Sic Semper Tyrannis

The Brothers and the Others - Kieran Wanduragala

 

The opposition to Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood was, until last week, fragmented. 

The ‘revolutionaries’. Savvy, networked activists, graffiti artists, hardened leftists, football hooligans, democratic idealists, frustrated people with nothing to lose. The unifying element is a rejection of both the old regime and political Islam, and a willingness to go into the streets, protest, clash, and risk one’s life in the cause of radically transforming society. They are revolutionaries all too painfully aware that what has happened in Egypt since January 2011 is not a revolution (it is those who do not want to see a revolution, who insist that it has already happened). This is the street force that set Mubarak wobbling, spearheaded resistance to SCAF in running battles in places like Mohammed Mahmoud St., and is now taking on Mursi and his supporters in the streets. They are at once the most influential and most powerless element: influential in their ability and determination to instigate crises and set the agenda; but losers in the post-Mubarak struggle for legitimate power in the new political system. They are a vanguard, with quality and energy, but not yet numbers and organization, on their side - hence a leading role in events, along with complete failure at the ballot box. 

The ‘remnants’. In this category fall, firstly, the decapitated leftovers of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. These remnants visible in political life, however (capturing perhaps 7% of the vote in parliamentary elections) are complemented by business interests, long-established systems of patronage, and a large slice of traditional officialdom, particularly the police. ‘Remnants’ networks were popularly believed to be engineering crises such as fuel shortages and violent incidents with the aim of destabilizing the country and returning to power. At the grassroots level, there are very many ordinary people who have started to feel that things were better under Mubarak. This started out as mere grumbling, but culminated in the surprise entry of Ahmad Shafiq, a ‘remnant’ if there ever was one, into the presidential runoff. This result can be seen as, firstly, discontent with the economic consequences of the ‘revolution’, secondly, fear of the Brotherhood, and thirdly, the continuing efficacy of NDP networks. 

The ‘liberals’. The people we like to call ‘liberals’ in the Middle East are often not very liberal at all. Indeed, to impose liberal ideas in Egypt would require a very illiberal dictatorship. ‘Liberal’ in this context is better understood as secular and capitalist. In this category you will find Western-educated intellectuals, re-branded old-regime billionaires, Christians fearful of Islamist domination, as well as professionals and businesspeople preoccupied with the dire state of the economy. Some parties in this category are distinctly ‘Western oriented’; others, like the Wafd, have more of a nationalist aftertaste. They have considerable means at their disposal and a strong media presence. Nonetheless, ‘liberal’ parties did not receive more than around 20% of the vote in parliamentary elections. 

Mursi’s actions are molding these disparate forces into an increasingly coherent secular opposition. The frontline street activists, the old-regime patronage networks, and the ‘liberal’ money and media are making common cause against the threat of MB domination. 

When the hurly-burly's done - Kieran Wanduragala

Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel of the U.S. Defense Department, made some remarks at Oxford yesterday constituting a rare recognition of the aberrant nature of the present War on Terror.  “‘War’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs... In its 12th year, we must not accept the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the ‘new normal.’” He anticipated a day when, instead of an “armed conflict”, we would pursue “a counterterrorism effort against individuals who are the scattered remnants of Al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with Al Qaeda, for which the law enforcement and intelligence resources of our government are principally responsible”. Johnson further cited arguments that “analyzing war in terms of a continuum of armed conflict - where military force is used at various points without a distinct break between war and peace... results in an erosion of ‘any demarcation between war and peace’.” Daring to ask “how will this conflict end”, Johnson also made clear that “our enemy does not include anyone solely in the category of activist, journalist, or propagandist” (whew). Johnson’s remarks, evidently inspired by a tortured awareness that our present ‘state of 911’ is far from healthy, are nonetheless guided by an unwavering commitment to the underlying premise of the War on Terror, this “new kind of war... an unconventional war against an unconventional enemy” - the fateful premise that it is actually a war. 

 

Tomorrow, and Tomorrow, and Tomorrow - Kieran Wanduragala

There is no question about it; Assad is committed to reform. He has shaved his mustache again. There is no going back. As for politics, however, the matter is less certain. In an interview yesterday on Syrian state television, Assad laid out a ‘package’ of reforms, a present for the ‘eid perhaps. The parties, elections, and local administration laws will be implemented starting this week; the new media law will be issued before the ‘eid; a committee to review the constitution will be formed after the ‘eid and take 3 to 6 months; local elections will take place in December and parliamentary elections in February. In the abstract, these are positive steps. Implemented in faithful spirit months ago, they might well have have ushered in a period of relaxation in which political conflicts played out in institutions rather than on the streets, bringing natural, phased change. The regime as presently constituted might not ultimately have survived this process, but individuals and factions within it might plausibly have carved out new roles, vital interests safeguarded, while other figures made dignified exits. What is the meaning of these ‘reforms’ after months of bloodshed? They cannot be a sincere move towards a real political opening. The prerequisite of such a strategy would have been a halt to deadly violence against regime opponents. The ‘reform’ escape hatch is now shut. In fact, the regime or elements within it have slammed it shut themselves.

#States of Emergency - Kieran Wanduragala

One of the first concrete demands of demonstrators across the Arab world is an end to the “states of emergency” that have served as the legal basis for methods of political dictatorship. Real emergencies may briefly demand dictator-like actions (like the fireman who carries someone kicking and screaming out of a burning building); for those who wish to establish or consolidate authoritarian regimes, there is nothing better than a vague, ill-defined, and open-ended ‘emergency’.