"The U.S. Army has been plagued with costly acquisition failures in recent decades, chief amongst them the Future Combat System (FCS) program. This $200 billion program initiated in 2000, the largest U.S. military acquisition program ever attempted, failed to produce results on a multitude of levels and was abandoned by 2009. The Armored Ground Vehicle (AGV) and Armored Gun System (AGS) programs also wasted tens of billions of dollars before being cancelled without achieving their intended goals. These programs were chiefly defeated by an overly bureaucratic Army acquisition system, and the fact that the Army had asked for far too much from the defense industry, demanding many new and unproven technological advancements.
The FCS was the most expensive, most ambitious, and most transformative modernization program ever undertaken by the U.S. Army. It is often hypothesized that the U.S. experience in the first Gulf War of 1991 and in the NATO Kosovo intervention of 1999, led to the desire for a more rapidly deployable U.S. Army expeditionary force. FCS envisioned a highly mobile new Army, light enough to be air-deployable, yet lethal enough to survive on the modern battlefield. This survivability would be provided through the leveraging of new technologies, as well as superior command and control capabilities that would tie together all the various armed forces in a seamless information sharing and communications network.
The Army set very high deployment goals as part of FCS, which would prove to be unattainable." South Front
The US Army is still in the midst of a long term transition to an expeditionary force capable of brigade sized interventions on short notice with a high degree of lethality and sustainability in its systems. The attainment of that goal is still long way off.
It should be noted that the joint SOF forces involved in the GWOT are really a separate army fighting a different kind of war from that envisioned for US Army general purpose forces.
I suppose that someone will now argue for the irrelevance of such forces in the world of Bill Lind's 4th generational warfare, I agree with the US Army leadership that the US needs to possess highly capable ground forces that amount to more than a huge SWAT Team. The Russians seem to think that with regard to their own forces as well.
The history of the present wars in Syria and Iraq support my belief in the continuing need for general purpose forces. pl