Habakkuk on Iraq

Adam Silverman,Thanks for that most interesting and helpful clarification of the current state of play in Iraq.This may be a stupid question, but if the 'diasporan movements' don't have 'indigenous support bases' why do the 'indigenous movements' have so little power? And is this a stable situation over the longer term? Can the 'powers that are' permanently capture 'huge chunks of the Iraqi Security Forces' in such a situation? And can they hope to prevail over the 'traditional and/or tribal Sunnis and Shi'a' and the Sadrists?JohnH"That is certainly not part of any US end state I've ever heard of." Me neither! And that all by itself would lead one to be skeptical that it could actually be happening."The problem is not simply that, as the Colonel says, the ability of the United States to control history is far too limited for one to be able to infer from a given outcome either that the USG wanted it, or from the fact that the USG did not want it that it could not have happened.When one actor has overwhelming power, the name of the strategic game for many other actors will be to find ways of getting this power to act in their interests. Allying with it is one way.Others include using superior guile to outwit the overwhelming powerful actor, and make its own power work against it. One way of doing is a classic insurgency technique -- manoeuvre the security forces into a situation where they have to tread a narrow line between not responding and appearing weak, and responding in ways that make them the insurgents' recruiting sergeants -- very easy to do, particularly if you let yourself be baited into letting anger get control of you. Another is manipulating the overwhelmingly powerful actor into using its strength in one's own interests.The attacks on the World Trade Center are an interesting variant of the former approach -- although fortunately the sectarianism and cruelty of the jihadists, among other things, have limited their ability to capitalise on the success of their ploy to inveigle the United States into ruinous involvements in Muslim lands.Although definitive evidence is lacking, little that has happened recently has served to dispel suspicions that the Iranian exploitation of Ahmed Chalabi's ties to the neocons was one of the classic displays of the latter tactic of all time.To avoid being the victims of either tactic, it is necessary that the United States - and also my own country, Britain -- wise up. One central part of this is precisely grasping the limitations of one's ability of to influence outcomes in other societies. Another is shedding the deeply ingrained delusion that we 'modern', 'scientific' and 'rational' people understand the world, while others less fortunate do not. Where the kinds of understanding required to play Machiavellian games are at issue, this is commonly the precise reverse of the truth. The 'informational advantage' lies not with us, but with them.  David Habakkuk