Sic Semper Tyrannis

"Iraq Faces Deadlock On Charter" Washpost

"Kurds and some Shiite Arabs have called for a federal system that would formally create separate regions in the predominantly Kurdish north and possibly in the Shiite south. The minority Sunnis, who ruled Iraq for more than eight decades, until Saddam Hussein was deposed, said such a move would mean the breakup of the country."  Washpost

Islamic history reflects the patterns of traditional Islamic social structures and even religious discourse.  In all these fields the emphasis is on unity, cohesiveness and consensus.  Almost nowhere is there any real value placed on the kind of devolution of power or diversity of opinion, or authority implicit in the Western idea of federalism.

"Ta'ifa" (faction) is a word in Arabic that has few positive connotations.  It is generally associated with divisiveness, selfish self-interest and the weakness that struggles over the division of power are thought to produce.

The only federal structures that I know of in Arab history are modern and the products of the interaction of British educators and colonial officials with the people of the arabian Peninsula.  The first of these was the ill fated "Federation of South Arabia" which was cobbled together by the Brits from a collection of colonies, protectorates, sultanates, etc. when the British were intent on pulling out of Aden.  This lasted a short time and then was replaced by a Stalinist regime of British educated Marxists who were not interested in the distribution of power and who, therefore fit nicely into the historiography of the Arabs.  The other example is that of the United Arab Emirates, a grouping of princely city-states into a loose federation in which one of the rulers holds the reins as president.  I don't think that model will work in Iraq.

Federalism in Iraq?  It is a way station on the path to dissolution on the model of Yugoslavia, and that is the way most Arabs see it.  pl

Prince Turki's Islam

"Imams and teachers who have used Islam to bolster and preach their political beliefs have done so by perverting traditional Islamic texts. Declaring fatwas permitting suicide bombings goes against everything at the heart of Islam. These so-called Muslim scholars must be and are condemned. They are violating the most dearly held principles of Islam Imams and teachers who have used Islam to bolster and preach their political beliefs have done so by perverting traditional Islamic texts. Declaring fatwas permitting suicide bombings goes against everything at the heart of Islam. These so-called Muslim scholars must be and are condemned. They are violating the most dearly held principles of Islam." Turki al-Feisal and George Carey

"George Carey?"  Ghosts should be more invisible.

The new Saudi ambassador to Washington in this piece in the "Beirut Daily Star" takes his stand against Jihadi claims to speak for Islam, the world's Muslims, and for his country.  He also takes the position that he is not in favor of the idea that the Jihadi War is a "clash of civilizations," in other words a war between the culture and countries of the West and the world of Islam.

Well, good for him.  This is certainly a praiseworthy sentiment.  Unfortunately, the Jihadis DO think that what is in progress is a "clash of civilizations," and since we are fighting THEM and not the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the opinion of the Jihadis in this matter is of somewhat greater importance.

Prince Turki, a former prep school boy at a prestigious east coast boarding school, also gives as his opinion (or Carey's) that he knows exactly what Islam is and that the Jihadi version is just wrong.

Interesting.  The problem with that from our point of view is that Prince Turki's opinion as to what is Islam, is just that, Prince Turki's opinion.

At the risk of sounding like a man with only one tune to whistle, I will say again that in Islam there are no clergy, only scholars.  There is no priesthood, only officials (Muftis, etc.) and there is no hierarchy.(no pope, college of cardinals, bishops, etc.)  There is no ecclesiastical "chain of command."  This is altogether true in Sunni Islam (where the jihadis and Prince Turki live) but it is also true in Shia Islam where the array of ayatollahs somewhat obscures the view of the real situation.

There a number of "roots" of the Islamic law.  I will reserve that for another time, but suffice it to say that in the end, opinion on the exact meaning and application of Islamic law depends on what, in Arabic, is called "Ijma'" or Consensus.  This is the Consensus of groups of scholars, the Consensus of "universities" like Al-Azhar in Cairo, the Consensus of groups of Muslims in accepting the view of their group or the most persuasive among them.  There is no pope or archbishop of Canterbury to say which Consensus is best among others.  There is only opinion among the the adherents of various Consensus positions.

In other words, Islam is what your Consensus group says it is.  Islam is what you can make "stick" in terms of how much power and influence your Consensus group has and/or can exert.

So, in Saudi Arabia, PrinceTurki's Consensus probably has a lot of traction, but less so among the expatriate Muslims of Western Europe which, unfortunately is where the TATP is mixed.

Pat Lang

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=10&article_ID=17184&categ_id=5

"the wolf by the ears"

The question often arises of the strange doings of Saudi Arabia and their apparent fecklessness in not taking up positions which would be satisfactory to us in the West.  Truth to tell, Saudi Arabia is not a "nation state,"  is difficult to think of as a homogeneous "nation," but is a "state."  In fact it is a family enterprise.  That is why it is called, "Saudi Arabia."  The family of owners are the Al-Saud.

The Saudi government is run as a family business with the help of people who have proven or who hope to prove their loyalty to the family. The idea of Saudi "citizenship" is a bit of a joke. Saudis are "subjects" of the monarchy, not citizens in the sense that would be understood elsewhere, even in other Arab kingdoms. Jordan, for example.

The perceived legitimacy of the Saudi state rests on its three hundred year old alliance and symbiosis with the Wahhabi sect of Islam. As a result of that relationship the Saudi government has felt required to fund many zealot schools and other projects around the world. In the process, they have "created" a mass environment in the kingdom that is xenophobic, and intolerant of other peoples' ways and beliefs.

The Saudi government now has the problem of placating the largely anti-Western 'Ulema and masses while retaining some sort of "working" relationship with the US. Difficult.

To borrow an expression from Mr. Jefferson, the Saudi establishment has "the wolf by the ears."

Hobson's choice.

"A Wasting Asset."

CS,

We no longer seem so useful to the Shia. I recommend to all Peter Galbraith's superb piece on Iraq in the "New York Review of Books." He makes the observation that the demography of the country pretty much insures that the Sunni insurgency will not be able to re-capture Iraq as a whole. On that basis the Shia may have made the judgment that our continuing presence is a "wasting" asset and that our inability to efficiently deliver re-construction moneys makes that even clearer. The Shia activists do not want to share power with the Sunni Arabs. There is a reason why the Sunnis ran Iraq for a thousand years and the Shia know that if the Sunni Arabs are given a share of power, they may well rule the country at some future time and that "payback" will be a bitch.

The Bush Administration actually believes much of its own rhetoric and the continuing efforts of Khalilzad, Rice, Casey and others to achieve some degree of power sharing must be a growing problem for the Shia rulers.

Therefore, "let's get the Americans out of here as soon as we reasonably can do it."

pl

"Only Interests.."

"After meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari said there was no firm timetable for any American withdrawal, but he noted that Iraqis "desire speed in that regard." "  NY Times

There is a famous "bon mot" usually attributed to Palmerston in which the PM says that "countries do not have friends.  They have interests."  This truism is well demonstrated in what happened during Rumsfeld's "surprise" visit to Baghdad today.  Actually, Jaafari's statement shows that the truism applies not just to states but also to ethno-religious communities that wish to rule states where once they were the under-class.

Jaafari and company are first, last and always Twelver Shia zealots who wish to rule where for many centuries they were ruled.  (I, obviously would not include Chlabi's INC in that statement) The process of growing a new government in Iraq that is now underway is essentially a process of handing the country over to the majority Shia.  The Sunni Arabs know that.  The Kurds know that as well, but the Kurds still think they will be able to retain at least as much autonomy in their mountains as they have now.

There has been much talk of the secular nature of the Iraqi Shia population.  In fact, the Iraqi Shia Arab population has always been deeply divided between those who think themselved primarily Iraqi and those for whom Shia Islam comes first.  It was the latter group that repeatedly revolted against Saddam's government, and the same group and its leaders are now taking over Iraq.  Jaafari is a semi-reformed, but altogether rehabilitated Dawa' terrorist leader who was in the leadership of this group when it bombed the US Embassy in Kuwait.  Dawa and SCIRI, the two militantly politico-religious Shia groups dominate in the new government.  They are already deeply involved with the Iranian government.  It is inevitable that they should be so whether they wish it or not.  Iran is Shia.  The surrounding Islamic world is overwhelmingly Sunni.  What choice do the Iraqi Shia zealots have but to drift inevitably into the orbit of Iran.  The Sunni Iraqi Arab and international Jihadi Sunni revolt in Iraq is widely supported among the populations of the Sunni Muslim World.  What choice do the Shia of Iraq have but to look to Iran?  They are not going to rely on us in the long run.  To do that would be to accept the westernization and de-racination that the Bush policy clearly imples.

The process of shifting to an Iranian orientation has already begun.  The formerly exiled Sunni Defense Minister, Dulaimi, of Iraq was in Tehran a couple of weeks ago and he and his Shia colleague who is Defense Minister there announced a mutual defense arrangement between the two countries that looked to have the Iranians train Iraqi troops in th future.  This announcement in the press set off a tussle in washington after which we now "know" that Dulaimi was "way off the reservation,"  and "way past his instructions."  From what was said today by Jaafari it looks like Dulaimi was pretty close to his instructions.

So, what will happen over the next years?

1-There will be a constitution.  It will make Islam the supreme legal authority.

2-Kurdish autonomy will be grudgingly accepted for now.

3-Women will lose a lot of what they have achieved over the decades in Iraq.

4-We will be asked to leave as quickly as possible and at a rate that the Shia think we will accept.  Iran's forces and "volunteers" will "back up" the Iraqi government.

Beyond that there is the prospect of a different Middle East, but that is another subject..

Pat Lang

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/27/international/middleeast/27cnd-rumsfeld.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5094&en=6388bf45be90413b&hp&ex=1122523200&adxnnl=1&partner=homepage&adxnnlx=1122476854-WmtmkKFRM0ZILs5t5dvZzw

Reduced Exposure

It's pretty clear that the operational tempo for US forces in Iraq has been reduced.  The continual, slow loss of soldiers and equipment is potentially a threat to US public support for the effort in that country.  The insurgents know that and so doea the Bush Administration.  The insurgents main target in Iraq is the destruction of the nascent government but a necessary secondary target is American public opinion.  The Western media's "take" on all that is occurring is very important to the insurgents.  as someone said on TV today, "if the press moved to Basra, the insurgents would increase the tempo of their operations there."

With all that in mind, the coalition has reduced the level of its unilateral operations in order to avoid casualties.

There are some exceptions:

1-Along the syrian border operations involving a reinforced battalion of infantry (1,000+) continue with the intendtion of reducing border crossing by jihadis and breaking up the emergence of "redoubt" areas more or less under insurgent control.

2-Escort operations continue along supply routes needed for the support of US Forces. These escorts for convoys are very vulnerable to roadside bombs (IED).

3-Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) for incidents. These QRFs are essentially acting as a mobile reserve for friendly Iraqi forces.

pl

"Not a Worthwhile Metric."

Larry De Rita, the ASD for Public Affairs at the Pentagon says that although the US Government has a good knowledge of the identities of the leadership of the Iraq insurgencies that DoD does not attempt to estimate the size of the population of the insurgency because "that would not be a worthwhile metric."  What would that mean?

I think it means that the administration now realizes that their earlier assertions that the multi-faceted insurgency has no popular support is just wrong.  What they now appear to understand is that there is enough support for the insurgency (whether nationalist or Jihadi) so that losses of personnel to combat action can be easily made up and new fighters recruited.

Someone wrote earlier to ask if I thought there is enough "Water in the sea" (using the Maoist metaphor) for the guerrilla "fish" to swim.  It seems clear to me that there is enough "water" to keep the fish going for a long time.  If there were not enough supporters, this thing would be over by now.  It is the "wall" of passive resistance put up by supporters that provides the shield behind which the guerrillas operate.

Are there good and constructive projects happening in Iraq, Civic Action projects which many people there are grateful for?  Of course there are.  Unfortunately neither those good works nor the praiseworthy exercise in government creation in Iraq will have much effect on the prospects for pacification within what is called the Sunni Triangle until the large group of people who support the insurgents decide that they no longer wish to provide that support.

Why would they do that?

1-Despair may set in over the possibility of gaining anything in terms of relative power in Iraq through the insurgency.  This would probably cause the insurgency to decline in violence to a level of endemic unrest which could be handled by the Iraqi forces.

2-A political compromise with the Shia dominated government that makes Sunni Arabs believe that they are not going to be second class citizens in their own country would greatly diminish support for the insurgents.  Once again this would probably lead to a controllable but endemic situation of unrest.  I do not think that this last possibility is going to happen for reasons of ethno-religious politics that I will write about next.

PL

Thus Always...

This weblog will tell the truth as it is given to me to know the truth.

Pat Lang