Sic Semper Tyrannis

Top Ten Myths About Iran by Dr. Christopher Bolan

 

International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program have resumed this week in Kazakhstan.  Initial reporting suggests that Iran will be offered some limited sanctions relief in return for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities.  However, these talks have a troubled history and experienced observers are quick to tamp down any expectations of a major breakthrough.  As any number of foreign policy pundits will be debating the significance of these outcomes over the next several days, it would be prudent to dispel some of the most popular (and misguided) myths surrounding the Iran policy debate.

Myth 1:  Iran is an irrational actor.  This myth is especially popular among those pushing the case for immediate military action to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.  Their argument is that Iranian leaders are crazed, hot-headed, and messianic actors who do not respond to logic or reason and therefore cannot be trusted with such destructive weapons.  These claims are based on cultural ignorance and prejudices that would be routinely dismissed as out of bounds in just about any context outside of US policy debates on Iran.  Fortunately, senior US and Israeli officials have publicly dismissed this myth as false.  America’s senior military officer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey asserted in a television interview that “we are of the opinion that the [Iranian] regime is a rational actor.”  Israel’s retired Mossad director Meir Dagan similarly opined that “the regime in Iran is a very rational one.”  Moreover, Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defense Minister, elaborated on this basic point saying that “I don’t think the Iranians, even if they got the bomb, [would] drop it in the neighborhood…They are radical but not totally crazy…They have a quite sophisticated decision-making process, and they understand reality.” 

“The Easy Road to War with Iran” by Dr. Christopher Bolan

In Thursday’s Washington Post David Ignatius discusses the results of a war game simulation conducted at the Brookings Institution.  He observes that “the scariest aspect of a U.S.-Iran war game…was the way each side miscalculated the other’s responses – and moved toward war even as the players thought they were choosing restrained options.” 

In reading Jeffrey Record's “A War It Was Always Going to Lose:  Why Japan Attacked American in 1941” (2011) I was struck that the enduring historical lessons he draws in examining this case also underscore the relative ease with which the US and Iran could now easily drift toward war with dire consequences for both sides.    For those interested, a shorter version of Record’s book was published in 2009 as a U.S. Army War College publication available here. 

Allow me to briefly extend the ‘Top Five’ of Record’s historical lessons (within quotation marks below) to the situation with Iran today:

1. “Fear and honor, ‘rational’ or not, can motivate as much as interest”:   A war between the US and Iran is almost certainly not in the objective rational interest of either party.  Iran’s relatively anemic military forces could not hope to stop the inevitable onslaught from a massive, sustained, and technologically superior US air and naval campaign.  Iranian nuclear, military, and any associated facilities (both economic and political) would lay in absolute ruins. 

Perspective on the Threat of Terrorism by Dr. Christopher Bolan

Micah Zenko at the Council on Foreign Relations observes that based on the most recent USG official statistics on global terrorism for 2011, "the number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorist attacks [is comparable to those] crushed to death by their televisions or furniture each year."  So the inert television and chairs sitting around your house are every bit as threatening to your physical safety as the sum total of all terrorist organizations actively operating world-wide.

In confronting this objectively miniscule but emotionally-compelling threat, the USG has undertaken the most extensive reorganization and expansion of its national security apparatus since WWII; conducted massive military interventions and enormous nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq at tremendous costs in American blood and treasure; and authorized ever-more intensive assassination campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen that include American citizens as 'legitimate' targets.

The 'global war on terrorism' was a flawed strategic framework from its inception appealing primarily to the appreciable fear of the American public in the wake of the horrific attacks of 9-11 and eschewing an objective assessment of the scale and nature of the threat.  Terrorism as a tactic of the weak will always be with us.  It will never be eliminated.  This report demonstrates that this threat has clearly been reduced to a manageable level.  The Al-Qa'ida organization that attacked us on 9-11 is a shadow of what it was.  Targeted attacks on its leadership and support networks wherever they operate can most effectively and efficiently be facilitated by close cooperation with local law enforcement, intelligence, and as needed, special operations forces.

In these times of fiscal constraints and 'tough choices', U.S. citizens and taxpayers should demand a reality-based discussion of the military, security, and intelligence forces needed to defend critical American national interests here and abroad.  Our political and military leaders should lead this rational debate.  Nevertheless, many politicians, defense lobbyists, and those working in the national security and foreign policymaking apparatus (both government and civilian) will be tempted to employ hyperbolic exaggeration of the threats confronting us as a justification for continued U.S. interventions across the globe.  The rise of China as a conventional military and economic competitor and the potential for Iran to develop nuclear weapons are prime candidates to replace terrorism as the next great  security 'threat' demanding exorbitant expenditures of America's treasure and resources.  Let's at least insist on a rational and fact-based debate over these issues.

The author is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Army War College.  The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.

Missing a Strategic Opportunity on Iran by Dr. Christopher Bolan

The broad outline for a negotiated deal over Iran’s nuclear program that would satisfy essential U.S. and Iranian national interests is fairly clear.  Iran would agree to limit its nuclear enrichment activities (to levels between 3-5 % seems to be a consensus figure) while allowing for rigorous international inspections designed to minimize prospects for the diversion of civilian nuclear materials and technologies to military programs.  In return for these Iranian concessions, U.S. and other international officials would agree to meaningfully ease and eventually lift (assuming continued Iranian cooperation) economic and financial sanctions.    

However, as rumors circulated earlier this week about the potential for a successful negotiated deal along these lines, two primary obstacles have re-emerged.  One of the main obstacles on the international stage is Israel.  Unsurprisingly, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has adopted an exceptionally tough position regarding international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program insisting that Iran “stop all enrichment, ship all its nuclear material outside the country, and dismantle its nuclear installation at Qom.”  Of course, each of these conditions would be a deal-breaker from the standpoint of Iranian officials.  After all, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (to which Tehran, unlike Israel, is a signatory) guarantees states the right to develop civilian nuclear programs which presumably include the ability to produce nuclear fuel. Israel, as a sovereign state, is free to pursue and advocate policies as it sees fit.  President Obama, however, is sworn to defend the interests of the American people and should be solely focused on taking those actions that advance American national interests.  No other country should divert the President from that single focus.

Opposing Government-sponsored Torture by Dr. Chris Bolan

The National Security Archive published a recently declassified memorandum from a senior U.S. State Department advisor Philip Zelikow who in 2006 courageously (if belatedly) opposed the Bush Administration's authorization of water boarding and other methods of what is often euphemistically referred to as 'enhance interrogation.'  The legal opinions by former Deparment of Justice lawyers led by John Yoo endorsing the use of torture will serve as a blot on the soul of our nation for some time to come.  It is a credit to both John McCain and Mr. Zelikow that they pressed the government to adhere to its own laws and professed principles.

Much of the Zelikow memo is written in legal-ease.  The essence of his argument is that many of the "enhanced interrogation techniques authorized for employment by the CIA...[are] intrinsically cruel, inhuman, [and] degrading...[and should] be barred even if there is a compelling state interest asserted to justify them."  The memo goes on to more explicitly make the case that specific coercive techniques including water boarding and stress positions are unconstitutional; while other measures such as sleep and food deprivation may be legal "depending on the circumstances and details of how these techniques are used."

Nations often reflect the aspirations, hopes, and fears of their people and leaders.  In the of 9/11, many Americans have become overly fearful and only too willing to sacrifice personal liberties and bypass constitutionally-guarantee legal protections in the pursuit of an imagined (and unachievable) sense of security.  Thankfully, President Obama has put some of the uglier aspects of the 'global war on terror' behind us.  However, other aspects such as warrantless searches, 'targeted assassinations', and indefinite detentions remain.  We will yet need many more citizens, politicians, and officials to demonstrate the courage of their convictions.

The author is professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College.  The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

A Disappointing Assessment of U.S. Investment in Iraq by Dr. Christopher Bolan



Several recent events can only reinforce the assessment that after a decade of tremendous expenditures of American blood and treasure, the U.S. strategy of military invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq was ill-conceived from the start, poorly executed throughout, and ultimately has failed to advance U.S. national interests in any meaningful way.  Let's briefly review the anticipated achievements, the key developments in U.S. strategy, and the outcomes as they are manifested today.

 

"Waltzing Toward War with Iran" by Christopher Bolan, Ph. D.

Another shoe has dropped on the path toward war against Iran.  A potentially deadly game is brewing between the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and Iran over access to military facilities at Parchin.  Deadly – because similar stand-offs with UN inspectors led to U.S. missile attacks in 1998 against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities and provided the rationale for the subsequent full-scale military invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

In the current atmosphere of increasingly heated rhetoric threatening military strikes against Iran, these disputes at Parchin or other similar sites could quickly (if unintentionally) spiral into direct military confrontation.  US, Israeli, and Iranian officials alike should take this moment to carefully consider the potentially catastrophic consequences of their next steps.

In announcing the US missile strikes against suspect Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities in December 1998, President Clinton cited Saddam’s failure to “cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM.”  In particular, he observed that “Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites [and]… restricted UNSCOMs ability to obtain necessary evidence.”  In his speech to the United Nations Security Council in February 2003, Secretary of State Powell similarly based the American case for war on a pattern of incomplete Iraqi cooperation with UN inspectors suggesting that “Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.”