at the end of the war," but from 1967 on the US was busy trying to apply this method under the control of the major part of the US Mission called "Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support" (CORDS). This organization united; USAID, military training groups at all levels, Agricultural, Educational, Civil Police, Medical, etc. into one effort with a consolidated national, regional, provincial, and district planning and operations policy. I worked at the District and Provincial levels. This project continued until US forces completed their withdrawal process under Nixon's Vietnamization Policy" in early 1973. I was on one of the last planes to leave. By that time most of the heavily inhabited areas of the country were under government control. How it is that Brooks thinks that we adopted this kind of strategy late in the war is a mystery to me.
Like the French the US faced the main battle forces of the Viet Minh as well as local force guerrillas, and the shadow government that CORDS struggled with for control of the people. After gaining control of Tonkin in 1954-55 the Vietnamese communists had renamed themselves as a national army and so we knew them as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). It was the same army. The divisions and regiments which had fought the French at Na San in 1953 and Dien Bien Phu in 1954 fought us in our war. I remember talking to PWs captured by us who had actually been in the same units at DBP.
We brought our main forces into the country in the mid 60s to meet the very real threat to our early pacification programs posed by the introduction of the NVA regular army into South Vietnam. As a result our regular forces fought the NVA's regular forces all over the country out in the woods where the civilian population was pretty thinly scattered. In 1965-1967 it was "force on force" in the "Iron Triangle," "The Ashau Valley, "The Michelin Rubber Plantation" and similar places. From 1967 on the job of "heavy" US forces was to fight the NVA in SUPPORT OF the strategy that Brooks thinks was adopted "at the end of the war." People like me who were located in Vietnamese towns and villages out in the country depended for our lives on the shield provided by US Regular units who would come to our rescue if the NVA attacked in strength. That happened a lot because they were not happy with what we were doing.
Unfortunately for the NVA we (and the South Vietnamese) were neither outnumbered nor outgunned. Throughout the period under discussion we had something over half a million men in country and the South Vietnamese had about 350,000 troops in units that varied greatly in quality. As a result, the enemy found themselves in a losing situation in which they could rarely win engagements against our side if our main forces were engaged. The only situations in whch they could prevail were fights against isolated units and in particular against small groups of CORDS advisers and their Vietnamese allies in the border regions. How did we lose the war in the end? We lost in the same way that the French lost in Algeria. People at home got tired of the whole thing and pulled the financial and military support plugs. After a couple of years of "peace" under the armistice of 1972, the North Vietnamese government decided to test the system. They attacked and captured a provincial capital on the Cambodian border (Phuoc Binh). It fell and the reaction of the US media and Congress was to immediately declare that under no circumstances would ANY assistance be given to the South Vietnamese. Collapse then followed. There were NO American forces or advisers in the country then. There had not been for a long time.
Is this Vietnam example applicable in some way to Iraq? Not really, not at present strengths in Iraq. In Iraq we do not have the forces to go out and provide the needed protection for isolated coalition "development" teams all over the country. Neither do we have the policy generated structure to provide integrated teams of experts to occupy a large number of towns on a permanent basis. If we want to do that we will have to organize such an effort and put it in in place. It will be a major additional commitment. At the same time we will have to remember that these scattered groups will be very vulnerable and will need the the prospect of reinforcement by US Army or Marine units within a couple of hours. All this implies a very different deployment, a different commitment, and a lot more troops.
Can we pacify the country that way? Yes, we can if we are willing to pay the price in assets and invlovement over four or five years. The answer is also dependent on whether the various Iraqi groups do not start "competing" to see who can ask us to leave first.
In the meantime, David Brooks needs to do some more reading
Pat Lang
To early to tell if Iraq was really a success or a bigger mistake than removing Mohammed Mosaddeq in Iran.
Right now it looks like a success, but so did Operation Ajax.
Always remember, Generals always prepare for the last war, remember Hader v Von Mannstein.
Posted by: Jose | 21 February 2009 at 02:04 PM
The extent of my total sum of knowledge of the events in Algeria comes from watching The Battle of Algeria on TCM, but when I read what you write, it seems to me that this short-changes the planning, strategy and foresight of the insurgents, and places excess blame on politicians by treating them as if they are acting in a void of public opinion.
It is my understanding that the ultimate strategic goal by the Algerian insurgents was never in any way to physically defeat the French, but rather from the beginning to attrit public support in France métropolitaine. I certainly feel silly and inadequate trying in any respect to contradict you with regards to Vietnam, but I would ask you if you really think it would have been possible for the politicians to have acted any other way without being removed from office?
If you achieve a victory by accident, is that less of a victory? I don’t know if the insurgents in Vietnam realized they could win by waging a PR campaign, but in fact it seems to me that this is what they did. Is that really so different than some of the basic ‘hearts and minds’ tenants of COIN? And would you describe a victory achieved mostly through ‘hearts and minds’ as anything but a genuine victory?
Perhaps this is just meaningless semantics, but it does seem important to me.
Posted by: Keith | 21 February 2009 at 02:51 PM
"The question's a good one, but the answer, it seems to me, can only be approached by answering the fundamental question of the strategic objective in Afghanistan. I see two logical candidates for a statement of the objective. One would read something like this, The United States will, using all appropriate resources, establish a viable government in the contiguous territory of Afghanistan. The other is, The United States, using necessary and appropriate means, will prevent Al Quaeda and associated organizations from establishing bases of operations in Afghanistan.
If the first statement defines our objective. then a counter-insugency campaign makes sense and, indeed, may be the only way achieve it. However, is that what we really want, or need, to do. The question is not only one of the required resources of men, money, and political will. Afghanistan isn't Algeria nor is it Viet Nam in the sense of having a history, traditions, and institutions of central authority. In fact, quite the opposite.
If the objective is defined as in the second statement , would it not be achievable without a campaign of pacification? The COIN effort would not be required, since we wouldn't be attempting to control the country, indeed there wouldn't be insurgents as far as the United States is concerned. Afghanistan would continue to be fractured along tribal and geographic lines. The denial of bases would be accomplished by good intelligence (we must have assets and contacts in abundance), alliances, bribes, and, when necessary, targeted operations.
Final thought, if we're not shrewd about this chapter in "the great game" , I foresee 20 or 30 battalions of soldiers and marines plus civic action teams, advisors, allied forces, DoD contractors, and all the "ash and trash" that accompanies American armies at war humping around Afghanistan for years to come.
I'm on a borrowed computer, which woudn't send this via the SST website e-mail function, so I hope this works.
777guy"
Posted by: Patrick Lang | 21 February 2009 at 03:30 PM
Unwinnable.
Unconquerable by Western democracies.
A authoritarian US, with a suitably rabid - as opposed to cowed - population at WWII-scale full bore might be able to raze the country in a few years, but that's it.
Nothing but trouble ever coming outta there and both sides of the Durrand Line for the U.S. now, Best leave them to have at each other as they will.
Curious is absolutely right that the "enemy' is dictating the timing and pace of combat, and it seems to me that unless Pakistan is disappeared, that will remain so indefinitely, literally ad infintum. What if they all just stayed home for one year, sat our counterinsurgency out? Its like the opium crop, huge stockpiles were amassed and withheld from the market several years running for both market/price control and general rainy day purposes.
I'll leave the problem of securing Pakistan's nukes to wiser counsel than I.
Do real practicable security at home, as opposed to porky security theatre, stop unnecessarily pissing clever determined people off, defeat your current owners, that'd be useful, less futile, work.
Not to worry though. you'll always have the War on Drugs! I was going to say until the Latinos ruled, but I suppose they'll like the current more profitable and militarized state of affairs that currently obtains, and it'd be racist too. Works just fine for the white man for now, though.
Posted by: Charles I | 21 February 2009 at 04:20 PM
I always thought the objective in afghanistan is very clear and non negotiable. Prevent al qaeda version 2.0 to emerge. The big question is how to go about doing it, because it turns out to be far more complex than chasing bunch of terrorists in the mountain.
The big question is what do we want in Pakistan!
We are in schizophrenic mode. And the incoherency simply destroys everything. We are running in circile.
Pakistan-FATA is what drives afghanistan problem. There are about 6 million peoples in fata area, right next to fundamentalists going over drive supported by wacky pakistan politics.
The situation in Pakistan is not sustainable. They cannot keep pulling "death by thousand cuts" strategy employed during soviet era against India and trying to create buffer/friendly regime in Afghanistan.
THAT is the big question we have to answer: WHAT DO WE WANT in Pakistan?
Unless there is change in Pakistan policy, fixing afghanistan will be nearly impossible and very expensive. (look at the map folks, Aghanistan is practically split in 2. west of mountain, persian speaking and relatively calm. central/eastern part are in turmoil, pasthun speaking.) WHY IS THAT?
Creating stable and viable afghanistan central government will never happen as long as Pakistan-Fata is supporting talibanism strategy. It's that simple.
I mean, this is everything: the cultural drive, the inteligence support, the money flow, the opium trade, weapon manufacturing, flow of refugees and people,lawlessness,...
The Pakistan problem is serious. Observe how everybody next to pakistan is panicking (Iran, India, China) They all hedging bets, doing all sort of plans anticipating pakistan imploding. (logistic/trade route, alliance, etc)
talibanism is Pakistan creation. You can't change a thing in afghanistan as long as Pakistan going full force with that strategy. And this strategy will lead to continuous long term instability in afghanistan and ultimately destruction of pakistan.
Pakistan has to understand, the strategy and path they are heading is going to destroy everything. They are not in control of their strategy anymore.
Posted by: curious | 21 February 2009 at 07:25 PM
Col Lang - While I cannot address your express topic, I can relate a story about my late husband (US Marine).
In December, 2002, we were watching the evening news and Bush's decisions. He began passionately talking about his experiences in Korea, and how politicians won't let the generals do their job. He brought up examples from Vietnam, and the more we talked, the angrier he became.
Unfortunately, he got so upset that he suffered a major heart attack, mid-conversation, and could not be revived.
He was much older than I (Korea is only in text books for me) but his upset opened my eyes as to how our military is often compromised by politicians who care only about their continued careers.
I suspect most in the military share his feelings.
Posted by: Nevadan | 21 February 2009 at 07:48 PM
FB Ali:
Do you think Dr. Najibulah could have survived if he had political support? Say, hupothetically speaking, from Iran, US, India, and China?
Would (Could) Mr. Karazi survive with political support from US, China, Russia, India, and Iran?
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 21 February 2009 at 09:15 PM
Curious:
Iran, unlike Israel, does not posesses nuclear weapons. You are, perhaps negligently, conflating two distinct situations. Your statements only further obfuscates the reality of the situation.
The fact remains that US & EU have severly damaged, over the last 30 years, two major international instruments of disarmaments: The Chemical Weapons Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And their collective response to any criticism is this: "We will bomb you.".
Perhaps with a lot of effort and money they can reverse the damage that their instrumentalist abuses of these andother treaties have caused - but I am not optimistic.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 21 February 2009 at 09:22 PM
All:
The NWFP has been militarized over last 25 years. There are a lot of men over there who know of no other way of life except war.
Without the demilitarization of NWFP there will be war on both sides of the border for a generation; in my opinion.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 21 February 2009 at 09:26 PM
John Howley wrote:
“…hampered cooperation with the limp-wristed Old Europeans who thought human rights mattered.” times have certainly changed when the principles upon which this nation was founded, - here are a couple: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,… That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,…” are no longer respected by many who share your view that only ‘limp wristed Old Europeans think human rights matter.
I believe the Europeans also remember the other fact that Thomas Paine wrote two hundred years ago – that an army of principles can go where an army of soldiers can not. Politicians who have never served seem neither to understand nor respect that principle.
Al Queda is the most recognized ‘brand’ name on earth now thanks not to Osama Bin Laden’s leadership but to the incompetence of the neo-cons and the leadership of George W. Bush which took America into Iraq.
FB Ali’s points should be taken to heart. John Howley’s question – what is our political strategy – is exactly what the administration needs to explain in clear language, I certainly haven’t heard it yet.
Posted by: fred | 21 February 2009 at 10:55 PM
Corruption, guns, drugs, ineffective government and misused military training. Same stories everywhere.
with bad economy hitting everywhere, unemployment, corruption, etc are going to explode
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/20/AR2009022002891.html
About 6,600 Mexicans were killed in fighting involving drug gangs last year, and alarms are going off in this country. The U.S. Joint Forces Command, former drug czar Barry R. McCaffrey, former CIA director Michael V. Hayden, former House speaker Newt Gingrich and any number of analysts have speculated that Mexico is crumbling under pressure from drug gangs.
But "failed state" is the sort of shorthand that Washington has a way of turning into its own reality, the facts be damned. The Mexican government isn't on the verge of losing physical control of its territory, stopping public services or collapsing. But it is under tremendous pressure and has only nominal control in some places, including border cities such as Tijuana, near San Diego, and Juarez, which sits cheek-by-jowl with El Paso. Army troops patrol the streets, but the police, courts, journalists and citizenry are cowed by the less-visible but more-ruthless drug cartels.
Posted by: curious | 21 February 2009 at 11:34 PM
http://www.acfnewsource.org/science/afghan_ag.html
Most news footage of Afghanistan shows collapsed buildings, barren deserts, and dusty wastelands. But Afghanistan also has a long agricultural history of growing wheat, corn, almonds, and fresh vegetables. Much of what grows well in California grows well in Afghanistan, and many of these crops � including melons, apples, pistachios, peaches, and over 60 varieties of almonds � actually originated there. Before war broke out in the late 70s, Afghanistan was agriculturally self sufficient, and was known for its excellent fruit, especially table grapes.
For the past 20 years, Afghanistan hasn't produced much of anything in the way of agriculture. Civil war and rule by the Taliban destroyed much of the country�s farming industry. Unexploded land mines make it difficult to reclaim farmland, irrigation systems have been destroyed, and much of the country�s agricultural knowledge died with the farmers and researchers who perished in war. The experts from UCD are working with the people of Afghanistan to rebuild that country's agriculture by training people in basic farming techniques and introducing new technology in irrigation, production, and marketing of crops.
Posted by: curious | 22 February 2009 at 12:16 AM
Colonel,
Did you ever read historian Gabriel Kolko's book on Vietnam, and if so, did you like it? He writes from the perspective of the Vietnamese.
Book: "Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience"
http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko04292005.html
Posted by: MRW. | 22 February 2009 at 10:22 AM
Very important comments above; these should be and are hopefully read by people in the US government. However, I consider past several and the current government to be progressively disfunctional - because of lack of national coherence and common will , too many interest groups pulling on the fabric of our society - this is the slow unraveling of the great American Democratic Experiment. Please, tell me it is not so.
Posted by: fanto | 22 February 2009 at 11:10 AM
Babak Makkinejad,
Re the NPT: What would be required to reverse the current degenerative dynamics would be a change in thinking on the part of the Western powers -- an adequate appreciation that fairness is relevant to international relations, as well as power.
Some evidence given to a House of Commons Select Committee by Michael MccGwire -- the most intellectually significant post-war British intelligence analyst, as well as one of the few in this country who still thinks seriously about strategy -- is to the point:
'At the time of the Treaty's inception in 1968 and for the next 25 years, the NPT was immensely important and unexpectedly successful. This was largely due to the nature of the Cold War world with its two camps, client states and the superpowers' common interest. The Treaty was, however, inherently discriminatory, and would remain effective only as long as the non-nuclear states believed it was, on balance, fair and that it served their long-term interests. Fairness is important because its correlate—resentment—is a powerful and destructive motivator.
'Come the end of the Cold War, the nuclear-weapon states sought the indefinite extension of the NPT. There was significant opposition to this proposal from the non-nuclear states, but, in return for a range of inducements, the indefinite extension was agreed at the 1995 Treaty Review Conference. This was subject to a pledge by the nuclear-weapon states that the five-yearly Conferences would provide an engine for progress towards the goal of nuclear elimination, as set out in Article 6 of the Treaty.
'That promise was explicitly reaffirmed in the final statement of the 2000 Review Conference but, by then, the nuclear-weapons states were already walking back on their earlier promises. In 2001, the incoming Bush administration made clear its disdain for these and other arms control negotiations, and the 2005 Review Conference could not even agree a final statement.
'Meanwhile, the tacit pledge that the nuclear states would avoid the resort to nuclear weapons has been replaced by the increasing normalisation of such weapons. Washington talks about using them in response to biological and chemical attack and is developing small warheads that can be used more readily ("useable nukes"). Britain and France talk in general terms of "sub-strategic" systems. In other words, having achieved the indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon states are not observing their side of the bargain, and America (which determines the nuclear "weather") has explicitly woven the nuclear option into its operational doctrine.
'These double standards contribute to the post 9/11 image of the "West against the Rest", and a cynical view is that the NPT (and the associated Nuclear Weapon Free Zones) is now a convenient instrument of US foreign policy. It ensures that US conventional forces will not be deterred or hampered by the threat of a nuclear response, and can be used to justify punitive action against any "rogue state" that might be seeking such a capability.
'This perception conflates dissatisfaction over the implementation of the NPT with the wider dissatisfactions arising from the rich/poor and North/South divides, from the socio-economic circumstances that have nourished fundamentalism, and from the polarising effect of Bush's "war on terrorism", with its simplistic slogan that "you are either with us or against us". These different dissatisfactions each have their own fault lines, but in all cases the NATO nuclear states find themselves on one side and the "dissatisfied" on the other, and the NPT is increasingly seen as part of a larger Western conspiracy. It is failing the crucial test of being seen as "fair".
'More importantly, increasing numbers of states are beginning to question whether the treaty still serves their long-term interests; the post-Gulf War dictum—that if you take on America, you need a nuclear capability—was seemingly borne out in 2003, when the US attacked Iraq, but not North Korea.'
(See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/225/225we34.htm.)
Posted by: David Habakkuk | 22 February 2009 at 11:34 AM
Colonel,
America’s most successful colonial war, led by veterans of the Indian Wars, pacified the Philippines, unlike Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. Even so, during the Great Depression the Philippines was promised its independence in 1946 because the cost of managing the colony in corruption and treasury was too great.
Our battalion pacified our valley in Vietnam. We could drive safely anywhere during the day. But, as soon as the last American troops the Communists regained control in the 1972 offensive. America never had a chance in Vietnam once we were tagged as colonial occupiers. The war was simply unsustainable. Besides the money spent on fighting a war on the other side of the world, there were huge costs for those who served. Although only one soldier was killed in a fire fight, no one in my company stayed out in the field the whole year. Most were medevaced out, sick or wounded, never to return. The Draft assured endless supply of bodies.
Each generation has to learn the same lessons all over again. Colonial Wars fought on the cheap cost too much in lives and money and are never resolved until the occupier departs. Pakistan is failing; pushed by the Predator bombing campaign. Human beings innately resist a foreign attacker.
With Bank of America and Citibank, the two largest banks, both are about to go belly up. America doesn’t have the treasury to continue fighting two religious colonial wars.
Hillary Clinton in Beijing:
"I appreciate greatly the Chinese government's continuing confidence in United States treasuries. I think that's a well-grounded confidence."
Posted by: VietnamVet | 22 February 2009 at 11:41 AM
All:
In regards to Afghanistan, the best choice for US & EU is to treat Afghanistan as a Muslim issue and withdraw.
US & EU cannot usefully puruse an imperial polciy in Central Asia - Russia, China, and Iran are opposed to their presence and their aims. Moreover, they are an alien people with an alien value system among Muslim populations that are still living in a largely pre-capitalist economy.
The Muslim states always bitch & moan about the superpowers and assorted more powerful states messing up their polities.
This is a perfect opportunity for these states to put their money where their mouths are and try to resolve the Afghan problem. Fundamentally, only Muslims will have any traction with the Muslim population of Afghanistan.
Let Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey deal with the Afghan problem. US, EU, China, Russia, and India can provide political or financial support but they do not need to be directly involved in Afghanistan.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 22 February 2009 at 03:49 PM
David Habakkuk:
Thank you for your fine points.
In addition to those points, there is also an apparent attempt to restrict the rights of states - under NPT - to fissile material production and re-processing. Without it, in my opinion, NAM states will leave NPT. And there are too many of them to be bombed, bribed, or intimidated.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 22 February 2009 at 04:03 PM
Babak Makkinejad
“Political” support by outside powers is essentially irrelevant to the longevity of a government in that part of the world. Internal political support would, in theory, matter, but is meaningless in Afghanistan. It is generally forgotten that the Taliban ruled the country for over 5 years with the acquiescence, and even support, of the bulk of the population because they brought peace and order to a land that had suffered terribly (after the Soviet withdrawal) from civil war, banditry and the depredations of assorted warlords. The system they imposed was a medieval religious one, but it was accepted easily by a deeply conservative, largely tribal society. That is why the Taliban still have so much support: because they provide hope of a way out of the current state of warfare, turmoil, corruption and misrule to the previous state of peace and order. This support will continue to increase as the current war is prolonged.
Curious
You have it upside down when you say: fix Pakistan in order to fix Afghanistan (Feb 21, 0725 PM). See below.
All
There have been a lot of excellent comments in this thread. Many of them highlight the pointlessness and/or futility of continuing the war in Afghanistan (777Guy’s hit the nail exactly on the head – Feb 21, 0330 PM). But it seems to me that the key, critical point in this situation is still not sufficiently appreciated, and that is: unless the Afghan war is ended soon Pakistan will be lost to religious fundamentalism. The one exception was Grego’s quote from Andrew Bacevich : "No country poses a greater potential threat to US national security than does Pakistan. To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake." (Feb 20, 0202 PM).
But it’s not Pakistan’s stability that is at risk. Pakistan is not going to implode (a la Somalia, etc). The prospect is much worse. The current misrule, corruption and economic hardship are causing more and more people to give up on this entire system of modern (Westernized) governance; this is the fertile soil in which religious fundamentalism establishes itself. (Note that I don’t use the term “Taliban”. Nothing so vitiates discourse on the subject as the stupid lumping together of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and sundry other extremist movements. It makes one want to tear one’s hair out to hear Richard Holbrooke prattling on about “the bad guys” etc).
Pakistan can still be saved. But the absolute, unavoidable pre-requisite is to end the war in Afghanistan.
David Habakkuk
Thank you for that quote from Michael McGwire. He is exactly right. Much of Pakistani thinking on the nuclear issue conforms to his analysis. There exists a strong suspicion, even inside the military, that the US is pushing Pakistan into fighting its war against "terror" in order to destabilize it and take over its nuclear weapons.
Posted by: FB Ali | 22 February 2009 at 05:05 PM
unless the Afghan war is ended soon Pakistan will be lost to religious fundamentalism.
Posted by: FB Ali | 22 February 2009 at 05:05 PM
One can stabilize Afghanistan using brute military force and various social engineering. But that is only 2-3 yrs solution, and very expensive.
while one doing that, a functioning afghanistan has to be created. A government that is able to more or less, create law/regulation, able to somewhat enforce it (police/national arm force), civil services, and more importantly able to define and generate the idea of "nation state", function as the source of nationalism.
I don't suggest the condition above can only happen if reform happens in Pakistan. But the situation in Pakistan plays major role in sustaining the biggest threat to creation and sustaining afghanistan central government.
things like RPG, huge administrative freedom in FATA, weapons, drug money, and more importantly ISI techniques to generate and maintain public supports using religious populism are detrimental.
The product of those mix is an organisation that is much stronger than afghanistan central government.
I don't suggest changing Pakistan condition will happen in 3-5 yrs. But it has to happen in less than a decade. Or else eastern afghanistan will fall into fata gravity. The amount of RPG and opium alone will devour the new and very weak afghanistan national army. I also know the refugee and drug flow from afghanistan is putting serious stress on Pakistan.
But Pakistan also adding huge uncertainty to its own condition.
Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan has to be resolved. It is not possible for Pakistan to use the strategy in kashmir without people in fata learning the trade. The two areas are only half a day driving distance.
The problem with trying to win popular vote using religious populism, one has to play harder and harder each round. And it will finally explode in some sort of ethnic religious violence.
Fata has to be reformed over time, definitely under 10 yrs.
Pakistan economy has to improve, Pakistan politics has to move beyond what is happening right now, etc, etc...
Otherwise, next economic crisis, Pakistan will be gone. Currency, national debt, etc. With that, things will cascade fast. Next thing we know, It's a small group of desperate rogue military men running big narco warlord operation taking over the country.
and that's how Pakistan will collapse. It runs out of money and nobody cares.
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The Muslim states always bitch & moan about the superpowers and assorted more powerful states messing up their polities.
This is a perfect opportunity for these states to put their money where their mouths are and try to resolve the Afghan problem. Fundamentally, only Muslims will have any traction with the Muslim population of Afghanistan.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 22 February 2009 at 03:49 PM
The world is waiting. It's show me time.
Posted by: curious | 22 February 2009 at 10:13 PM
Iran, unlike Israel, does not posesses nuclear weapons. You are, perhaps negligently, conflating two distinct situations. Your statements only further obfuscates the reality of the situation.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 21 February 2009 at 09:22 PM
Once capability to enrich uranium pass through certain threshold, the next biggest problem is electronic fuse. And I think Iran is more than capable to create such device.
granted there is a difference between enrichment threshold vs Israel 200 nuke heads, but that's a question of manufacturing speed.
Posted by: curious | 22 February 2009 at 10:29 PM
curious:
That argument scurrilous.
All women have equipment to be prostitutes; that does not make them so.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 23 February 2009 at 10:12 AM
curious:
You argued: “Once capability to enrich uranium pass through certain threshold, the next biggest problem is electronic fuse. And I think Iran is more than capable to create such device.
granted there is a difference between enrichment threshold vs Israel 200 nuke heads, but that's a question of manufacturing speed.”
That argument is scurrilous.
All women have equipment to be prostitutes; that does not make them so.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 23 February 2009 at 10:17 AM