CPA and Sanchez rejected tribal help in '03.

In response to my post yesterday concerning the present participation of Sunni Arab tribes in fighting Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, I received the message below from a retired senior Army intelligence officer who served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.  This message recounts the failure of the CPA and Joint Task Force-7 (Sanchez) to take advantage of the willingness of the same tribes to fight AQII then.  This officer was a personal participant in the effort to bring the tribes into the fight at that time.

Take note of the reference to the attitude in the CPA at that time to the effect that the "new Iraq" would not want to deal with tribes.  This is yet another instance of the Utopian nonsense that has shaped American policy in Iraq during the Bush '43 administration.  The blue words are mine, added for clarity.  pl

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Pat,

  Super comments about the Anbar tribes.  Maybe the Americans working with the tribes today, if they are, appreciate the qualities of the Bedouins.  In the event anyone is interested, unfortunately, here's what happened in DEC 2003 to mid Jan 2004:

   With help of an Arab American businessman and translator working at CPA, accumulated 19 Anbar sheiks who were willing to commit their tribes to fighting AQ.  They were going to disarm their folks, and with our authorization and assistance (AK-47's, some money, some vehicles, and a recognition of them - a "Patch" or something), they were going to boot foreigners out, and secure their areas.  They would recognize the police, should any be out there.  They were going to recognize whatever politicians were in the province.  The only thing we offered in addition to getting the funding and equipment was that we had business lined up to come in once they were secure.  No kidding, the Arab American had businesses lined up.  The money provided by us would allow the tribal chief to start generating economy.  Each of the 19 tribal chiefs would get equivalent of $200 per man monthly, starting off with 50 men.  Our tribal Arab American businessman had a handshake with all 19 sheiks on objectives and who would do what.  No city sheiks, or what the Iraqis referred to as "the false sheiks."

  The concept was that once the 19 tribes got going, more would join in.  Once Anbar in progress, would move south of Baghdad, then north.

  Grand total for what it would have cost from Jan - Jun 04 was $3 million. No bribes - no coercion -- only operating costs.

  they would have provided weekly progress reports.  They were motivated. They knew if they didn't perform, they wouldn't get the income for their people.  Heck, we even developed metrics for what would constitute progress (for CJTF  (Sanchez)and CPA (Bremer) consumption).

Spent 2 weeks doing circular briefings at CPA, driving the IED/sniper alley between CPA and Victory daily. First go round of the concept to one of Bremer's deputy ambassadors sent us back with the instructions that every DIV had to concur.  OK -- rapid staff work thru CJTF-7 put this out to the field. Multi-page paper and brief slides.  Brief slides also showed the areas in Anbar the tribes would cover.  Made clear to the units what this helped:  areas of roads they would secure and areas that needed to be IPB (intelligence analysis) by us and then covered down on for us to detect and act against enemies.

Got all the "concurs" back finally.  82nd was out in Anbar at the time.  they didn't non-concur either with our lead in assessment that Anbar was broiling and AQ threat had to be stopped immediately.  AQ was using the area between Anbar and Mosul as a peninsula -- freedom of movement.

Well, then the circus began.  Multiple rounds of CPA briefs.  Finally, all the pillar heads in the room, along with CIA, British intel, and some military.  Oil guys were worried that we intended to take over their security.  Went back over the concept, said these guys were not replacing infrastructure security - they were going to rid their areas of AQ, keep the MSRs (main supply routes) clear, and basically, make it a blood feud if anyone committed an act of violence in their area.

The last two holdouts, not pillar heads -- ambassador types and 1 military. Comments were:

  (Sanchez's POLAD) - "We don't want to recognize tribes in the new Iraq.  The city folk want modern life - not tribes"  Same echo'ed by one of her diplomat buddies.

  (Military)  How can you guarantee that these sheiks won't then oppose the political electees? 

Outcome: majority in favor.  Need to present it to Bremer.

Went thru Amb Jones (I believe my memory serves me right here) and the newly appointed "Community Outreach office head -- amb guy named Schlecker (had been in Egypt and a few other places.  They said " we need to see an outline of how we would control this -- what support architecture do we need?

OK -- went back and drew them a picture of an office with about 10 folks, including budgetary oversight.

Back in:  answer was: we don't have $3 million.  They had billions per supplemental but said they didn't have money - go get it from Sanchez. I argued that this was their program.  Nope - they refused to touch it.

Here's what they were doing: they set up a series of town hall meetings under Schlecker with the city sheiks.  Then they wanted to build some community centers out in the provinces.

Went to see the British general who was at CPA -- deputy CDR for Sanchez.  Briefed him.  Came back after whatever he did to get with Sanchez - answer was "you aren't going tog et support for this initiative. Drop it."

So, we had to go thru Anbar in APR 04, then in fall of '04, and another couple of years of AQ in Anbar to get back to where we thought we should have been in Jan '04.

I hope the guys there really appreciate those tribes.  They knew It was going to be extremely dangerous back in '03.  They are putting their lives on the line.  With or without our support, they wanted to do this -- they did  not want AQ in there screwing up their areas and their lives.

Best

CS"

Comments

[W. Patrick Lang]

Diogenes

You old cynic! Still in your barrel, I see.

Seriously, it has been a while since I looked at all the claims and counter-claims about accounting and inspections so I have no idea what you are talking about. 6,000 what? pl

[Frank Durkee]

One is left with the profound impression that the top leadership was not deeply serious about their own ideology. It begins to take on the 'feel' of an impulsive and ego driven set of assumptions and actions, to be done because 9-11 provided a handy rationale.

[wasabi]

I remember reading about 8 months ago in the NY Times an article about Anbar province and the status of AQ. It mentioned there were about 25 sheiks that wanted to rid their area of AQ. (I had previously heard that Saddam didn't spend time there because of tribal issues) At the time I thought that was great news. Let the Iraqis kick out the unwelcome foreigners. It's not like we can tell who's who there.
For some reason it never got any news play. Now it is being touted as a major success in this latest surge plan.

P.S. I found the article:
Most Tribes in Anbar Agree To Unite Against Insurgents By KHALID AL-ANSARY AND ALI ADEEB; REPORTING WAS CONTRIBUTED BY PAUL VON ZIELBAUER, OMAR AL-NEAMI, KHALID W. HASSAN AND QAIS MIZHER.
Published: September 18, 2006

[pbrownlee]

Reread this just last night (accidentally):

"It is curious to find how many of the Bagdad notables are tribesmen, often only settled in the town for the last generation or two. Some sheikh builds himself a town house, sends his sons to school and starts them in a learned profession leading to Government employment. And at once they settle down into citizens. But the tribal links are unbroken. Any sheikh with business in the town looks by right to his kinsman's house for entertainment in the matter of daily meals -- a pretty expensive duty it is -- and if a member of the town family gets into trouble he will seek sanctuary with the tribe, safe in the assurance that he would never be given up. Several men I know fled to their tribe during the year before the Occupation, when the Ottoman hand was heavy on the Arabs of Bagdad. Most of these are now in our service and their tribal connection makes them all the more useful. We have a few really first-class Arab officials, just as we have found a few really first-class sheikhs who will assume responsibility and preserve order. There are not many of them, but such as there are, are invaluable. And we in our turn have an immense responsibility towards them... We are pledged here. It would be an unthinkable crime to abandon those who have loyally served us."

(February 8th, 1918)

I'd put my money on Gertie Bell well ahead of any of the Kagans and the rest of the blind camels.

[W. Patrick Lang]

Diogenes

Presume we must know each other.

IMO chemical weapons are not strategic in nature. Maybe this was an admin error. After all, the 3rd world is where nothing works well.

This does not seem like a good reason to go to war. pl

[pbrownlee]

Seen this?

"Army Squeezes Soldier Blogs, Maybe to Death

"Noah Shachtman

"05.02.07 | 2:00 AM

"The U.S. Army has ordered soldiers to stop posting to blogs or sending personal e-mail messages, without first clearing the content with a superior officer, Wired News has learned. The directive, issued April 19, is the sharpest restriction on troops' online activities since the start of the Iraq war. And it could mean the end of military blogs, observers say.

"Military officials have been wrestling for years with how to handle troops who publish blogs. Officers have weighed the need for wartime discretion against the opportunities for the public to personally connect with some of the most effective advocates for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq -- the troops themselves. The secret-keepers have generally won the argument, and the once-permissive atmosphere has slowly grown more tightly regulated. Soldier-bloggers have dropped offline as a result."

http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers

[pbrownlee]

Or this:

"Rumsfeld to Receive Statesmanship Award at 2007 Churchill Dinner"

http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.704/pub_detail.asp

[Will]

Anbar-the granary. the province until 72' used to be called Ramadi after its capital.

US Army Captain Travis Patriquin presentation, "How to win in Al-Anbar"

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Christian Science Monitor is on the story:

"Like dominoes, tribes reeling from a campaign of killing and intimidation by Al Qaeda have been joining, one by one, the US-led fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq in this Sunni Arab province. Last month, US Gen. David Petraeus told Congress that violence was down significantly here and that the tribes were key to the transformation...."
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0503/p01s04-wome.html?page=1

[Tim G]

Sanchez's POLAD was a East European expert. Army still hasn't broken the code on this; look at the latest issue of Military Review where DOS wants to become the provider for tactical POLAD. What are FAOs for? Schlicher, not Schlecker, was charged with Sunni outreach and faced DC-imposed hurdles from the beginning. Hindsight is 20/20, but we should recall that certain Sunni tribes were the bulwark of Saddam's regime and Schlicher's instinct that this dynamic needed to be controlled was spot on. Who knows that would Sunni sheiks would do what we actually wanted them to once they got their weapons? We continiously underestimate the ability of local actors to manipulate their super power patrons.

[W. Patrick Lang]

Tim G

"Hope is not a plan," but neither is timidity. pl

[Tim G]

Pat--

I would argue that this administration is anything but timid.

Thinking through second and third order of effects is not being timid, it shows due dilligence and forethought, which are the very themes you have been pressing on this blog.

[fasteddiez]

Will,

Captain Patriquin USA, and Major Rachel McLung USMC were both Killed by an IED, while escorting press in Anbar (one of whom was Ollie North, of all people).

[W. Patrick Lang]

Tim G.

Ah, yes, but you must be bold AND "get it right." A"good try" is not good enough.

A good military thnker does think through the "down stream" effects of what is contemplated. The trick is to avoid being paralysed by fear of the possibilities once the "thinking through" has been done. What is the Harrison Ford quote? "Never tell me the odds!" what is meant by that is "Don't keep telling me the odds once I have decided that I am going to do something risky, in spite of the 2nd or 3rd order possibilities." "Who dares, wins." pl

[Clifford Kiracofe]

More coveraqe:

"A group of Sunni tribal leaders in beleaguered Al Anbar province said Thursday that it intended to form a national party to oppose insurgents such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and reengage with Iraq's political process.
The announcement came after 200 sheiks said to represent 50 tribes met here and agreed to form a provincial sheiks council and hold the first convention in May of their new party, called Iraq Awakening. Sheiks from three other provinces will attend, organizers said.
The driving force behind the new party, Sheik Abdul-Sattar abu Risha, said in an interview that the tribal leaders would be pushing a slate of candidates in Al Anbar provincial elections later this year, as well as in the next round of national parliamentary balloting, scheduled for 2009.....
"Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said the "most important result may not be in the battlefield but in producing new Sunni voices that Shiites and Kurds can negotiate with." LATimes at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-sheiks20apr20,0,3931359.story?coll=la-home-headlines

On the ground:

"But Lt. Col. Miciotto Johnson and Sheik Ahmed al-Rishawi have learned to rely on each other to quell the insurgency in this part of the city. Though no one will openly admit it, it’s believed that the Anbar sheiks lent tacit support to insurgents operating in the restive province just west of Baghdad. But now Johnson, commander of the Army’s Task Force 1-77 Armor, makes himself at home on the sheik’s property.
A burly man in a tan Army fire-retardant jumper, Johnson plops down on an oversized couch in an upstairs office in al-Rishawi’s vast compound, as much at ease here as he is in his battalion headquarters down the road at Camp Ramadi.
That’s because last September, al-Rishawi’s younger brother, Sheik Sattar al-Rishawi, launched the “Anbar Awakening,” a movement to stop the extreme violence here. Since then, the al-Rishawi tribe has been America’s ally in the attempt to break al-Qaida’s firm grip.
This afternoon, the elder al-Rishawi greets his American friend.
“We are brothers,” al-Rishawi says. “We fight as one hand." [note photo]: Atlanta Journal Constitution at
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/georgiansatwar/entries/2007/04/29/soldier_and_sheik_like_brother
.html

[anna missed]

Big mistake to assume the apparent fragmentation of the resistance and their attacks on AQ -- is the result of U.S. policy, or is even the beneficiary of it. AQ has been in a struggle with the resistance for control of the agenda. Its quite possible that AQ has developed into more of an irritant to the local population as opposed to becoming a model for it. And has in effect "soured the barrel" for base sympathies for the Sunni resistance itself. Getting rid of the AQ influence may then allow greater consolidation and trust to develop between the various indigenous resistance groups and their base. What may appear to effective influence (by the U.S.) may turn out, in the end, to be more indicative of a growth of resistance, as opposed to its fragmentation. That would have developed naturally anyway, without any participation by the U.S. at all.

Just when the U.S.celebrates a significant blow against AQ, they may find that in doing so, they have removed a ball and chain from the resistance.

[Tim G]

Pat--

"who dares wins."

Sometimes. But you know that always isn't always the case: Lee at Gettysburg, Custer at Little Big Horn, Hitler at the Bulge; the list of exceptions to your maxim is long.

I prefer the corollary: who miscalculates (either the most or badly) loses.

[jon]

These clowns should never have been trusted with planning a rotary picnic in Iowa, or was that a street fair in Indiana?

There was a brief moment as the invasion wrapped up when order might have held and a civil government transition occur. But we blew it big time. Insufficient personnel and utopian daydreams didn't help any, either.

The State Departments extensive plans were shitcanned immediately. CPA decided that everyone would line up and embrace a PTA/civics textbook governance structure.

There was zero understanding of the basis of the prior military dictatorship/fascist/decayed socialism structure that had just been obliterated, not to mention the social, tribe and religious identities and loyalties - structures that have persisted for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.

Now Saddam had methodically undercut the power of the tribes, because he didn't need any other power bases competing with his. He had a point. Iraqi politics have always been contentious - they were under the Ottomans, and worse under the British.

The US squandered its' moment to weld the country together. As a result, everyone's been choosing up to fight, establishing defensive perimeters, and trying to grab as much as they can.

Since the primary focus of the US seems to have been rolling up the oil infrastructure and constructing enormous fire bases you could say that the Iraqis were just following the example of their betters.

I'm sure the tribes are happy to work with the US to tamp down foreign insurgents - it build their own power and consolidates their authority. But don't confuse that with a shared vision for the future or the establishment of a trustworthy ally.

The Iraqis can also the US playing a game of divide and conquer. But when push comes to shove, the US is just visiting. We have no true alignment of interests with any of the players. We have no history of trust to reassure our allies. They can see how we used and then discarded Saddam when it was convenient. (OK, he made it easy.)

Our best option for an ally is the Kurds. But they can never govern the entire country on their own. If they form a republic, it will destabilize Iran and Turkey - talk about fun!

The Shiite have no use for us, except to make their control over the entire country or the largest possible fraction far easier. I'm sure the Muqtada will thank us as we leave.

We could potentially choose up with the Sunnis. They proved to have the people, the ruthlessness and the managerial ability to keep the country together. If we do that, there are 2 options for how it unfolds.

First option is to have the tribes run the show, with their Sunni religious outlook underpinned by Saudi support. Welcome to Madrassaville.

Second option it to give it all back to the Baath, or their lightly rinsed and spun dry successors. They'll change their name to make it better, maybe to SLORC.

They're secular, they respect women's rights, and Baghdad used to be the center of islamic publishing. They have a few scores to settle, but they've proven they can run a tight ship. Saddam took his money and kept his mouth shut, nearly till the end. They'll appreciate the redoubts we've built for them in Sadr City too.

And being a minority, they will rely on US support. At least until they figure out their new helicopter gunships and uparmored Humvees. It's blue skies and painted schools from there on.

All of this is of course idiocy of the first order. But something has to, and will happen. We should be having deadly serious discussions about how to rescue the least worse options before there's nothing left. The only rational approach is damage control and strategic disengagement, because more of the same won't cut, and we can't bring the needed resources to bear, even if we wanted to.

I really hope there's progress being made in Anbar. I hope the government start to actually work and accomplish something (insert government here). But hope doesn't cut it.

We could be at the beginning of generations of civil war - there's enough to fight over, and enough folks wanting to finance it. I'm not sure that's in the best interests of the US, but it could be all there is.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Per Iraqi Resistance Movement, dated but interesting.
http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/iraq-resistance.pdf

Anyone have a more recent overview?

[Will]

Thanks fasteddie

http://www.iraqwarheroes.com/patriquin.htm

[anna missed]

Clifford,

This Guy has been following some of the AQ/resistance interactions.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

"the area around Fallujah, where the insurgency remains strong among the tribes there....The struggle among tribes for power in Ramadi – which threatens to undo much of the US success – can be seen being played out throughout the city."
Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0504/p06s01-woiq.html?page=1

On AQ generally, a new piece from Bruce Reidel in the Establishment's "Foreign Affairs":
"Summary: By rushing into Iraq instead of finishing off the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Washington has unwittingly helped its enemies: al Qaeda has more bases, more partners, and more followers today than it did on the eve of 9/11. Now the group is working to set up networks in the Middle East and Africa -- and may even try to lure the United States into a war with Iran. Washington must focus on attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions in which they thrive."

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86304-p40/bruce-riedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html

Not a few were making this point around town in the summer and fall of 2002 but Establishment extremists had other plans back then.

[Got A Watch]

"UK and US must admit defeat and leave Iraq, says British general"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2072171,00.html

" Julian Borger
Friday May 4, 2007
The Guardian

A retired British army general says Iraq's insurgents are justified in opposing the occupation, arguing that the US and its allies should "admit defeat" and leave Iraq before more soldiers are killed.

General Sir Michael Rose told the BBC's Newsnight programme: "It is the soldiers who have been telling me from the frontline that the war they have been fighting is a hopeless war, that they cannot possibly win it and the sooner we start talking politics and not military solutions, the sooner they will come home and their lives will be preserved."

Asked if that meant admitting defeat, the general replied: "Of course we have to admit defeat. The British admitted defeat in north America and the catastrophes that were predicted at the time never happened.

"The catastrophes that were predicted after Vietnam never happened. The same thing will occur after we leave Iraq."

General Rose is a former SAS commander and head of UN forces in Bosnia. Last year, he called for Tony Blair to be impeached for going to war on "false pretences". He has written a book, entitled Washington's War, which compares the Iraqi rebels to George Washington's irregular forces in the American war of independence.

When he was asked if he thought the Iraqi insurgents were right to try to force the US-led coalition out, he replied: "Yes I do. As Lord Chatham [the politician William Pitt, the Elder, who, in the second half of the 18th century called for a cessation of hostilities in the colonies and favoured American resistance to the British Stamp Act] said, 'if I was an American - as I am an Englishman - as long as one Englishman remained on American native soil, I would never, never, never lay down my arms'. The Iraqi insurgents feel exactly the same way. I don't excuse them for some of the terrible things they do, but I do understand why they are resisting the Americans."

It appears the Iraqi tribes have their own way of settling disputes. Let them get on with it. If there are no foreign troops in Iraq A-Q loses much of its reason to be there and most of whatever popular support it has had. An added bonus - no more troops will be killed or wounded fighting this pointless war.

I am certain the Iraqi's will make their own way to a future peace, after the civil war has exhausted militants on all sides.

[Duncan Kinder]

A good military thnker does think through the "down stream" effects of what is contemplated. The trick is to avoid being paralysed by fear of the possibilities once the "thinking through" has been done. What is the Harrison Ford quote? "Never tell me the odds!" what is meant by that is "Don't keep telling me the odds once I have decided that I am going to do something risky, in spite of the 2nd or 3rd order possibilities." "Who dares, wins." pl

Compare Hamlet with Othello.

What is the question in both plays: Has adultery been committed?

In Hamlet the answer is "yes," but Hamlet does not act.

In Othello the aswer is "no," but he does.

The result in both plays: dead bodies splattered all over the scene during the fifth act.

"Fortune favors the brave."

[fasteddiez]

Will, the other KIA was Megan (not Rachel) McClung, I did not spell correctly.
http://www.iraqwarheroes.com/mcclung.htm