First, let's go over a little history. The 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFGA) was activated in 1952 under the command of Colonel Aaron Bank, a veteran of the OSS and a Jedburgh Team leader advising and leading resistance forces in occupied France. Colonel Bank organized and trained the 10th SFGA to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe. Specifically the Group's teams were prepared to develop, organize and direct indigenous resistance forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. This beginning is reflected in the SF motto "De Oppresso Liber" (Liberate From Oppression). To this day, SF training is focused on this mission.
Since those early days, the SF mission expanded to include counter insurgency operations, direct action missions and training foreign. However, SF organization and training is still focused on the UW mission. In the final exercise for both officers and enlisted candidates for SF, the students are inserted into the fictitious "Republic of Pineland" to develop, organize and direct an indigenous resistance force in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Recall the paper written by Major Gant to see how this mindset remains in SF.
What to Do:
I'm certain there are SFODAs (SF Operational Detachment Alpha) that have planned and trained for employment in Libya to support guerilla operations. But given our decade long preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan, those teams may not be immediately available or not immediately ready to move into Libya. On the other hand, I'm sure there are teams with Arabic and desert training ready to go in the 3rd, 5th or 10th Groups. The headquarters for the operation would probably be in Stuttgart, Germany where EUCOM, AFRICOM and, conveniently enough, 1st Battalion, 10th SFGA are located. An assessment/ command team should be immediately inserted into Benghazi to make contact with the Libyan resistance. In a previous post I alluded to the difficulty and criticality of this initial contact. How this team will be received is unknown. However, I am getting the impression that the resistance forces initial euphoria is being tempered by the realization that they have a difficult struggle ahead of them. This assessment team will serve as liaison to the resistance leadership and a command element to the SFODAs to follow. The assessment team will determine the size, abilities and needs of the resistance fighting forces and relay this information to Stuttgart so the SFODAs can properly prepare for their insertion. The ODAs will be in isolation intensively preparing for their insertion and mission execution.
An ODA can usually train, advise and/or lead a battalion to regimental size force. In addition to a couple of ODAs in Benghazi organizing the main resistance forces, I would insert an ODA each in Zawiyah and Misrata to shore up the resistance in those areas. I could envision SF troops working to break up armored assaults by Qathafi's forces on these two areas while using the resistance forces for supporting fires similar to the Hizbollah regulars did in the last dust up in Lebanon. Holding these two areas would keep pressure on Qathafi and give time for the main resistance forces around Benghazi to organize. As I write this, I am watching a report of former Libyan soldiers in the Benghazi area preparing captured equipment and training youths for military action so things are already moving in the right direction. The ODAs can also direct any air or naval support that may or may not be available. That would be a tremendous force multiplier and would IMHO pretty much guarantee that Qathafi's forces would not be able to overrun the resistance. The taking of Tripoli will still be a tough nut to crack. The SF troops could ensure that the final battle is done smartly and with patience rather than seeing an angry armed mob just surging toward the palace and getting themselves slaughtered.
The author is known here as "The Twisted Genius" (TTG) He wrote this on behalf of Aaron Bank's Children