"Some military analysts have expressed skepticism that the revolutionary defense shield will hold up under a sustained assault from a wide variety of more lethal missiles attacking from different points of the compass and maintain the approximately 90 percent interception rate claimed by the IDF during last year’s Gaza conflict." Foxnews
"Major General Eshel could have alleged: "That if we only had another 20 I.D batteries, we could protect the northern border.” But he didn't. Why? Because he knows it is just a delusion. He further added a grim insight to the picture, indicating that possibly the I.D success could be attributed to the small weight of the warheads (18 kg. N.F) it had to tackle." IDTS
"An unpublished 2013 report by Theodore Postol, Mordechai Shefer and another colleague argued that the official effectiveness figures for Iron Dome during Operation Pillar of Defense were incorrect. Although Postol had earlier lauded Iron Dome's effectiveness, after studying YouTube videos of the warhead interceptions as well as police reports and other data, he argued that "Iron Dome’s intercept rate, defined as destruction of the rocket's warhead was relatively low, perhaps as low as 5%, but could well be lower." Postol reached this conclusion mainly from an analysis of non-official footage of interceptions taken by civilians and published on YouTube." WIKI on Iron Dome
"The Pentagon believes that Hezbollah has a rocket arsenal of around 30,000. According to IranTracker, estimates of Hezbollah's overall missile arsenal range from 40,000 to 50,000 large-caliber munitions of all kinds. Israel estimates that Hezbollah has about 40,000, most of them shorter-range rockets and mortar shells. Katyusha rockets" Wiki on Hizbullah Armed Force
Hizbullah has enough rocket and guided missile weapons to devastate Israel as far south as Tel Aviv. The Iron Dome system is not as effective as Israeli internal and external propaganda said it was during the Gaza War of 2014. The Israelis know that Iron Dome would be overwhelmed by a massed Hizbullah attack and that Iron Dome would easily be swamped by the sheer number of incoming flying objects.
Israel does not possess the means to block such an attack. Iron Dome is very expensive and the number of system required for an effective defense is prohibitive.
In 2006 the IDF was shocked by the quality of ground resistance provided by Hizbullah militias in carefully prepared positions, replete with tank traps, canalization by obstacles of avenues of approach, lots of reinforced concrete, air conditioning in bunkers, buried cable communications, body armor, night vision equipment and the like. The IDF ground forces do not want to repeat the experience.
The Israeli Air Force has little ability to find the launchers or caches of munitions possessed by Hizbullah. The IAF's most likely course of action in the context of another Israel/Hizbullah war will be to ravage the whole country in the hope of intimidating Hizbullah into a de facto cease fire.
Once again, Israel has no effective counter to an all out Hizbullah rocket and missile attack. pl