Sic Semper Tyrannis

Peter Principle

Someone using that moniker wrote to say that "if I had suggestions to make about Libya" I should make them."  What?  Who?  What the hell have we been doing here?  pl

#Afghanistan in the 80s

 
I just heard Chuck Todd of the idiot MSNBC network assert as a predicate to a question that the Mujahid groups that the US supported against the USSR BECAME the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida.

NO!  NO!

The groups we supported were defeated by the Taliban in the civil war that followed Soviet withdrawal.  The Taliban and Usama bin Laden were supported by the separate "Sayyaf" group of Mujahideen supported by Saudi Arabia and Deobandi fanatics in Pakistan.

But, what the hell, why bother with facts?  pl

#Libya - De Oppresso Liber - An Update

It has been a month since my original proposal to support the Libyan rebels with Special Forces ODAs. A lot has happened since then. At the behest of our host, I offer an update on the situation and my proposal. Let us not mince words. What I propose would actively aid the rebels in defeating Qathafi. There is nothing impartial about this. We should choose unequivocally to free the oppressed in Libya because it is both the right thing to do and well within our capability to accomplish.

The rebel forces are under equipped, under trained and disorganized. That is obvious. Yet they still manage to hold on in the face of mechanized onslaughts from Qathafi's army. They are a mobile force willing to give up ground rather than be cut off and destroyed when faced by vastly superior firepower. However, their mobility depends on light pickup trucks and late model sedans. This force is pretty much limited to the paved coastal road and not capable of cross country maneuver. Maintenance on this fleet of vehicles is probably nonexistent. Overloaded with rebel fighters, crew served weapons and ammunition, these vehicles will start breaking down in large numbers soon.  Another danger facing this road bound force is Qathafi's use of land mines. They've recently been seen in front of Sirte.  

The physical environment and available resources dictate that the rebels should remain a lightly armed, mobile guerilla force rather than trying to become a conventional mechanized army. To do this, the rebels do not need to be armed by NATO. They have the weapons they need.  If anything, NATO could provide fuel and supply trucks - preferably full. That would be helpful. The Libyan Army units and soldiers that have sided with the rebels are probably no more familiar with creating a mobile guerilla force than the youth in their pickup trucks. This is where the deployment of SFODAs would do the most good.

Rather than taking the time to formally organize and train conventional rebel military units from scratch, I would very quickly send several ODA's forward from Benghazi to the front lines to work with what's already there. Some informal small unit leaders have no doubt already emerged on the highway between Benghazi and Sirte. Begin by working with these natural small unit leaders and their followers to form units similar to the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) of WW II fame.  Judging only by watching news footage, it seems there are sufficient off road vehicles, 106 mm recoilless rifles, heavy machine-guns and light AAA to equip a number of small reconnaissance/raiding groups. The ODA's should deploy with vehicles (and possibly weapons) similar to what the rebels are already using, just newer with a lot less wear and tear on them. That way they can bring a lot more medical and communications gear than if they were just humping rucksacks. Whatever vehicles the ODAs bring in would be used to train the rebels and would not be part of any SF exclusive combat unit. Think of it as a small version of the lend-lease program.    

Training of these mobile guerilla recon/raiding units would include cross country navigation, mounted and dismounted reconnaissance patrolling, communications, and EFFECTIVE long range use of the weapons carried by the groups. That includes conservation of ammunition. Maintenance and logistics training will be critical. There must be a lot of mechanics in Libya to maintain all those pickups and cars. They can help the rebel force more by turning a wrench than by firing a weapon. I doubt this rebellion will be over in a week or two, and the side without effective logistics will eventually grind to a halt. Employment of these mobile guerilla units would begin with what UW doctrine terms confidence missions - limited objective missions to to train the rebels to operate effectively as a team and to build their confidence in their abilities. These actual combat missions would begin in a matter of days of the arrival of the ODAs at the front lines. No graduation certificates. No badges. Just on the job training to defeat Qathafi's forces.  As more rebel leaders develop or just surface in these initial units, new units would be formed around those new rebel leaders, trained and employed in combat. Special Forces soldiers will remain with the mobile units to train, advise and provide special skills such as coordinating air and naval fire support.

Recent reporting from the latest running of the Benghazi handicaps indicates that sandstorms may have hampered NATO interdiction of Qathafi's forces advancing from Sirte. Effective rebel LRDG-like patrols could continue to raid and harass Qathafi's logistical and fire support units when NATO aircraft are not available. When aircraft like the AC-130 and A-10 are available, they can be directed to targets by these patrols with the help of the embedded Green Berets. Qathafi's forces are apparently attempting to adapt to operate under NATO airstrikes.  The creation and employment of mobile guerilla units will become a necessary adaption for the rebels.            

I leave you with the NASA Pirate Code written by John Muratore, an engineer and NASA program manager renowned for his creativity and ability to get things done faster, better and cheaper. I believe his code describes how a mobile guerilla force of Libyan rebels trained, advised Special Forces professionals would operate and eventually bring freedom to all Libyans.    

- Pirates have to know what they’re doing.

- If we fail, there is no mercy.

- You’re operating outside the normal support structure of society. It’s all about knowing all the details.

- You hit hard and fast. Pirates don’t spend months wandering around.

- Pirates live on the edge or just in front of the wave that is about to catch them.

- Piracy is about taking risks. Occasionally we’re going to fail and you’ll get some holes blown in you.

- Pirates don’t have resources to waste. You’re always operating on a thin margin, not in fat city.

- We’re all banded together.

The Twisted Genius 

Hasbara mischief

Dr. Brenner informed me that someone who calls himself (itself) "Mr. URL" is writing that I have called for"an attack on MB" (presumably Michael Brenner).  This is supposedly because I am unhappy with his post yesterday.

This is untrue.  I have done no such thing.

pl

#Obama, soon to be defeated in Libya?

 
After listening to Obama's speech last night and observing the relative lack of air action today I would say that Obama appears to be intent on seizing defeat from the jaws of victory.

He and his political cronies in the WH and in Chicago are, to say the least, unenthusiastic about regime change in Libya or anywhere else in the ME.  Why is that?  Hmmm. 

Obama's lukewarm and self contradicting statements have produced what is at least for the moment, operational paralysis.  Think about it, if you were Carter Ham or any number of other NATO senior officers how could you avoid thinking that you are very exposed as a probable scape goat if a claim is made that you somehow exceeded your "instructions?"

The rebels are a rabble?  Certainly, but so are Qathafi's people.  The rebel "ranks" may contain people who fought us in Iraq?  Probably, but we do not actually know that except on the word of Qathafi and persistent suggestions in the MSM by people who have no way to know.

NATO air power is ineffective in built up areas?  Rubbish.  Go look at the satellite photographs of these towns, Sirte, etc., on Google Earth.  They are mostly open space with a few palm trees.  The tanks, rocket artillery launchers, armored personnel carriers and AAA guns on trucks of Qathafi's people are all quite exposed.  USAF has now brought AC-130s and A-10s into the action.  These aircraft are well suited for engagement of targets in these towns or anywhere along the road.  The metal masses in these weapons are very detectable by the aircraft night or day.

Obama should think about the political effect here in the US of defeat by Qathafi's puny forces.  He wants to be re-elected?  It would be interesting to see how his prospects would be affected by Qathafi's continuing presence in Tripoli in November 2012 and the mockery that the Republicans will rain down on him over his present weakness.  pl

#SHIFTING SANDS

 
“The Middle East never will be the same again” are the words on every observer’s lips.  True – but in itself that tells us very little as to consequences and implications for the United States from the political cataclysm shaking the region and reshaping its politics.  Restraint in predicting what those implications will be is praiseworthy.  Anyone who boldly claims to know the specific and concrete effects is talking through his turban.  Yet it is imperative that we begin to think rigorously about what the future holds.  So let’s begin with a rough taxonomy.

Odyssey Dawn Squeezes Qathafi - Jeff White

 
"Operation Odyssey Dawn is having telling effects on the military situation in Libya. Air operations by NATO and the coalition of countries opposing the Libyan government are degrading regime capabilities substantially and bolstering the rebels' ability to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. For the Qadhafi regime's part, its capacity to engage in offensive operations is declining markedly, and even its ability to conduct a coherent defense of its heartland is diminishing."  Jeffrey White at WINEP

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Jeff White is a colleague from the DIA days.  A most excellent analyst.

I understand that the Qathafi garrison has chosen to defend at the eastern and southern entrances to the town of Surt (Sirte).  This is wonderful news!  Keep it up boys!  Someone will be along to "dance" with you shortly.  pl

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3338

 

#John Batchelor Show - 27 March 2011

http://wabcradio.com/FlashPlayer/default.asp?SPID=33447&ID=2145542

19:30 into the segment.  pl

#"The Kill Team" - Rolling Stone

 

Colonel Jack Jacobs today said on one of the 24/7 news entertainments that the behavior of this platoon was "worse than Abu Ghraib."  IMO he is exactly correct.  In that prison men were abused by MP reservists who amused themselves by humiliating them in a multitude of disgusting ways, but they did not kill them.

In this instance the men of this rifle platoon (40 men more or less) decided to kill unarmed Afghan villagers because they were bored, hated these strange beings, and thought they could get away with it.  In one instance they picked out an unarmed 15 year old boy as a victim and then revelled in mocking and defiling his corpse while the company commander stood by and watched.

This story is all about leadership, bad leadership as well as the baleful effect of ignorance about the local people, and the degeneration in moral standards that US Army commanders in the chain of command above this unit had allowed to occur.

No commissioned officers have been charged for conspiracy or neglect of duty?  What a farce!  This is all about their failures, all of it!

In the last few days I have had the sorry experience of watching a group of senior US Army officers preen and strut and glory in the stature allowed them by high rank.  They do not remind me of the senior officers of my youth, men who led troops by example and with a sense of the responsibility that they carried for the honor of the Army.

In my big war, a lot of officers died on the battlefield.  I can remember two major generals (Ware and Casey) who died within a few months in 1968-69.  Senior officers in these wars are more likely to die from IED incidents than anything else.

These men do not seem like the men of that time.  They seem to be a caste of uniformed Walmart managers and executives, each maneuevering for whatever is to be had in the consultant work that awaits them in retirement.  They band together to arrange such work as a perquisite of their "success."

The enlisted men involved in these bestial murders must be punished but the officers who let this happen should be punished with them.  pl

http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327?page=8

 

 

#History According To Prof Baram by Yusuf al-Misry

 
Prof Baram,

There are many reasons why one should go back to history. It could be an effort, if analyzed neutrally, to understand how different forces play out and shape the outcome of a certain period of time, or to pick an event from here and there to prove a subjective point related to the one’s own argument about that period or the present. I believe that what counts to people on this site is reading previous chapters of history to figure out where we are going particularly in times of uncertainty like those now in the Middle East.

As many already know, what is important in looking at the issues you and I have been debating with the participation of many friends here is the context in which any event took place. For many of the friends here, this is not done merely as an intellectual exercise, or as propaganda. If we understand, from studying previous periods of history, how religious fundamentalism spreads in a place, for example, we will be able to know if it is possible to defeat it and how.